These days, debate over whether “the war in Afghanistan is an ethnic war” has intensified. On social media, this debate is sometimes accompanied by strong emotions and sharp reactions, to the point that a political or military event is quickly attributed to a single ethnic group, and responsibility for the behavior of individuals or armed groups is generalized to all members of that ethnic group.
If we do not speak about this issue responsibly and rationally, such debates can go beyond a political or military dispute and fuel ethnic hatred and social enmity. Given Afghanistan’s fragile conditions, this process could lead to a catastrophe whose consequences would not be limited to one group, but would harm the entire society.
For this reason, in this piece I want to address the question of whether the war in Afghanistan is truly ethnic. If the answer to this question is not a simple yes or no, we must examine why the war is perceived as ethnic, what factors can push a conflict toward ethnicization, what the consequences of such a process are, and how it can be prevented.
Is the war in Afghanistan really ethnic?
If we consider all of Afghanistan’s wars to be merely wars among ethnic groups, we ignore a large part of reality.
Throughout history, Afghanistan’s wars have not had solely ethnic roots. Various other factors, such as competition for power, ideology, religion, foreign intervention, regional rivalries, economic interests, and the weakness of political institutions, have also played a role in shaping and prolonging them. The weight and significance of these factors have also not been the same across different conflicts.
Even about the Taliban, not everything can be reduced to ethnicity. Ethnicity has been significant in the social, political, and military composition of this group, but ideology, political structure, and the Taliban’s conception of governance and social order have also been effective in shaping and sustaining this conflict.
Therefore, the presence of an ethnic factor alone does not mean the war is ethnic. A war can occur in a multiethnic society, and ethnicity can play a role in it, without ethnicity itself being the central axis of the conflict.
A war takes on a more ethnic character when ethnic affiliation, rather than political position, ideology, or the conduct of individuals and groups, becomes the primary criterion for distinguishing “us” from “the enemy.”
From this perspective, the war in Afghanistan cannot be considered inherently and purely an ethnic war. But this answer does not mean ignoring the role of ethnicity either. At many junctures, ethnicity in Afghanistan has entered into competition over power and political organization, and this has caused part of society to interpret political conflicts through an ethnic lens.
So to understand this perception, we must look at the contexts that have caused power and conflict in Afghanistan to become linked with ethnic identity.
If the war is not purely ethnic, why is it perceived as such?
One of the main reasons for this perception is the historical relationship between political power and ethnic identities in Afghanistan.
When political power, resources, security, representation, and social opportunities become linked to ethnic affiliation, ethnicity no longer remains merely a cultural and social identity; it enters into people’s perception of power and the state.
In such a context, experiences of discrimination, exclusion, supremacism, or violence can create ethnic memory. Different generations may remember certain political events not merely as the conduct of a government or a group, but as the conduct of “one ethnic group against another.”
Amid this, ethnic hegemony is one of the important contexts behind this perception. By ethnic hegemony is meant a situation in which the identity or interests of one group attain such a dominant position within the power structure that part of society links it with the dominant or “natural” definition of the state, nation, or political power.
In Afghanistan’s political history, Pashtun-centered policies and the linking of ethnic identity with political power and the country’s national identity can be considered manifestations of ethnic hegemony, particularly in cases where elements of one ethnic group’s identity have attained a dominant position in the official and prevailing definition of the nation and state. This discussion is not about Pashtuns as an ethnic group; it is about structures and policies that excessively link one ethnic group’s identity with political power and the definition of national identity.
But a distinction must be drawn between ethnic hegemony and the responsibility of an ethnic group. The existence of an ethnicity-centered policy or power structure does not mean that all members of that ethnic group played a role in creating or maintaining it. Many ordinary people may themselves have been victims of that same structure, war, and deprivation.
Therefore, when we speak of ethnic hegemony, our subject is not an ethnic group as a whole; the subject is the relationship between ethnic identity, the structure of power, and society’s perception of the conflict.
These contexts explain why part of society may interpret a political dispute as an ethnic issue more quickly than an ordinary political dispute would be interpreted. But these contexts alone do not yet mean the conflict has become ethnicized. For a conflict to move toward ethnicization, other factors and behaviors must also come into play.
What pushes a conflict toward becoming an ethnic war?
A political dispute may initially be specifically about governance, power, ideology, or interests, but in the course of the conflict, the behavior of the parties involved can change its nature.
One of the most important factors is the political exploitation of ethnic sentiment. When a leader or political movement incites fear of another ethnic group in order to mobilize people, a political rival is no longer merely a political rival; he is presented as the representative of an ethnic group.
At the next stage, a political or military event may be attributed to an ethnic group rather than being examined based on its actual perpetrators and contexts. Following this, the conduct of a single commander is generalized to his entire ethnic group, the words of a politician are attributed to millions of people, and the crime of an armed group is also linked to the ethnic identity associated with that group.
Another factor is the formation or strengthening of armed forces along ethnic lines. When people feel that their security is guaranteed not by national institutions but by an ethnic group or an armed force affiliated with their own ethnicity, ethnicity can shift from a social identity into a security and military instrument.
Likewise, the use of historical memories, past wounds, and fear of a repeat of violence can play a role in the ethnicization of a conflict. If a political group can convince people that “if we do not hold power, another ethnic group will stand against us,” political competition turns into a matter of survival.
Under current conditions, social media can also accelerate this process considerably. An event may be turned into an ethnic narrative before its perpetrators and contexts become clear. Emotional reactions, insults, generalization of responsibility, and the language of revenge can also reinforce that same narrative.
In this way, the ethnicization of a conflict is usually not the result of a single factor; rather, it takes shape when several factors, such as ethnic mobilization, generalization of identity, arming along ethnic lines, use of historical memories, and reinforcement of ethnic narratives, are present simultaneously in a conflict. The more these factors combine, the greater the likelihood of a change like the conflict.
Of course, this process is not always the same, and not every conflict necessarily reaches this stage. But the more elements of this process accumulate in a crisis, the greater the risk of its ethnicization.
These factors are also not limited to one ethnic group. Any leader or political movement, from any ethnic background, can play a role in the ethnicization of a conflict if it uses ethnic sentiment to gain power, maintain its position, or secure its political interests.
If the war becomes ethnic, what consequences will it have for Afghanistan?
When a conflict reaches this stage, its first consequence is a change in how people view one another. Individuals are no longer judged solely based on their conduct and political position; their ethnic identity also enters into political judgment. As a result, individual and political responsibility can be replaced by collective responsibility.
Another consequence is the formation of mutual fear. Each group may view the other group’s rise to power not as political competition but as a threat to its own security and future. In such an atmosphere, people’s political decisions may also be influenced more by fear of the other side than by their actual political preferences.
This situation can also weaken trust between communities. When people feel that their ethnic identity affects how they are judged, the social distance between groups widens, and political cooperation becomes more difficult.
The ethnicization of war also makes the path to peace more difficult. In a political conflict, it is possible to negotiate over power, law, and policy; but when the parties to a conflict regard one another as ethnic enemies, reconciliation can be interpreted as “betrayal of one’s ethnic group.” As a result, even leaders who want an agreement may distance themselves from reconciliation out of fear of their own community’s reaction.
Most importantly, the consequences of such a war can persist even after the fighting ends. A generation that has experienced war as “our ethnic group versus theirs” may pass distrust and enmity on to the next generation. In that case, the end of the war does not necessarily mean the end of the conflict in society’s mind and memory.
As a result, the ethnicization of war does not merely increase violence; it can also alter the structure of social and political relations and turn a political dispute into lasting enmity between communities.
How can the ethnicization of the war be prevented?
If the ethnicization of war results from the entry of ethnic identity into political competition and its transformation into a tool of mobilization and enmity, preventing it must also be based on separating these two spheres. The goal is not to ignore ethnic differences, but to prevent these differences from becoming tools of exclusion, violence, and political monopoly.
First: we must separate political and criminal responsibility from ethnic identity. If an individual, commander, politician, or armed group commits a crime or discriminatory act, it is that individual or that responsible structure that must be held accountable, not the entire ethnic group to which they belong.
Second: the struggle against discrimination and the monopolization of power must not turn into enmity toward an ethnic group. It is possible to criticize a Pashtun-centered policy or structure without holding all Pashtuns responsible for it, just as it is possible to criticize the policy of a leader or group belonging to any other ethnic group without generalizing their conduct to all members of that group.
Third: the use of ethnicity for armed mobilization and the stoking of violence must be stopped. When political leaders incite people’s fear of another ethnic group to gain power, maintain their position, or secure a larger share of power, they turn a political dispute into an identity-based threat.
Fourth: the standard of accountability must be the same for everyone. If using ethnicity for power is wrong, this principle must not be applied only to one movement or one ethnic group. Political conduct must be judged based on the performance and responsibility of individuals and groups, not on the basis of their ethnic affiliation.
Fifth: political disputes must be resolved through political and institutional channels as far as possible. The less people trust national institutions, the more likely they are to rely on ethnic networks and armed groups for their security and the protection of their interests. Building fair and trustworthy institutions is therefore part of preventing the ethnicization of conflict.
And finally, our own language is also part of our responsibility. In a society facing distrust and historical wounds, a single irresponsible statement can erase the line between political criticism and ethnic enmity. Criticism should be directed at policy, conduct, and structure, not at an ethnic group as a whole.
But these measures relate more to preventing the ethnicization of the conflict under current conditions. To break this cycle in the future, we must examine what approach movements seeking to build a mutually accepting society founded on equal citizenship should adopt.
What approach should resistance groups take for the future?
If resistance groups and movements opposed to the Taliban truly want to fight for building a mutually accepting society founded on equal citizenship, one of the important tests they face is not turning the struggle against a military structure into enmity between ethnic groups.
Opposition to ethnic hegemony must not lead to the creation of another ethnic hegemony. If a movement, in confronting a monopoly on power, itself resorts to ethnic mobilization and the creation of a new monopoly, it in fact reproduces the very cycle it claims to oppose.
Therefore, these movements should not only answer the question of who should hold power; they must also answer the question of how power should be distributed and limited so that no single ethnic group can monopolize it.
Political and military movements must also make clear that their goal is not merely to secure a share of power for one group. If ethnicity once again becomes a tool for political bargaining, it may create the grounds for another conflict once the current phase of the war ends.
This standard, of course, does not apply only to resistance groups. Any political or military movement that wants to play a role in Afghanistan’s future must demonstrate that its program goes beyond ethnic self-interest and articulate what it proposes for building a shared political system.
The long-term approach must focus on building a system in which citizenship rights, law, and political participation replace ethnic affiliation in determining people’s standing. No citizen should have to stand behind an ethnic group or ethnic leader to access power, security, or their rights.
But for such an approach not to remain merely a temporary political arrangement, a deeper issue must also be addressed: national identity and a shared sense of belonging to the country.
Without the formation of an inclusive national identity, can the ethnicization of war be prevented in the long term?
The end of a war does not necessarily mean the end of ethnic distrust. If the roots of distrust and unequal belonging to the country are not resolved, a military conflict may end while the grounds for future crises remain.
If citizens feel that the state and the country belong to one group, and that their security and future can only be guaranteed through their own ethnic group, they are more likely to take refuge in ethnic identity in times of crisis. Conversely, if an individual can both preserve their ethnic identity and feel that the country and the political system belong to them as well, ethnicity does not necessarily become a tool of conflict.
National identity can play an important role here, but only when it is inclusive for everyone. National identity should not belong to one ethnic group, nor should ethnic identity be erased. A citizen should be able to preserve their ethnic and cultural identity while also feeling that the country, the state, and its political future belong to them to the same degree.
The problem begins when one ethnic group considers itself the exclusive owner of the country or of national identity, or when another ethnic group feels that in order to be accepted in their own country they must set aside their identity. Both situations can reinforce feelings of alienation and distrust.
This brings us to one of the most sensitive debates about national identity in Afghanistan: the debate over “Afghaniyat” (Afghan-ness). “Afghaniyat” cannot be imposed on everyone through a predetermined definition. If there is disagreement over national identity, the solution is not to eliminate one of the viewpoints, but to begin an open and inclusive dialogue in which all residents of Afghanistan can speak about the meaning of belonging, citizenship, and national identity.
The goal of such a dialogue is not to erase ethnic identities, but to turn national identity into a shared framework for coexistence, rather than a tool for monopolizing power or asserting the superiority of one ethnic group over another.
If such a framework takes shape, political disputes will be less likely to turn into ethnic disputes, because citizens will know that despite their ethnic differences, they can enjoy equal rights within a shared country.
From this perspective, preventing the ethnicization of war is not only a task for today; it requires building an order in which belonging to Afghanistan and citizenship rights do not depend on ethnic affiliation.
Closing remarks
What could serve the interests of the people of Afghanistan is that, instead of attributing the war to one ethnic group, we recognize the roots that push conflicts toward ethnicization and work to eliminate them.
Let us speak responsibly, take positions responsibly, and not allow the conduct of one individual, one leader, or one group to be attributed to an entire ethnic group. Instead of emphasizing ethnic superiority or monopoly, we must lay the groundwork for the formation of an inclusive national identity, one in which all the people of Afghanistan can see themselves.
If we succeed on this path, Afghanistan will be the winner, and those who benefit from division and enmity among the people of Afghanistan will be defeated. But if we once again allow ethnicity to become a tool of enmity and war, we will all be losers, and Afghanistan may once again be reduced to ruins.
The choice between these two paths is not merely a choice between narratives about the war; it is a choice between building Afghanistan and repeating its destruction.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis article here:
