Recently, the stance of Zalmay Khalilzad, the former U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, toward Pakistan has become increasingly clear. After reports emerged that Islamabad planned to host a gathering of Afghan political figures opposed to the Taliban, Khalilzad quickly lost his composure, once again focusing on what he described as Pakistan’s destructive role in Afghanistan. Now that the meeting has been postponed amid both criticism and praise, concerns have arisen that political calculations, rather than technical hurdles, may be the real reason behind the delay.
The fact remains that anti-Pakistan sentiment is still a widely traded currency in Afghan politics, particularly during the era of the Islamic Republic, when it was at its peak. At that time, the idea of “Pakistan-bashing” had gained such traction that even an unpopular politician could restore some public standing by railing against Islamabad. Some were even labeled “patriots” simply for their fiery rhetoric. Even today, anti-Pakistan discourse still finds an audience, though not to the extent of the past two decades. Were it not for the disputes over Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which have strained Islamabad’s long-standing ties with the Taliban, that same old hostility toward Pakistan would likely remain just as entrenched. Even if one accepts that Pakistan has been hostile to Afghanistan, the path to turning hostility into friendship or at least tempering animosity runs through dialogue, not noisy media tirades or the deliberate production of hate-filled narratives. At the same time, strengthening Afghanistan’s internal capacities across all sectors is also key to keeping adversaries in check.
Khalilzad, an Afghan-born American diplomat, has undoubtedly been influenced by this prevailing anti-Pakistan spirit in Afghan politics—especially since his formal involvement in Afghanistan’s conflict on behalf of the United States, where he closely followed Islamabad’s role. For Khalilzad, deploying anti-Pakistan rhetoric becomes particularly convenient when he confronts the depth of Afghan public discontent with his own record. In the eyes of most politicians and citizens, his role in the collapse of the Republic and the Taliban’s return to power is undeniable and prominent. So prominent, in fact, that critics often judge him more with their emotions than with reasoned analysis.
Now, in an effort to soften this deeply ingrained negative perception, Khalilzad seeks cover under the cloak of anti-Pakistan rhetoric, trying to project the image of a man who not only has no affinity with countries hostile to a stable Afghanistan, but who also stands firmly against them. Yet the dissatisfaction, if not outright hostility, toward Khalilzad in Afghanistan is so profound that even his attacks on Pakistan cannot rescue his reputation.
Alongside this, Khalilzad’s ethnic affinities and inclinations are clearer than daylight, leaving no room for doubt. In his missions to Afghanistan on behalf of the United States, his conduct has rarely been impartial; more often, it has reflected ethnic bias or personal leanings. In a country composed of diverse tribes, when political missions are pursued not with neutrality but through the lens of one group’s interests, the outcome is stalemate or even collapse. Khalilzad not only failed to act impartially, but he also subdued non-Pashtuns who challenged his approach by showcasing America’s advanced weaponry, such as B-2 and B-52 bombers. Up to this point, it is evident that Khalilzad’s vision for Afghanistan has been the creation of a state centered on one dominant ethnicity, with other groups relegated to decorative roles precisely mirroring the current Taliban regime. By most accounts, Pakistan also favors such a state, though it prefers one that is submissive, compliant, and modest in its demands, certainly not one entertaining ambitions of uniting Pashtuns on both sides of the border.
Now, to deflect the perception of collusion with Pakistan on this very issue, Khalilzad has chosen confrontation with Islamabad. In other words, while advocating for an ethnically centered government in Afghanistan, logic would dictate alignment with Pakistan, which shares that goal. Thus, his dissatisfaction with Pakistan stems from personal inclinations rather than being tied to U.S. or Afghan interests.
On the other side, Pakistan remains highly suspicious of Khalilzad’s conduct and deeply uneasy about his presence on the political stage. This mistrust dates back to the moment he became active in Afghan politics. Pakistan’s ideal is for the United States not to view the region through the lens of figures like Khalilzad. Indeed, Islamabad resists having Washington represented in Afghan affairs by someone who possesses an intimate knowledge of both capitals and of the roots of their conflict. Khalilzad, however, knows the intricacies of the Kabul–Islamabad relationship inside out and is well aware of everything Pakistan has inflicted on its western neighbor over the past four decades. For this reason, when Khalilzad was appointed U.S. Special Representative for Afghan Reconciliation, the Pakistanis grew anxious. To ease Islamabad’s concerns, the White House dispatched then–Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Khalilzad to Pakistan for talks with the country’s leadership, Prime Minister Imran Khan and Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi. In his memoir, Mohammad Omar Daudzai, former Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s special envoy for Pakistan, described that meeting as an effort to reassure Islamabad that Khalilzad’s role in negotiating with the Taliban would not harm its interests. At the time, the Americans told Pakistani leaders that Khalilzad’s presence on the scene posed no threat to Islamabad’s position, and that Pakistan, in turn, should not obstruct the Afghan peace process.
It should not be forgotten that the first Trump administration’s stance toward Pakistan was deeply skeptical and fraught with ambiguity, a posture that may well have been influenced by Khalilzad’s lobbying. But now that he no longer holds an official role in U.S. politics, Trump’s second administration has consistently praised Pakistan, even hailing it as a champion in the fight against terrorism.
Ashraf Ghani, for his part, sought to sideline Khalilzad by turning more toward Pakistan than toward Qatar. Ghani’s strategy was aimed at weakening or neutralizing the Doha peace process and shifting the effort to Pakistan. Yet fortune did not favor him, and he ultimately yielded the field to the Doha-based allies loyal to Khalilzad.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
