The recent social-media message posted by former president Mohammad Ashraf Ghani has generated wide attention largely because its content was more meaningful and distinct from his previous statements. His flight from Afghanistan has also meant that any comment he makes, even personal or apolitical, circulates for days or weeks online. Now that Ghani has issued a serious and unusual message amid old and new crises, the question arises: Is he positioning himself for a return to power, or is he, by invoking terms and phrases adorned with the label “national,” seeking to confer legitimacy on the Taliban regime?
The notion that Ghani is pursuing a deal with the Taliban to return to Afghanistan does not align well with current realities. Neither does Ghani appear willing to pay such a price, nor are the Taliban yearning for his comeback. Those who believe in this scenario argue that Ghani aims to formally hand over power to the Taliban and thereby legitimize them. The truth, however, is that the Taliban need no such “extra rituals,” nor does the international community. Even now, most influential countries involved in the Afghan conflict are engaging with the Taliban in ways that are not far from interactions with a recognized, legitimate government. More importantly, the Taliban do not wish to derive their desired legitimacy from Ghani or become indebted to him. They have repeatedly insisted that they captured the presidential palace not through secret deals with foreign or domestic actors, but through what they call “jihad.” For that reason, they do not want this celebrated victory questioned through an unnecessary arrangement with Ghani. When he held power, the Taliban did not take him seriously; now, in exile, why would they look to him for favor?
Moreover, Ghani’s credibility was severely damaged by his flight from Afghanistan, and he is unlikely to deepen that notoriety by formally handing over power to the Taliban. Had he intended such a gesture, he would not have fled; on 15 August 2021, he could have held a power-transfer ceremony inside the Arg, with a ready-made excuse: the lack of an opportunity to leave the country and fear of being killed. Beyond that, an official power transfer by Ghani would not necessarily bestow legitimacy, and the Taliban regime remains obligated to meet the expectations of both the Afghan people and the international community.
Against this backdrop, and given the tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban, the group’s gradual tilt toward India, and the speculation about a potential U.S. return to the Bagram air base, a different scenario seems more plausible: Islamabad may be preparing to increase pressure on the Taliban by leveraging former leaders of the republic, particularly Ghani. It should not be forgotten that during his time in office, Ghani maintained a favorable posture toward Pakistan and was deeply suspicious of developments in Qatar. He sought to disrupt the “Doha process” by drawing on Islamabad’s influence, though he ultimately failed. Mohammad Omar Daudzai, his special envoy to Pakistan, writes in his memoirs that Pakistani officials preferred Ghani over Hamid Karzai, largely because Karzai was educated in India and therefore not fully trusted in Islamabad. In addition, Ghani’s fraught memory of Zalmay Khalilzad, someone aligned with the Taliban and opposed to Pakistan, could make him even more useful to Islamabad. Unlike Karzai, Ghani does not indulge in the same expansive romantic nationalism that risks provoking Pakistan with extraterritorial claims. Most recently, New Lines, a U.S.-based publication, released a detailed report suggesting that Islamabad has intensified efforts to mobilize anti-Taliban assets, and Ghani could fit neatly into this framework. The magazine describes Pakistan’s objective as an attempt to engineer “regime change,” a claim that, even if accurate, would face formidable obstacles on the path to realization.
If Pakistan is indeed seeking regime change, Ghani is the most convenient and readily available option. Islamabad’s preference has always been to leverage Pashtun figures against the Taliban, rather than leaders from other ethnic groups. Therefore, dismissing Ghani and others who have lived or studied in the West as “spent forces” is an emotional reaction that does not align with Afghanistan’s past or present realities. Ghani’s popularity among Pashtuns has not significantly diminished, and those who insult him on social media are largely non-Pashtuns. The majority of Pashtun users still speak of him favorably. This, however, underscores the persistent strength of ethnic politics in the country.
Ghani’s words also resonate among Taliban opponents, though few are willing to openly stand beside him. The reason is clear: his refusal to fight the Taliban and his departure from Afghanistan. Alternatively, it may be that Ghani has not yet formally re-entered the political arena or presented a clear plan; otherwise, many Taliban opponents would likely overlook his record. For example, Amrullah Saleh, Ghani’s former first vice president often seen as an uncompromising figure against the Taliban, continues to place the blame squarely on the United States and does not question Ghani’s resolve in the fight against the Taliban. Likewise, the Taliban’s other opponents, by emphasizing the provisions of the Doha Agreement, may unintentionally be shifting responsibility away from Ghani, if not outright absolving him. Some even argue that Ghani, by fleeing Afghanistan and refusing to formally transfer power, pushed the Taliban into a legitimacy crisis.
In sum, Ghani’s recent message signals his re-entry into Afghan politics not as someone prepared to hand power to the Taliban, but more likely as a political figure seeking to rally the group’s opponents around himself. It is more probable that he will become a useful and functional instrument in the evolving Afghan landscape, particularly within the context of tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban. If, in the coming months, Ghani enters into dialogue with Taliban opponents, especially remnants of the former republic and works toward building what he calls a “national consensus,” the true nature of his mission will become much clearer.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
