The United States, after a month-long pause, has once again targeted southern regions of Iran with an attack, a serious and dangerous strike that has resulted in the deaths of both military personnel and civilians. In response, the Islamic Republic launched missile strikes against American military bases on Jordanian soil, an attack similar to previous ones that caused little damage. The reality is that since the start of the forty-day war, Iranian territory has, in a sense, become a “southern Lebanon,” in that the United States attacks whenever it wishes and inflicts human and financial losses on the Islamic Republic. Iran’s retaliatory strikes against American interests have not only failed to serve as a deterrent, but have not even had a superficial or temporary effect; otherwise, Washington would have reconsidered its approach toward Tehran. There was a time when the likelihood of war between Iran and the United States seemed very remote, and even after the two sides entered the battlefield, not only the Middle East but regions beyond it were not spared its consequences. But now this very war has become normal, in that it neither creates an uproar, nor provokes a serious reaction, nor prompts any effective diplomatic effort to contain it.
It now appears that Iran and the United States have entered a “war of attrition,” though with a limited scope, unlike the forty-day war. This is also the result of the failure of mediators’ efforts to persuade both sides to return to the negotiating table. Pakistan’s efforts have so far borne no fruit, and the same is true of Qatar and Oman. The reason is that the United States feels it has the upper hand and should not make concessions to the Islamic Republic to bring it back to the table. In other words, if the United States’ previous goal in attacking and pressuring Iran was to bring the country back to the negotiating table, that is no longer the case. Donald Trump, the President of the United States, has also stated these days explicitly that he does not need a deal with Iran and will continue to attack and pressure the country. The United States believes that the damage it inflicts through its attacks and pressure on Iran far exceeds the damage caused by the Islamic Republic’s response to American interests, meaning there is no proportionality between the United States’ attacks and Iran’s reaction.
For now, Washington has the upper hand both in the war and in the imposition of sanctions (though this does not mean the United States has achieved its stated objectives). It has recently taken actions in the Strait of Hormuz that have narrowed the scope of Iran’s control over this waterway. It can be said that the Islamic Republic no longer has the level of control over the strait that it should, and as a result, the oil market has not been disrupted to the extent the Iranian side expected. The United States’ efforts are also aimed at neutralizing or reducing the strait’s role in disrupting the order of the global oil market. For this reason, it continues to target southern Iran and its coastal areas. The more Iran’s control over the strait weakens, the greater the United States’ dominance over the oil market becomes. If this trend continues, it would not be surprising if Iran not only lost control over the strait, but the strait itself also lost its previous and current significance, prompting the exploration of alternative routes.
The attacks of the past several nights by the United States appear to be aimed at helping intensify economic pressure on Iran. The United States has recently escalated economic pressure on Iran, ranging from imposing a naval blockade to unprecedented, heavy sanctions in other vital sectors. The impact of the new sanctions is also unprecedented compared to the past, so much so that the exchange rate of the dollar against the toman has recently hit a historic record. This has led some economic experts to speak of the possibility of “economic collapse” in Iran. The impact of the toman’s decline in value against the American dollar has not yet been properly felt in goods and food items; otherwise, the likelihood of renewed street protests would increase.
Naser Hemmat, Governor of the Central Bank of Iran (CBI), also expressed concern and, in defense of the Islamic Republic’s position, claimed that Iran has not reached the stage of economic collapse or even “hyperinflation.” Although his remarks are made in defense of the Islamic Republic’s position, they show that Tehran has properly understood the seriousness of the threat. In other words, Hemmat wants to say that Iran is not in a state of hyperinflation, but the current situation is not much less damaging than a state of hyperinflation would be. The measures taken so far to control the market’s runaway state have not only been ineffective, but have in fact intensified the pain. In this situation, a military attack, even if limited and temporary, would further inflame the situation and could well lead to renewed street protests.
When the United States, through limited and targeted attacks, gradually wears down Iran’s military capability, and the naval blockade and unprecedented sanctions drain the life out of its already fragile economy, and more importantly, street protests begin in response to rising commodity prices, the United States will prepare itself to deliver the final blow. It is unclear whether the Islamic Republic would survive this potential blow unscathed, or continue its existence wounded and barely alive. For now, this is the United States’ intention, unless mediators’ efforts change the equation, which is a separate discussion.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
