In recent months, the Taliban regime has intensified its crackdown on dissenting clerics. These clerics have protested against the monopolization of power by the Kandahari faction of the Taliban and have called for the formation of an “inclusive government” a demand that has been repeatedly voiced over the past three and a half years but has been consistently ignored by the regime’s leadership in Kabul. The feasibility of expecting an inclusive government from the Taliban is not the focus of this discussion. However, the persistent calls for inclusivity, especially from within the Taliban’s ranks, highlight a deep-rooted and ongoing crisis that has not only persisted since the group’s return to power but has intensified. A significant and widening gap exists between the ideological framework of the Taliban’s religious doctrine and the realities on the ground in Afghanistan. The more the regime attempts to bridge this divide, its internal disagreements become apparent. These efforts continue to fail because only a faction within the Taliban fully grasps the existential threat posed by the ongoing crisis and seeks to resolve it before it spirals out of control. This faction, often referred to as the “moderate” or “pragmatic” Taliban, fears that if the current situation persists, the regime’s downfall will become inevitable. The dissenting clerics advocating for an inclusive government belong to this camp.
On the other hand, the “hardline” faction remains oblivious to the looming collapse, still reveling in their perceived victory over the “American occupiers.” As a result, the internal crisis is becoming increasingly visible, and the Taliban leadership’s attempts to downplay these divisions are proving futile. The very figures who once brazenly denied the existence of factional tensions, dismissing reports on the subject as “enemy” and “biased” media propaganda—are now pleading with Taliban officials to avoid publicizing their disagreements for the sake of preventing further instability. This is yet another indication of the deepening crisis within the Taliban regime: as long as tensions remain manageable, they deny their existence, but once the discord reaches a boiling point posing a threat to those with vested interests in maintaining the status quo—the same defenders of the regime resort to desperate pleas, warning that the survival of the Taliban government is at stake. However, when private grievances and internal criticisms are consistently ignored, dissenting Taliban officials find themselves left with no option but to make their concerns public. When the group’s “Amir al-Mu’minin” reaches such an extreme level of autocracy and unilateralism that he sees himself as God’s representative on Earth believing all his reactionary policies to be infallible—critics within the regime face two choices: either remain silent and enjoy the privileges of their positions or abandon their current status and openly challenge their leader, even if their objections fall on deaf ears.
If Mullah Hibatullah continues to ignore dissent within his ranks, tensions will inevitably escalate, potentially pushing the power struggle into a violent and lethal phase. Should that happen, Afghanistan will enter yet another cycle of crisis. This new phase could present both opportunities and challenges for the Taliban’s opposition forces. On the one hand, the more unstable the regime becomes due to internal conflicts, the greater the political maneuvering space for its adversaries—provided they possess the capacity and strategic acumen to capitalize on the situation. On the other hand, if the opposition remains weak, fragmented, and incompetent, these opportunities could quickly become insurmountable challenges, possibly leading to their complete political elimination. The exiled, corrupt warlords and non-warlord politicians, who spent the two decades of Western presence in Afghanistan perfecting the art of unbridled corruption, have already been sidelined from the political arena. They have become little more than parasitic and ineffectual relics. The only reason they are still occasionally discussed is the worsening internal crisis within the Taliban. In other words, these inept and discredited politicians continue to cling to relevance solely because the Taliban regime in Kabul lacks even the most basic political governance—far below the levels seen under Karzai or Ghani. If the current rulers had managed to establish even minimal internal and external legitimacy, the chapter on exiled political figures would have long been closed.
With the Taliban leader showing no interest in engaging with the world and the group’s internal power struggle growing fiercer by the day, there is a chance, however slim—that if the so-called “pragmatic” Taliban manage to defeat the hardliners, some of the exiled political figures might find an opening for a political comeback. But do the so-called moderates within the Taliban currently possess the strength and courage beyond rhetoric and hollow criticism to challenge Mullah Hibatullah? The answer is no. There are no credible signs suggesting they are capable of toppling their autocratic and self-righteous leader. As a result, the Taliban’s political opposition must remain patient, waiting for more favorable winds—enough to steer their shattered and sinking vessel toward the political shore. However, if the hardliners under Mullah Hibatullah, who already wield immense power and maintain control over the situation, achieve a decisive victory, it will mark the final nail in the coffin of Afghanistan’s exiled politicians. Over the past three and a half years, the hardliners have demonstrated in practice that they have no intention of sharing power with anyone outside their inner circle—let alone exiled politicians who have already lost all credibility. Yet, despite this, the exiled political figures will likely never abandon their wait-and-see approach. They will continue to pin their hopes on possible future developments perhaps another shift in the “international community’s” stance believing that fortune might once again smile upon them.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
تشدید جنگ قدرت در رژیم طالبانی؛ سیاستبازان مخالف در چه حالند؟ | روزنامه ۸صبح
