Discussions about Afghanistan’s political future usually begin with the type of system. Some propose a return to a republic, others see federalism or decentralization as the way out of the country’s historical concentration of power, and still others emphasize guaranteeing the rights of ethnic groups or different models of power distribution. But before choosing among these options, a more fundamental question exists: who has the right to decide on Afghanistan’s future system, with what authority, and through what process?
Before agreeing on the final shape of the system, Afghanistan needs agreement on three matters: a credible mechanism of representation, rules for the transition, and a set of shared minimum principles. The future system should not be a precondition for entering dialogue; it should be the product of a legitimate process. The outcome can remain open, but the path to reaching it must be rule-based.
The Issue Before Choosing a System
Afghanistan does not suffer from a shortage of proposals for the future. A republic, federalism, decentralization, and guarantees of ethnic rights are among the options on the table, and alongside these debates there are also views on autonomy, redefining political identity, and reshaping the geography of power.
This disagreement is not, in itself, a crisis. In a pluralistic society, differences of opinion over political structure and the distribution of power are natural. The problem begins when each faction treats its own preferred answer as the predetermined outcome, while no legitimate authority yet exists to choose among the different options.
This is where a distinction must be drawn between “having a political plan” and “having the right to determine the system.” Any faction can advocate for a republic, federalism, or any other model, but advocating for a model does not, by itself, create the authority to impose it on the country.
The importance of this issue becomes clearer if the balance of power shifts. If a single opposition force defeats the Taliban on its own, military victory might be interpreted as political authority to determine the future order. If several armed forces gain power in different regions, the risk is greater still: military control of territory could become the basis for claims to political authority, and Afghanistan could once again face the fragmentation of power. The experience of the 1990s has shown what consequences a political vacuum and the absence of agreed rules for the transfer of power can produce.
Of course, the role of a force that has played a decisive part in changing the situation is not the same as that of marginal actors, and such a force will carry its corresponding weight in the political reality of a transitional period. But there is a difference between “a decisive role in a change of power” and “the right to unilaterally determine the country’s permanent system.” If military victory alone were the source of such a right, the actor would change, but the logic of governing through domination would remain.
For this reason, agreement on the rules of transition should not be postponed until after a change of power. The more forces consolidate their military position and territory, the harder it will become to reach shared rules.
The Options Matter, But the Outcome Should Not Be Predetermined
The models under discussion are responses to Afghanistan’s real problems. Federalism highlights the issue of concentrated power; the republic emphasizes electoral legitimacy; decentralization addresses the relationship between the center and localities; and the debate over ethnic rights stems from concern about exclusion and monopolization.
But each option becomes a governance plan rather than a political slogan only when it answers institutional questions. Federalism, for example, remains an incomplete plan without clarifying the basis of federal units, the division of authority and resources, the rights of minorities within those units, and the mechanism for resolving disputes between the center and the units.
Nor can a republic simply mean restoring the structure that existed before August 2021. Alongside its institutional achievements, that period also revealed problems such as the extensive concentration of power, weak local government, electoral crises, corruption, and the personalization of parts of the public administration. If a republic is proposed again, the debate should be about redesigning it, not simply returning to the past.
The rights of ethnic groups are also a real issue, but preventing exclusion does not necessarily mean permanently allocating power by quota based on ethnicity. The central challenge is finding a balance between equal citizenship and effectively preventing the monopolization and exclusion of social groups.
The value of these options, therefore, lies in bringing real problems into the political debate, not in predetermining the outcome.
Rules Before Outcome
If each side enters the dialogue assuming that its own model must be the outcome, negotiation turns into a competition to impose an answer. The order should be reversed: agreement on the process first, then competition over the outcome.
Here, three matters must be distinguished from one another.
First, the mechanism of representation must specify who has the right to participate in decision-making and on what basis.
Second, the rules of transition must determine how representatives negotiate and make decisions, how disputes are resolved, which decisions require consensus or a majority, what the limits of authority of transitional institutions are, and through what process the final decision gains public legitimacy.
Third, minimum principles must set boundaries that the outcome, whatever it may be, cannot cross. Equality of citizens before the law, a ban on the monopolization of power, meaningful political participation, fundamental rights and freedoms, accountability of power, independence of the judiciary, and the peaceful transfer of power can form the core of such an agreement.
Within this framework, the outcome truly remains open. One of the existing models might be chosen, elements of several models might be combined, or a different structure might emerge from negotiation and institutional design. The legitimacy of the future system does not come from its content alone; the process that produces it is also one of the sources of legitimacy.
Representation Before Leadership; Institution Before Individuals
The most difficult practical question is representation. Who has the right to speak in the name of women, youth, ethnic groups, regions, parties, civil society, or citizens inside Afghanistan?
Gathering a few well-known figures is not the answer to this question. Political fame, historical background, ethnic influence, military capacity, or media presence may make an actor significant, but none of these, by itself, creates a right to represent others.
Before leaders are chosen, a transitional structure must clarify which areas need representation, how representatives are selected, and to whom they are accountable. This matters especially for the people of Afghanistan inside the country. A process shaped mainly from abroad, one that fails to create a credible and, as far as possible, secure channel for the participation of voices inside Afghanistan, will face a serious legitimacy problem.
The principle should reverse the usual pattern: individuals should not confer legitimacy on an institution; the institution should derive its legitimacy from a credible process of representation and then grant individuals the authority to make decisions.
Governing Is Not the Same as Seizing the State
The future order must also resolve another problem: the blurred line between the right to govern and the authority to seize public institutions. In a democratic order, elections give winners the authority to govern for a set period, not to become owners of the state. The civil administration, the judiciary, independent institutions, security forces, and public assets should not become the sphere of influence of the victorious force with every change of government.
This distinction is vital for the peaceful transfer of power. If reaching government comes to mean broad access to appointments, resources, and institutions, political competition turns into competition to seize the state. Defeat then no longer means merely losing government, but losing a network of influence and resources. The higher the cost of defeat becomes, the harder it will be to accept it.
Political Change Should Not Cause the Country to Collapse
Changing the political order should not be confused with destroying the country’s essential capacities. Schools, hospitals, customs offices, the banking system, official records, and technical and administrative capacities are necessary for people’s lives regardless of which force holds power.
But preserving these functions does not mean preserving all existing political, legal, and security structures. A transition plan must distinguish between services and capacities that should continue, institutions that can be reformed, and structures that are incompatible with a legitimate future order and must be replaced. The goal is to change the political order without causing the country to collapse.
One Rule for All, Including the Taliban
The Taliban are one of the groups present in Afghanistan’s conflict, and their presence cannot be ignored in discussions of the future. But military capacity or territorial control does not, by itself, create the right to determine the future system.
This rule is not only about the Taliban. No individual, party, armed group, ethnicity, or political current should be able to derive the right to unilaterally determine the system from its actual power.
If the Taliban are present in the future political process, their participation must be subject to the same rules applied to others. Participation does not mean special privilege or immunity from accountability. The same rule must also apply to any force that may defeat the Taliban in the future. A rule is only valid if it does not change with a change in who holds power.
From Principle to Practice
A practical path could begin with agreement on the same three foundations: the mechanism of representation, the rules of transition, and minimum principles. Based on this agreement, an assembly with defensible representation could then be formed, and a limited, temporary executive structure could be created to manage the transitional period.
This structure’s task should be to maintain essential services, provide political space, and manage the transition, not to unilaterally determine the permanent system. Once a minimum level of security, political freedom, and the possibility of participation has been established, the constitutional process should begin, and different models should be freely presented, debated, and compared. The final system should be the product of this process, not a condition for entering it.
The Real Test: Accepting the Rules
The central difficulty lies here. Rules only have meaning when the influential forces are willing to bind themselves to them. A group that believes it can achieve its preferred outcome through force or political superiority has little incentive to accept limits.
For this reason, the criteria for representation, the limits of authority, the duration of transitional structures’ mandates, and the method of decision-making must be clear in advance. International facilitation and guarantees can help create a secure environment and implement an agreement, but they should not take the place of Afghanistan’s own decision-making.
Conclusion: The Path to the Answer Comes First
Afghanistan does not face a shortage of blueprints for the future; it faces a lack of a legitimate process for choosing among competing blueprints.
The fundamental change must be in the order of things: first, the mechanism of representation; then, the rules of transition and minimum principles; after that, competition and negotiation among different models; and finally, a decision that carries public legitimacy.
Each of these serves a different function. The mechanism of representation determines who is present in decision-making and on what basis; the rules of transition determine how they negotiate and reach decisions; and the minimum principles set the boundaries that the outcome cannot cross.
In this order, the institution must take precedence over individuals, and political or military victory should not take the place of institutional legitimacy. Equally, gaining government should not mean seizing the state.
The outcome, too, must truly remain open. Afghanistan may arrive at a redesigned republic, a federal system, a decentralized structure, a combination of several models, or a different pattern altogether. The task of the transition is not to choose the answer in advance, but to build the conditions under which an answer can emerge legitimately.
The difference a real transition can make lies precisely in this change of order: not determining the outcome first and then building rules to justify it, but first forming credible representation, then establishing rules, and only then allowing the outcome to emerge from political competition and public choice.
Before agreeing on the name of its future system, Afghanistan needs agreement on the path to reaching it. If rules take precedence over outcome, institutions over individuals, and public choice over the will of dominant forces, the dispute over the type of system can be transformed from a continuation of the struggle for power into an ordinary matter of politics, negotiation, and popular choice.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis article here:
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