Sami Sadat, a former general of Afghanistan’s previous government and leader of a movement called the “Afghanistan United Front (AUF),” has recently held a brief conference in a U.S. city, where he announced his support for Donald Trump, the Republican candidate. Present at this conference were a former Trump advisor on foreign policy and a Republican member of the House of Representatives. Sadat, who reportedly studied in the U.S., enjoys the trust of both American civil and military officials. His quick access to sensitive government roles in the previous administration was likely due to his connections with Americans. As the former Afghan Republic was gasping its last breaths, he was appointed as the head of Kabul’s security, tasked with turning the city into an impenetrable fortress. However, like others, he chose to flee and is now residing in a U.S. city.
Sadat’s support for Trump may not be significant to many, but it is meaningful. He has also established a political front that opposes the Taliban. From time to time, he holds meetings with U.S. politicians, particularly members of Congress. More notably, he is a recognized general of the former government, who might find it shameful to remain silent about his country’s current situation. His support for Trump is driven by the hope that Trump’s return to the White House could lead to the Taliban regime’s overthrow. Though he hasn’t explicitly stated this, it’s clear to others what he wishes. To Sadat, Trump’s opponent, Kamala Harris (the Democratic nominee), appears weak and incapable of meeting his and his movement’s expectations. Sadat explained his support for Trump by saying, “Biden caused the Afghan catastrophe, and Trump will bring peace and stability.” He also called Trump decisive and claimed that no country takes Biden or Harris seriously. Meanwhile, most of America’s key allies around the world are hoping for Harris’s victory and Trump’s defeat. This highlights how limited the understanding of Afghan politicians is regarding U.S. foreign policy—even those living in the U.S.
In a previous article about Trump’s potential return, his approach toward the Taliban was briefly examined. However, given Sadat’s recent actions and how they’ve revived discussions on him and the Taliban, it’s worth delving deeper into the matter from different perspectives:
1) Let’s not forget that it was Trump, not Biden, who signed the Doha Agreement; however, he was fortunate not to have the disastrous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan as part of his legacy. If he had been in power, he would likely have done what Biden did: withdraw. The consequences of the withdrawal are evident: the collapse of the Afghan Republic and the return of the Emirate. Most experts, media, and international research bodies consider the Doha Agreement as the primary cause of the Republic’s fall. Therefore, one should not place much hope on the rhetoric of the person who signed that agreement.
Trump didn’t just sign the pact—he instructed his Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, to meet with Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the current Taliban Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs. Trump himself even held a video call with this Taliban official, an event he still proudly mentions in his speeches years later. He went as far as nearly inviting the Taliban to Camp David, a location that has hosted some of the world’s most famous leaders. Why didn’t this meeting happen? According to various writings, John Bolton, Trump’s National Security Advisor, intervened. Bolton has remained a staunch Taliban critic since then, and his statements over the past few years reveal his firm opposition to the group.
During the electoral debate between Harris and Trump, Harris harshly mocked Trump for inviting the Taliban to Camp David. Unlike Trump, Biden, for better or worse, has refrained from sacrificing his senior officials’ credibility through staged meetings with the Taliban. So far, only Rina Amiri and Tom West from the Biden administration have openly met with Taliban officials. While secret intelligence meetings may have occurred, they have largely escaped media attention.
2) Trump’s softened view of the Taliban remain unaltered, largely due to the continuous efforts of Taliban lobbyists. H.R. McMaster, Trump’s former National Security Advisor, vividly described Trump’s attitude toward the Taliban in his memoir. McMaster, a staunch opponent of U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, stood in direct opposition to Trump on this matter. He recalled that Trump repeatedly emphasized withdrawing from Afghanistan, citing, “The Taliban are resilient fighters whose victory is inevitable.” According to McMaster, Trump had heard this from a friend and took it seriously, leading to McMaster’s eventual dismissal and the signing of the Doha Agreement that handed over everything to the Taliban. Altering Trump’s deeply ingrained perception of the Taliban would require significant and persistent effort, something that Sadat and his allies seem unable to achieve. Even as recently as August, Trump referred to the Taliban as “good fighters” in an interview, further evidence of his unchanged view.
3) The Taliban face two major issues in America’s eyes: human rights and terrorism, specifically concerning al-Qaeda. Interestingly, Trump seems to dismiss these two challenges. The concept of an inclusive government doesn’t matter to either American faction. Trump’s four-year leadership revealed that he has no devotion to democracy or human rights, nor is he willing to invest in propagating Western values. He has openly criticized the billions spent by previous American administrations on promoting democracy in Afghanistan, calling it a “foolish” endeavor. As such, he feels more at ease with rulers whom Democrats label as dictators. During the electoral debate with Trump, Harris noted her opponent’s comfort with dictatorships. Recently, John Kelly, Trump’s former Chief of Staff, claimed that Trump once said he preferred generals who were as “serious as Adolf Hitler, the former Nazi leader.” Harris also echoed this claim in one of her campaign speeches.
Over the past three years, Trump hasn’t said a word about human rights violations in Afghanistan. His criticisms have focused solely on wasted U.S. arms and alleged Chinese activity at Bagram Airfield, for which he has yet to provide evidence. He raises these issues solely as a tactic against his rival party. In contrast, Democrats, albeit selectively, occasionally call the Taliban out on their actions. Thus, if Trump returns, even these minimal efforts for human rights could disappear. For Trump, issues like democracy and human rights fall under domestic affairs, making U.S. intervention unjustified, which aligns with the preferences of America’s rivals (China, Iran, and Russia). The withdrawal from Afghanistan fits Trump’s doctrine well, allowing him to avoid the fallout.
4) A Trump administration would be highly personalized, with him ignoring established structures and molding them to his preferences. This is why Democrats see his victory as a threat to American democracy. Trump doesn’t care about pleasing any particular group or nation; he rides the wave of power however he likes, trusting few people and rarely accepting advice unless he feels inclined. During his four years in office, four National Security Advisors rotated through the position. The notion that America is the beacon of democracy, which other countries should emulate, doesn’t appeal to Trump. Consequently, he would approach the Taliban as he sees fit, without measuring them against standards like democracy or human rights.
5) The most minimal action Trump might take is to cut off financial support to the Taliban. The use of “might” here is intentional because, to date, he has not criticized the Biden administration for sending funds to the Taliban, which raises questions. Meanwhile, he has used aid to Ukraine and other countries as a key issue against Biden. His deputy, J.D. Vance, criticized a single instance of U.S. funds going to the Taliban, calling it “insane.” Trump’s reluctance to fund Taiwan, South Korea, and Ukraine makes it unlikely he would support the Taliban financially—unless the Doha Agreement compels it, which is another matter.
Conclusion
At first, Trump will likely adopt a stance of neutrality toward the Taliban, essentially disregarding the current situation in Afghanistan. If forced to engage, his most straightforward and effective option would be to approach the Taliban for negotiation. It seems unlikely that he would engage with the anti-Taliban forces; after all, when the Democrats didn’t take that route, neither would Trump. The option of applying pressure would only come into play if the situation in Afghanistan were assessed as a serious threat to U.S. interests.
Since Trump is unconcerned with human rights issues, he could potentially align with China, Russia, and Iran on the Afghanistan matter. This could foster a kind of consensus among major global and regional powers—a consensus that might lead to the recognition of the Taliban regime or pressure the group to establish an inclusive government.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
