The Taliban hosted a meeting in Kabul attended by senior representatives from the Central Asian republics. The meeting was held at the initiative of the Taliban’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was chaired by Amir Khan Muttaqi, the group’s foreign minister. The Taliban have previously hosted one or two regional meetings that were attended by representatives of neighboring countries in addition to the Central Asian republics.
The Central Asian countries are visiting the Taliban at a time when they harbor deep concerns about Afghanistan under Taliban rule, particularly regarding the sheltering of terrorist groups on Afghan soil and the spread of the terrorism threat beyond its borders. Central Asian governments have repeatedly expressed these concerns, but they have gone unheeded by the Taliban. Among these nations, Tajikistan is the most vulnerable: on one hand, it is at odds with the Taliban and hosts some of their opponents, and on the other, terrorist groups sheltering in northeastern Afghanistan threaten its interests. A clear example of this was a series of drone attacks launched from Afghanistan against Tajik territory last year, which resulted in the deaths of several Chinese workers. Uzbekistan is also vulnerable, with specific terrorist currents seeking to harm its interests from Afghan territory; however, because it maintains a calm and tension-free relationship with the Taliban, its level of concern is lower than that of Tajikistan. The remaining republics each have their own particular concerns, but terrorism is their shared problem. In this context, the attendance of senior representatives from these republics at a meeting led and centered on the Taliban, a group that has done nothing to alleviate their terrorism-related fears, in Kabul, is not a welcome development. This is especially true given that the Taliban have not emerged as a legitimate government either at the national level or, more specifically, at the international level, and are still mired in a “legitimacy crisis.” It would be a different matter entirely if the Taliban were participating in a meeting led and centered on the Central Asian republics and held in one of those countries, which would be understandable and justifiable.
The Taliban hosting a regional meeting is an attempt to gain legitimacy. The reality is that nothing matters more to the Taliban than securing relations with the world, especially with major powers, provided that such relations do not force the group to retreat from its demands. Accordingly, participating in regional and international meetings, or hosting them, is an effort to normalize relations with the world and gain a degree of legitimacy. In other words, by hosting regional meetings, the Taliban seek to project a polished image of themselves and show the world that they apparently value diplomacy and good neighborly relations, and that they have broken with their disreputable past, which was built on absolute confrontation with the world. The result of these efforts will be that the world remains oblivious to what is happening inside Afghanistan. Indeed, for most countries, it is sufficient that the Taliban value diplomacy and the maintenance of calm relations with them, and the group’s internal governance is not a matter they wish to discuss.
It is evident that this meeting, like others before it, will yield no results. Neither the concerns about terrorism will be resolved by holding such meetings, nor will the other concerns of the Central Asian republics, particularly regarding the construction of the Qosh Tepa Canal and the manner in which the Taliban intend to exploit it. Uzbekistan is especially concerned about how the Taliban plan to use the waters of the Amu Darya. The concerns of the five republics will only be addressed when a mechanism for applying pressure on the Taliban is put in place. As long as the talk is of constructive engagement, the Taliban will grow more emboldened and will continue to disregard the demands of neighboring and distant countries alike. Of course, the Central Asian countries have few tools at their disposal to pressure the Taliban. First and foremost, these countries do not wish to support anti-Taliban forces, and even if they did, they lack the capacity to do so, since Taliban support for terrorist groups based in the northeastern provinces would increase their own vulnerability. For this reason, the outcome of such meetings will be nothing more than a concession to the Taliban and the projection of a softened image of the group.
The Kabul meeting is not unrelated to the war between the Taliban and Pakistan. The Taliban have also claimed that the meeting was held at the initiative of their foreign ministry, meaning the idea for the meeting is theirs and so is the chairmanship, and they are therefore pursuing a specific goal. By convening this meeting, the Taliban seek to convey that they are not warmongers, that they live in peace with Afghanistan’s neighbors, and that they are hosting a summit intended to improve relations and expand regional cooperation. Conversely, they want to show that it is Pakistan that continuously attacks Afghanistan under ever-new pretexts. Moreover, it is not unlikely that the Taliban will ask the Central Asian republics to clarify their position regarding the Taliban’s war with Pakistan, that is, to condemn any future Pakistani attacks on Afghanistan and to support the stance of the Kabul regime. Additionally, efforts to increase the volume of trade with Central Asia could be another objective of the meeting, particularly given that the Taliban have closed the door on trade with Pakistan. More importantly, Afghanistan is the least costly route for Pakistan’s trade with Central Asia, a matter that has likely been discussed, with the Taliban seeking to impose restrictions along this route. Similarly, the TAPI and CASA-1000 projects, which pass through Afghan territory to connect Central Asia with Pakistan, are of significance to the Taliban. Now that the Taliban are at war with Pakistan, the group is not indifferent to imposing new constraints on these major projects, both to increase Afghanistan’s transit fees and to make things more difficult for Islamabad, ensuring that Pakistan no longer benefits from its previous advantages as it once did.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
