Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Taliban’s Foreign Minister, recently held a telephone conversation with Asaad Hassan al-Shaybani, the Foreign Minister of Syria, congratulating the victory of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and expressing a desire for representatives from both sides to meet and establish prompt diplomatic relations between Kabul and Damascus. Surprisingly, Muttaqi praised the new Syrian government for implementing “general amnesty,” something the Taliban regime itself has not adhered to. When Bashar al-Assad, the previous ruler of Syria, fled, Taliban supporters in some provinces celebrated in the streets, distributing sweets and flowers to passersby, welcoming the rise to power of Ahmad Al-Sharaa, the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). However, Al-Sharaa has indicated that his government does not align with the Taliban’s Emirate model in Afghanistan.
At first glance, Muttaqi’s contact with the Syrian side appears to be a standard diplomatic move, yet it could carry specific implications and meanings, as outlined below:
First
It is a reality that both the Taliban and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) share common ideological roots, although the latter has seemingly rebranded itself and is trying to distance itself from its infamous past. Nonetheless, its rise to power boosts the Taliban’s morale. Perhaps the Taliban’s greatest aspiration is to see a Sunni Islamist state established somewhere in the world, especially one that claims to have endured nearly half a century of oppression from the minority Shia population. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)’s historical alliance with al-Qaeda also shapes its relationship with the Taliban. According to reportedly credible sources, the Taliban’s alliance with al-Qaeda has not yet fractured. Therefore, the two Sunni Islamist groups can be mutually beneficial in certain areas.
Currently, the Taliban are preoccupied with gaining international recognition. No country has yet taken the lead in this regard, for reasons that remain to be discussed. The victory of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has ignited hope within the Taliban, suggesting that establishing relations with this government might open the door to recognizing their regime. The Taliban have high expectations of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), seeing it as a Sunni Islamist movement that, in their understanding, lacks precise awareness of Afghanistan’s socio-political structure, and therefore will not emphasize inclusivity of other groups in power. They also believe that their imposition of “Sharia” on citizens, even if not welcomed by HTS, will face less resistance or indifference compared to some Western countries.
Even if the current Syrian government does not recognize the Taliban regime, the Taliban will still strive to align Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s stance with that of Qatar, the UAE, Türkiye, Oman, and others regarding their administration. This means that, even if their expectations are not fully met, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) would neither criticize nor remain indifferent. All this assumes that the current Syrian government is stabilizing and has gained international recognition.
Second
It is unlikely that Muttaqi’s contact lacked Qatar’s influence. So far, it has become evident that Qatar, after Türkiye, is the second country most pleased with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)’s rise to power in Syria, given its longstanding support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Currently, these two countries are particularly jubilant. Saudi Arabia and Jordan are monitoring the situation with concern, while Egypt and the UAE are visibly worried due to their strong aversion to the Muslim Brotherhood. Qatar aims to rally governments and groups under its influence to support the new order in Syria. Qatar seeks to secure international legitimacy for the new Damascus government, and for this, gaining the approval of the Islamic and Arab world is a primary and essential condition. It is evident that the Taliban, in many cases, act under Qatar’s influence. This point is so apparent that it requires no further evidence. Even the possibility of efforts by the United States and Türkiye to align the current rulers of Kabul and Damascus cannot be ruled out, as discussed in the next section.
Third
A closer relationship between the Taliban and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) will increase the Islamic Republic of Iran’s concerns. It is clear that Iran perceives itself as one of the losers in the developments in Syria, although its opponents label it as the “main loser.” Since Ahmad Al-Sharaa assumed power, he has consistently criticized Iran, blaming it for all the chaos in Syria. He has even accused Tehran of “sectarianism.” Consequently, the Taliban’s eagerness to establish ties with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is unwelcome in Tehran. This will make the Islamic Republic suspicious of the Taliban and more cautious about its group dealings. However, it will not openly display hostility. It is evident that for Iran, working with a Taliban that is a natural ally is far easier than working with a Taliban allied with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), while still being forced to engage with them.
Taliban could also serve Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)’s interests, particularly if Damascus and Tehran come into conflict and mutual engagement becomes impossible. In such a case, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) will likely use the Taliban and groups like Jaish ul-Adl as pressure tools against Tehran. This strategy might emerge among the new rulers in Damascus, though their success or failure is a separate matter. If this happens, the current Syrian government will be compelled to meet the Taliban’s demands, as mentioned earlier. Türkiye could also pave the way for using the Taliban as leverage for Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), provided its relations with Iran deteriorate further. The United States is also expected to maintain ties with the new Syrian rulers. Reportedly, its main condition for this friendship is to block all avenues to the Islamic Republic. In this scenario, the U.S. will aim to make the Taliban, like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a threat rather than an opportunity for Iran.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
