For over half a century, changing Afghanistan’s political structure has been a contentious issue among political parties and activists. The debate has revolved around transitioning from a centralized system to a decentralized or federal structure. In the past year, a group of Afghan leaders and political activists has formed a platform under the title of the Federalist Assembly of Afghanistan for the establishment of a federal political system in the country. This article evaluates the feasibility and limitations of federalism in addressing Afghanistan’s crises, considering the country’s unique patterns of socialization, prevailing cultural and social norms, and ground realities. Before delving into the compatibility of federalism with Afghan society, it is essential to briefly examine the nature of Afghanistan’s crisis to identify the structural solutions that could potentially address it.
Without relying on external research sources to justify the argument, it is evident that Afghanistan is a diverse country characterized by its multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-religious, and multi-lingual fabric. Four major ethnic groups Uzbeks, Hazaras, Tajiks, and Pashtuns constitute the demographic foundation of Afghanistan, alongside the Sunni Hanafi, Shia Jafari, and Shia Ismaili sects, and the dominant languages of Dari (Persian) and Pashto. Due to various historical and social factors, Afghanistan has not yet fostered a unified national identity. Consequently, the socialization process in the country is heavily influenced by these distinct ethnic, linguistic, and religious identities. Instead of nurturing citizens loyal to national interests, the existing socialization framework produces individuals primarily tied to ethnic, linguistic, and religious affiliations. This cycle has perpetuated another crisis: the crisis of national identity.
The term “Afghan” has long been used to define the national identity of the people of Afghanistan. However, because its political benefits have predominantly favored the Pashtun ethnic group, this political identity has failed to evolve into a civic identity that reflects the collective interests and vital concerns of all inhabitants of Afghanistan. Anthony D. Smith (1991) offers a framework for understanding national identity by distinguishing between ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism, each with unique characteristics that shape the formation of national identity within a society.
From this perspective, civic nationalism is founded on shared rights, mutual responsibilities, and loyalty to political and legal institutions that provide non-discriminatory services to all citizens. Rather than emphasizing ethnic, linguistic, or racial commonalities, civic nationalism underscores shared human principles and virtues, fostering peaceful coexistence and collective well-being. Smith argues that civic nationalism is rooted in trust and commitment to a country’s political institutions and constitution. Citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity, religion, or historical background, feel a sense of belonging to these institutions through active participation in political and social processes. Smith also refers to this form of nationalism as a social contract, uniting citizens around shared beliefs such as liberty, justice, equality, human rights, and universal virtues. In this definition, national identity is inclusive and open, where cultural and ethnic backgrounds do not serve as barriers or confer special privileges. Furthermore, Smith highlights that civic nationalism is reformable and adaptable, capable of aligning with political, cultural, and social changes.
In contrast to civic nationalism, ethnic nationalism emerges from shared ethnic, racial, linguistic, and cultural identities. Rather than binding individuals through a social contract, ethnic nationalism connects them based on inherited traits and historical commonalities. According to Anthony D. Smith, ethnic nationalism presents itself as a natural and historical reality, deeply rooted in shared ancestry, history, culture, and language. Under this framework, the bonds uniting a nation are more emotional, sentimental, and blood-based than contractual or rational. Additionally, ethnic nationalism is highly exclusive, offering privileges only to those who share racial, linguistic, or cultural ties with the dominant group in power. This type of nationalism often centers on ethnic mythology, focusing on ethnic identity as the core of national identity and defining the nation primarily through ethnic or racial characteristics. Smith identifies ethnic conflicts, exclusion, and discrimination as hallmarks of ethnic nationalism, noting that these elements pose significant challenges to building cohesive national identities. In multicultural societies, ethnic nationalism carries the potential to incite conflict and instability, undermining efforts toward unity and integration.
Considering these two definitions of nationalism, the official national identity in Afghanistan, supported and narrated by the political system, has emerged from the framework of ethnic nationalism. Even to this day, the political system continues its efforts to impose this identity on a multi-ethnic, multicultural, and multilingual society. From this perspective, the ongoing crisis in Afghanistan, which has deprived its people of the possibility of unity and the opportunity to build a prosperous and thriving country, can be defined as a crisis of national identity.
Korstelina (2007) examines the relationship between identity crises and social conflicts, offering a theoretical framework for analyzing this connection. According to her, an identity crisis occurs when individuals or social groups feel that their identity is under threat or being challenged. In such cases, members of these groups are likely to engage in conflict as a form of defense. Thus, identity crises can play a pivotal role in igniting social conflicts. Korstelina argues that the threat to identity fosters distrust, which ultimately creates distinct boundaries between “us” and “them,” further polarizing social interactions. She categorizes the identity crisis into four stages: comparison, competition, confrontation, and Counteraction. She asserts that the insecurity stemming from an identity crisis generates a cycle of aggressive actions and reciprocal responses, escalating tensions and conflicts.
David Stroh (2015) also attributes identity crises to cultural and ethnic differences, describing them as cycles of violence that intensify and prolong social conflicts. Stroh emphasizes the need for systemic approaches and a deep understanding of the historical and social relationships between ethnic groups to overcome these challenges. Stroh argues that the issues stemming from identity crises are not merely the result of group behavior but are rooted in systemic factors that shape human behavioral patterns. These systems encompass social, cultural, economic, and political elements, which interact to produce and sustain conflicts driven by identity crises.
As Smith’s definition of ethnic nationalism and the identity it generates aligns with the situation in Afghanistan, the perspectives of Korstelina and Stroh can also effectively explain and elucidate the national identity crisis in Afghanistan. In my view, the system that Stroh refers to as the cause of the identity crisis can be interpreted as the political system or structure. In other words, the current political system in Afghanistan, due to its disproportionate approach to the diverse realities of Afghanistan, has caused confusion and the failure to form a collective identity, leading to a national identity crisis in the country.
In this context, the Federalist Assemblies see the federal system as a structure that aligns with Afghanistan’s diverse realities. According to them, implementing this system could potentially mitigate the crisis of collective identity and guide Afghanistan toward stability, prosperity, and peace. However, the aim of this article is not to evaluate the advantages or shortcomings of the federal system, nor to analyze how well it matches the needs of societies grappling with the identity crisis described. Rather, the focus is on the reality that, despite its democratic and flexible nature, the implementation of a federal system in Afghanistan will not be able to resolve the crisis of collective identity and bring an end to the ongoing national identity confusion in the country.
To support this argument, it is useful to refer to surrounding realities. Aside from Pakistan, where the federal system has failed to manage ethnic tensions and foster economic development, the fate and outcomes of federalism in the African country of Ethiopia could serve as a clear mirror for assessing the hypothetical implementation of the federal system in Afghanistan.
Despite differences in geography and history, Afghanistan and Ethiopia share significant similarities in social, political, and cultural aspects. These similarities, particularly in managing ethnic diversity, state-building challenges, issues stemming from internal conflicts, and foreign interventions, have placed both countries on a similar path.
Ethiopia is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in Africa, having experienced a centralized system for many years. Over eighty ethnic groups, each with its language, culture, and identity, live in the country and have suffered from a national identity crisis. Ethnic groups such as the Amhara, Oromo, Tigray, Somali, and Sidama have struggled for recognition of their identities for many years. Eventually, after considerable struggles, to manage this crisis, an ethnic federalism system was incorporated into the 1995 Constitution, recognizing federal autonomy for all ethnic groups in the country, with its implementation guaranteed.
The implementation of federalism in this country was intended to respect identity diversity, preserve national unity, and manage ethnic and identity tensions. Historically, Ethiopia was largely ruled by empires and the elites of the Amhara ethnic group, while other ethnic groups, particularly the Oromos and Tigrayans, were marginalized. The historical centralization in the country led to numerous rebellions and conflicts, the most intense of which occurred during the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam from 1974 to 1991. After the fall of Mariam’s military government in 1991, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), led by Meles Zenawi, took power and initiated a new approach. This coalition, composed of several ethnic groups, emphasized ethnic rights and autonomy, drafting a new constitution that recognized ethnic federalism as the core form of government.
In the new constitution, Ethiopia was divided into nine ethnic states, later expanded to eleven, each with the right to self-autonomy. However, the implementation of the federal system, rather than alleviating or managing conflicts, escalated ethnic tensions and increased separatist tendencies. The very federalism designed to preserve national unity, decentralize power, manage ethnic tensions, and recognize a diverse identity, not only failed to realize these aspirations but, in various forms and dimensions, exacerbated ethnic divides, local and national conflicts, greater dependency on the ruling party, migration, territorial disputes, and separatism.
Ultimately, the definition of federalism in Ethiopia failed to achieve its goals of unity, justice, peace, and providing comfort for the people, and it could not extricate the country from years of tension and turmoil. The inefficiency and failure of federalism in Ethiopia can be attributed to multiple reasons, including the strengthening of ethnic identity at the expense of national identity, centralization of power in the hands of the central government, the highlighting of ethnic divides between minorities and majorities, the lack of strong democratic institutions, inefficient crisis management, competition over resources, the absence of national cohesion, economic challenges, and inequality. These have been considered prominent reasons for this failure (Abbink, 2006).
As previously mentioned, due to the significant similarities between Ethiopia and Afghanistan, the failure of federalism in Ethiopia can also be cited as a reason for the inefficiency of federalism in Afghanistan. According to Vaughan (2003), the ethnic diversity and the prominent role of ethnicity in politics, the unsuccessful management of ethnic diversity, a long history of internal conflicts, the decisive role of religion and sectarianism in politics and society, weaknesses in state-building, lack of strong institutions, foreign interventions, dependency on international aid, economic problems, underdevelopment, and the national identity crisis are considered the most prominent features of Ethiopia. These same characteristics are also present in Afghanistan (Ahmed Rashid, 2010). Even though Ethiopia is located on another continent, when the identity crisis in this country is compared to that of Afghanistan, the two countries, despite their geographical distance, have followed a similar path.
Therefore, given the similarities between Ethiopia and Afghanistan, the proposal for federalism in Afghanistan is unlikely to fare any better than the proposal for federalism in Ethiopia. This is because the effectiveness of federalism depends on a series of prerequisites that were neither present in Ethiopia nor Afghanistan.
Federalism, despite the legal guarantees it contains for development, cannot, by itself, pave the way for a country embroiled in identity crises and ethnic conflict toward stability, peace, and prosperity. The success of federalism depends on a combination of social, economic, and cultural factors, which have been carefully managed in countries like Germany, Switzerland, Canada, and the United States, ultimately contributing to the success of their federal systems. However, in cases like Ethiopia, Nigeria, and even Pakistan, the failure to consider these factors has resulted in the failure or inefficiency of federalism. For instance, the establishment of a federal system in Pakistan has yet to ease the country’s devastating poverty, and heavy debt, or resolve the issues faced by the Pashtuns and Baloch.
Thus, assessing the inefficiency of federalism in Afghanistan points to several factors tied to the country’s social, cultural, political, and historical structures. Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic makeup, geographic dispersion, and history filled with bloody conflicts make the success of federalism nearly impossible. The following factors contribute to this inefficiency: ethnic fragmentation, social inequality, including ethnic, religious, and linguistic conflicts; historical distrust; Pashtun concerns about fragmentation; the lack of strong political institutions, including weak infrastructure and the influence of political and ethnic groups on the judiciary; underdeveloped participatory political culture and lack of willingness to cooperate; fears of empowering local leaders’ ambitions; the promotion of corruption and unchecked autonomy; lack of Indigenous models; underdevelopment; limited access to financial resources; the bitter experience of internal wars; the absence of a comprehensive national identity; the lack of national cohesion; foreign interventions; and the radicalization of religion and sectarianism. These formidable challenges render the success of federalism in Afghanistan highly unlikely.
In this scenario, even if a federal system were to be established in Afghanistan, the inherent challenges and obstacles previously outlined would still prevent it from effectively replacing ethnic nationalism with civic nationalism, which is seen as the solution to the identity crisis in the country. Furthermore, the implementation of federalism itself would become a contentious system that David Stroh (2015) argues would contribute to the production and perpetuation of conflicts related to identity crises. Ultimately, the establishment of federalism in Afghanistan would not create the conditions or institutions needed to foster socialization based on shared virtues that could unite all citizens. National cohesion, emotional bonds, and a sense of collective identity would not be nurtured effectively under such a system. Therefore, federalism in Afghanistan would not be the solution to the national identity crisis or the people’s enduring challenges. Rather, it would initiate a new phase of ethnic conflicts and costly disruptions. Addressing the core issues in Afghanistan requires political management that can transform the socialization processes into non-ethnic, virtue-based frameworks that promote shared human values and emotions. Moreover, it requires a shift from ethnic nationalism to civic nationalism. Federalism, however, cannot catalyze such a transformation. If Afghanistan’s federal proponents carefully consider the experience of federalism’s inefficacy in Ethiopia paying particular attention to the similarities between the two countries and the challenges faced in Ethiopia, they will likely explore alternative approaches to resolve the national identity crisis in Afghanistan more effectively.
References:
- Abbink, J. (2006). Ethnicity and Conflict Generation in Ethiopia. Journal of Contemporary African Studies.
- Korostelina, E.A. (200). Social Identity and Conflict: Structures, Dynamics, and Implications. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Rashid, A. (2010). Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. Yale University Press.
- Smith, A. D. (1991). National Identity. Reno: University of Nevada Press.
- Stroh, D. P. (2015). System Thinking for Social Change: A Practical Guide to Solving Complex Problems, Avoiding Unintended Consequences, and Achieving Lasting Results. White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing.
- Vaughan, S. (2003). Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia. University of Edinburgh.
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