Afghanistan is among the countries where access to political power has consistently been accompanied by the use of various intellectual, social, and identity-based instruments. Among these, ideology has been one of the most effective tools, playing a decisive role over the past century in mobilizing groups, legitimizing authority, and organizing political competition. In Afghanistan, ideology has functioned not merely as a system of beliefs and values, but more often as a political instrument used to justify rule, forge temporary alliances, and eliminate political rivals.
In Afghanistan’s political experience, ideologies have rarely emerged from deep, organic intellectual and social transformations. Instead, they have largely taken shape in reaction to regional and global developments and in connection with the interests of external powers, and have been employed instrumentally. Within this framework, several prominent examples can be highlighted:
First: Communism
Communism as an ideology existed before the October Revolution of 1917, with its intellectual roots tracing back to the works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in the nineteenth century. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia was not the origin of communism, but rather the first successful experience of state-building based on this ideology. The revolution was led by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, who later founded the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
In Afghanistan, before the 1960s, the monarchical structure of power and the absence of an open political environment severely limited the possibility of party activity. With the adoption of the 1964 Constitution during the reign of King Mohammad Zahir Shah, a relative space for political and intellectual activity emerged. It was within this context that the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was formed. Divided into the two factions of Khalq and Parcham, the party sought to adapt communist ideology to Afghanistan’s local conditions.
Following Mohammad Daoud Khan’s 1973 coup and the proclamation of the republic, segments of the PDPA leadership initially cooperated with him; however, this alignment proved short-lived. Ultimately, relying on communist ideology and with direct support from the Soviet Union, the PDPA seized power in the April 1978 coup. Here too, ideology served less as a reflection of social demands and more as a means to capture political power.
Second: Islamic Jihad
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 paved the way for the emergence and expansion of the ideology of Islamic jihad. Although the roots of Islamist movements’ activities can be traced back to the 1970s and their opposition to Mohammad Daoud Khan’s government, the war against the Soviet Union transformed these movements into the dominant politico-military force.
Jihadist groups, under the banner of defending religion and national independence, succeeded in mobilizing large numbers of young people. In reality, however, these groups were extensively supported by the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and several other countries as proxy forces in the Cold War. After the collapse of Dr. Najibullah’s government in 1992, the mujahideen came to power and established the “Islamic State of Afghanistan.” Nevertheless, internal power struggles plunged the country into the devastating civil wars of the 1990s, demonstrating that the ideology of jihad, too, functioned more as an instrument of power than as a foundation for sustainable state-building.
Third: The Taliban
The Taliban emerged amid the chaos generated by the mujahideen’s civil wars. Although their initial slogan focused on ending instability and corruption, it soon became evident that the group espoused a rigid and extremist interpretation of Islam. Direct support from Pakistan, particularly at a time when the Cold War had ended, and the mujahideen had lost much of their strategic utility for Islamabad, played a decisive role in the Taliban’s rise to power.
By instrumentalizing religious ideology, the Taliban seized power in 1996 and established the so-called “Islamic Emirate.” In this experience as well, ideology was employed not as a means to ensure justice and order, but as a tool for eliminating rivals and consolidating domination.
Fourth: Democracy
Following the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001, democracy and modern Western values were introduced as the dominant ideology of Afghanistan’s new political order. However, a significant portion of the political elite who played key roles in this system were the same jihadist leaders who had previously opposed democracy and liberal values. They embraced democracy not as a normative principle, but merely as a mechanism for accessing and retaining power.
The absence of genuine commitment to democratic values was one of the primary factors undermining Afghanistan’s democratic institutions. As a result, this ideology, like those before it, was reduced to a political instrument and failed to lay the foundations of a sustainable system.
Fifth: Ethnicity and Language
Alongside formal ideologies, ethnicity and language have repeatedly been used in Afghanistan as tools for political mobilization. Electoral processes, which could have served as platforms for institutionalizing democracy, were in many cases reduced to ethnic competitions. Voting based on ethnic identity replaced program-based politics and national interests, further polarizing the political landscape.
Conclusion
Afghanistan’s political experience demonstrates that ideologies, whether religious, leftist, or democratic, have often functioned not as intellectual and social projects but as temporary instruments for gaining power. As long as public awareness of national interests, the concept of unity, and the role of citizenship are not strengthened, the instrumental use of ideology will persist, and society will remain trapped in a cycle
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
