Since the late 1950s, Afghanistan has witnessed the emergence of political circles operating outside the government’s purview. Various intellectual currents have surfaced in chronological order. The first Communist Party of Afghanistan was discreetly established in Kabul in January 1965 by a group of communist and pro-Soviet figures. Mohammad Dawood, the former Afghan chancellor who was ousted from power by the Royal family, orchestrated a coup against the King with direct support from communist military elements within the system. Following the coup’s success, several individuals affiliated with Khalqi and Parcham factions were appointed to key government positions. In response to the growing communist influence within the system and other social and academic institutions, numerous young Muslims also joined the movement.
Gholam Mohammad Niazi, a professor at Kabul University who had recently returned from Egypt and was influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood movement, collaborated with Burhanuddin Rabbani and Rasul Sayyaf to establish the Jamayat-E-Islami party of Afghanistan. In 1973, while Ahmad Shah Massoud was a student at Kabul Polytechnic University, he joined the youth wing of this party (Thomson, 2013).
In the early 20th century, a movement in Islamic countries sought to rouse the masses against political colonialism and Western cultural influences in Muslim societies. This movement’s foundation was laid a century ago by Sayyid Jamaluddin Afghani and Sheikh Mohammad Abdo Masri (Farhang, 2010). Later, a teacher named Hasan al-Banna further developed their ideas and founded the Muslim Brotherhood movement.
The Muslim Brotherhood movement provided an appropriate ideological and organizational model for the growth and development of Islamic movements across the Islamic world, from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Islamists in Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, the Persian Gulf, South Asia, and Southeast Asia have consistently acknowledged the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb (Esposito, Wall, 1996). Sayyid Qutb joined the Brotherhood movement in 1951 and became its ideological core. He was later imprisoned by the Egyptian government. During his time in prison and under torture, he wrote the book “Ma’alem Fi al-Tariq” based on his spiritual experiences and inner turmoil (Shahrour, 2014). Burhanuddin Rabbani, the former president of Afghanistan, translated this book into Farsi under the title “Signs of the Way” during the Jihad. In this book, Sayyid Qutb redefined the concepts of government, sovereignty, and community. He categorized the world’s governments into two groups: Islamic governments and Jahili governments. Therefore, according to him, all existing governments at the time were ignorant and did not govern based on divine legislation. Sayyid Qutb asserted that God was the true ruler, and God’s sovereignty equated to the exclusive right to legislate. Consequently, anyone claiming such a right was claiming divinity and committing blasphemy. Those who recognized this right in others and followed them were considered infidels (ibid). With this statement, Sayyid Qutb classified not only governments and societies but also the entire Ummah as being in the circle of disbelief and ignorance, necessitating their invitation and guidance. Sayyid Qutb’s ideology was intertwined with the Wahhabi Salafist belief of “Wala wa Bara” and was embraced by fundamentalists throughout the Islamic world.
The Russian invasion of Afghanistan bolstered the Jihadi groups, infusing them with increased momentum and dynamism. Akhwanism found fertile ground in Afghanistan and became ingrained within the ranks of the jihadist parties. Pashtun-oriented parties like Hezb-e-Islami, led by Hekmatyar, and Ittihad-e-Islami, led by Abdul Rab Rasool Sayyaf, exhibited a more radical and uncompromising stance in both the battlefield and politics when compared to the moderate, Tajik-oriented Jamayat-E-Islami party led by Burhanuddin Rabbani. Nevertheless, the establishment of an absolute Islamic system remained the central and shared goal of all jihadist parties. At the age of 28, Ahmad Shah Massoud embarked on his political journey, forsaking all else for this very cause, dedicating a significant portion of his life to it.
During his tenure as a student at the Polytechnic University, Masoud found himself amidst a burgeoning wave of Islamist movements and anti-communist nationalism in Kabul. In 1972, the prevailing political and intellectual climate stirred his interest in politics, prompting him to engage in debates with communist students who insulted Islamic beliefs. Following the failed coup against Dawood Khan, he sought refuge in Pakistan and later returned to Afghanistan in the wake of the Russian invasion. Over the course of ten years, he engaged in relentless combat against the Russian forces. Even after the Russians departed, he continued his struggle against the government they had backed, all with the aim of establishing an Islamic governance system. For Masoud, alongside political freedom and social justice, the establishment of an Islamic system represented the highest political ideal. He eloquently articulated his vision in his memoir: “I bear the weight of these challenges and assume the role of a leader because I am uniquely positioned to serve our nation’s common goals more effectively than any other Afghan leaders or Mujahideen. These goals are freedom and life under the banner of Islam” (Gal, 2021). In a later entry recorded at the end of 1988, he expressed, “Years before the revolution and my involvement in political activities, I resolved to dedicate my life to the pleasure of God and the service of Islam. In accordance with this commitment, I joined the Islamic movement, and I thank God for guiding me along this path for an extended period. I have no other duty than to work in the name of God and Islam, and I have no other objective than the primary one. Naturally, no one is immune to sin or lapses, and I may not have exerted myself as much as I should have, potentially committing sins, whether deliberate or inadvertent” (same).
While Massoud maintained his autonomy in military affairs, religious decrees (fatwas) issued by scholars or jihadi leaders held a significant place within the political system’s bureaucracy. In some instances, the term “Islamic” was affixed to institutions with dubious justification. For instance, in a note dating back to 1967, he wrote, “I have still arrived at the decision to take measures towards organizing a national ‘Islamic Army’ within Afghanistan” (Gal, 2021). Therefore, “Islam” remained the central tenet in the political discourse that Masoud championed for years, necessitating a redefinition of other political concepts and institutions in its orbit.
Masoud ventured into the arena of political campaigns during a period marked by intense ideological rivalry between left-wing and right-wing ideologies. He matured against the backdrop of the thriving Islamic Brotherhood, which exerted considerable influence in Islamic nations during that era. Unlike many other Jihadi leaders, Masoud’s horizons were not limited to this circle alone. He was an avid reader and thinker who delved into books with as much fervor as he engaged in warfare and politics. Habitually, he would seek solitude to study and scrutinize his past, present, and future, endeavoring to rectify the mistakes of his life.
In the 1970s, the emergence of the Taliban group and their propagation of an alternative Islamic narrative prompted Masoud to reflect on his own journey in the light of the Taliban’s ideology. Years of civil strife, corruption, and insecurity had left a significant question looming in the minds of the people: What was Masoud fighting for now? An inquiry that lacked a clear answer at that juncture. Consequently, he returned to Panjshir, preparing for a new phase of conflict and a “new narrative.”
Masoud introduced the concept of “moderate Islam” as a bridge towards democracy, directly challenging the religious narrative of the Taliban. In his speeches, he consistently emphasized democratic principles, elections, gender equality, human rights, and robust engagement with the global community. In a 1997 letter addressed to the British Foreign Office, he conveyed, “As long as peace remains elusive in Afghanistan, a stable central government remains unrealized, democracy fails to take root through free and fair elections, and foreign countries persist in their interventions in my homeland, this war will endure until a future government is established in accordance with the people’s will” (Gall, 2021).
Massoud unequivocally championed women’s participation in elections, a stance that contradicted the views of fundamentalists who cited the Holy Quran and Sahih hadith, asserting that “No people will succeed if they have a woman in charge of their affairs.” Massoud was acutely aware of this divergence. Among Afghanistan’s leaders, he became the first to endorse the Basic Declaration of the Rights of Afghan Women, a document drafted by Nasreen Groos and several other women’s rights advocates. Remarkably, this declaration later served as the foundation for Article 22 of the Constitution, safeguarding gender equality in Afghanistan (Bani Yaqoub, 2018). In response to a reporter’s query, he stated, “From a human perspective, there is no disparity between men and women. Both are human beings. In our view, there is no issue with women receiving an education, pursuing employment, or running for office.”
In the latter stages of his campaign, Massoud replaced the concept of a “democratic government” with that of an “Islamic government.” Notably, most of his public addresses and media interviews omitted any mention of establishing an Islamic government. Instead, he proffered a democratic framework as the solution to Afghanistan’s challenges. During discussions with foreign journalists in Dushanbe and Khawaja Bahauddin, he underscored the maturity of his political thinking. In August 2001, in one of his final conversations with a foreign journalist, he articulated his vision of an Afghanistan where every citizen, regardless of gender, could lead a content and peaceful life: “I firmly believe that this [ideal] can be achieved through democracy and an elected democratic government based on a consensus. This is the sole solution capable of resolving some of Afghanistan’s longstanding issues. The real solution lies in establishing a political and social environment and an administration where all tribes, ethnic groups, and the entirety of the Afghan populace are adequately represented” (Gall, 2021). Responding to inquiries about his vision for Afghanistan’s future, he stated, “The image I envision is one where Afghanistan remains an independent, unified, and free nation. The political system should be determined through the democratic will of the people, as expressed through their votes, shaping the future regime, with the people determining their own destiny. We support a free-market economy, which is not incompatible with Islam. Regarding the type of government we desire for Afghanistan, it is a democratic government.”
During his European tour, when asked about the presence of leftist and communist elements, he remarked, “It is of no consequence to us. Afghanistan belongs to all nations, including communists. What I require is skilled personnel. Whether someone is a communist or not does not matter.” (Bani Yaqoub, 2018) Massoud took bold measures to actualize his democratic vision, cognizant that his government would face international scrutiny in the presence of traditional and fundamentalist figures. To this end, he endeavored to establish a balance between jihadi figures and technocrats, exemplified by his interactions with Abdur Rahim Ghaforzai.
Massoud dedicated two decades of his life to the pursuit of freedom-centered ideals. Throughout a significant portion of this period, political Islam and the establishment of an Islamic government occupied the core of his endeavors. In his final years, his political ideology underwent a profound transformation, a synthesis of his theoretical studies and practical observations of global political and social developments. Undoubtedly, he stands as the most influential political figure in Afghanistan’s modern history. Consequently, comprehending and analyzing the evolution of his ideas concerning Afghanistan’s future holds paramount importance.
