Three Islamic countries (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey) have signed a joint defense pact and named it the “Mecca Pact.” The most important clause of this pact is that an attack on any one of these three countries will be treated as an attack on all pact members. The Mecca Pact’s newsworthiness stems largely from the provisions of this clause; whereas numerous pacts have been concluded among these three countries in the past, there has been comparatively little discussion about them. Regarding this new and current pact, attention to several points is important:
1) The countries that signed the Mecca Pact hold an elevated position in the Islamic world. For example, Saudi Arabia, while considering itself the qibla of the Islamic world, also holds unrivaled dominance in the fields of economy, multilateral diplomacy, and modern technology in the Middle East. As for the strength of its diplomacy, it suffices to say that it is the best friend of the world’s foremost power: the United States. At the same time, it is also the best friend of the strongest rival to the world’s foremost power: China. Turkey, too, considers itself a head above the rest of the Islamic countries. More importantly, it is the only Islamic member of NATO and also aspires to membership in the European Union. Pakistan, although it has lagged in some areas, is seen by few in the region as a military rival. Its possession of nuclear weapons has granted it a special advantage, one that has covered many of its weaknesses and shortcomings. When a pact of a defensive nature is signed among such countries, especially in the crisis-ridden Middle East region, it is inherently significant and carries particular implications.
2) Even if the Mecca Pact has nothing to do with Iran, it still cannot be considered unrelated to the current state of the Islamic Republic. The very fact that the Islamic Republic has emerged unscathed from its confrontation with Israel and the United States is not good news for Arab governments, because they fear that from now on it will act with even greater assertiveness and intervene more in its surrounding regions using militia forces. In other words, Arab governments will convince themselves that if the Islamic Republic did not back down against Israel and the United States, it will regard them as even less significant. This Arab perception of the Islamic Republic is accurate to some extent. For example, some time ago, an Iranian passenger plane, disregarding a Saudi security warning, landed at Sanaa airport, the capital of Yemen, and transferred Houthi representatives to Tehran, formally breaking the blockade line. After a ten-year hiatus, this was the first landing of an Iranian aircraft at Sanaa airport. From the Saudi perspective, this boldness and disregard are a result of the Islamic Republic’s resilience and survival following its forty-day confrontation with the United States and Israel. When we place this audacity of the Islamic Republic alongside its missile and drone attacks on Saudi territory, Riyadh’s concern becomes understandable. As a result, it is attempting to broaden its defensive umbrella, doing so with the help of countries toward which the Islamic Republic proceeds cautiously: Turkey and Pakistan.
3) On the surface, at least, Riyadh has also tried to ease hostilities between the United States and Iran. We have repeatedly heard from credible Western media that Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince, has urged American leaders to exercise caution and restraint in confronting the Islamic Republic. Bin Salman’s voice is also well received by the leaders in the White House. Now that bin Salman is moving hastily rather than deliberately to form a defensive alliance, it can be said that the Middle East will witness more dangerous tensions. Therefore, his actions these days can be seen as an effort to shield himself from the harm of future tensions, meaning that the Islamic Republic and the Houthis will no longer be able to fire toward Saudi Arabia without concern.
4) The expansion of the Mecca Pact’s umbrella also depends on its effectiveness. From now on, if the Islamic Republic and the Houthis exercise the necessary caution in dealing with Saudi Arabia, it is likely that other countries on the southern rim of the Persian Gulf will also join the pact. The three main countries have also announced that the Mecca Pact is not directed against any country and that its door is open to others. The expansion of the Mecca Pact’s membership can also be seen as an effort aimed at pushing Iran and its regional allies out of the picture. Therefore, the Iranian side will also work to ensure that the Mecca Pact does not become “region-wide” and remains limited to these three countries.
5) At a moment when American efforts to bring Saudi Arabia into the “Abraham Accords” have intensified, Riyadh’s creation of a joint defense pact with countries that have friction with Israel amounts, in a way, to a rejection of Washington. Recently, Donald Trump, the President of the United States, claimed that his country would provide Saudi Arabia with “civilian nuclear energy,” conditional, however, on Riyadh joining the Abraham Accords. Now Riyadh has formed a pact with Pakistan and Turkey; the former does not recognize Israel, and the latter also holds an anti-Israel stance, to the point that some speak of the possibility of war breaking out between the two sides. If Saudi Arabia’s goal is to gain protection against Iran, this is better achieved by standing alongside Pakistan and Turkey than by falling into Israel’s embrace. Standing alongside Israel would diminish Saudi Arabia’s weight in the Islamic world while increasing that of the Islamic Republic, and would further provoke pro-Iran forces against Riyadh.
6) Saudi Arabia wants to demonstrate that, contrary to what is assumed, its security does not depend on major powers, and that it can also contain its rivals and address its security concerns by resorting to regional mechanisms and initiatives. So it is all the better to make a NATO member and a nuclear-armed country its allies and sign a defense pact with them. In this respect, this signifies Riyadh’s embrace of regional arrangements and its move away from external arrangements that have so far not proven very effective in ensuring its security.
7) At first glance, it may seem that Pakistan and Turkey have sought refuge under Saudi Arabia’s wing, with their sole aim being to benefit from Riyadh’s abundant wealth. Upon closer examination, however, the Mecca Pact was signed based on the mutual needs of all three countries. For example, Riyadh needs a pact whose members include a NATO member and a nuclear-armed state to rein in its regional rivals. Likewise, Turkey, in sharpening its stance toward Israel, wants to make clear that it is not alone in the Islamic world and has allies like Saudi Arabia, whose words and actions carry weight with most Islamic countries. Pakistan, too, needs the support of Riyadh and Ankara to preserve its international standing and to effectively confront India and the Taliban. So the needs are mutual. The fact that the pact was signed in Mecca has a clear reason: to give meaning and legitimacy to the pact, aimed at securing the members’ commitment to its provisions.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis article here:
