The rapid developments in Syria have raised numerous questions and significant concerns. The complexity of the Middle East, particularly the Syrian situation, is no secret. This complexity spans from local and national levels to regional and international dimensions. However, despite its unique characteristics, Syria’s story is not exclusive to it. Many other countries in this part of the world are at risk of experiencing similar painful trajectories. A nation that once appeared to be in a favorable geographic position, with a rich civilization spanning thousands of years—making it a cradle of civilizations and empires—has now become a whirlpool of disasters and crises. Millions of its citizens live under a heavy shadow of fear and uncertainty about their future. This bleak situation prompts many questions and stirs concerns in other countries in the region.
One of the key questions analysts are asking these days is whether the handover of Afghanistan to the fundamentalist Taliban, with their bloody past and the insistence of some political circles in democratic countries on engaging with them, has provided a model that facilitates the rise to power of fundamentalist groups in Syria. Additionally, is this model likely to be replicated in other countries in the future? If turning a blind eye to 20 years of Taliban crimes and subsequently supporting their continued rule is acceptable to advanced nations today, what stops the world from ignoring the bloody records of other jihadist groups in the Middle East, Africa, and parts of Asia, and even aiding them in seizing power?
Although comparisons between the Taliban and jihadist groups in Syria reveal many similarities, there are also differences, making it impossible to equate them completely. For instance, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, despite his controversial background and past ties with ISIS and later al-Qaeda—ties he is said to have severed years ago, even fighting against them—now speaks of a government in Syria where all groups participate, governance is based on the people’s will, and a constitution accepted by Syrian citizens forms the foundation. He emphasizes avoiding internal and external tensions. At this moment, it remains unclear whether Julani’s current stance is merely a tactic, as often employed by fundamentalists before revealing their true intentions after gaining power, or whether he has genuinely learned from his country’s bloody conflicts and adopted a different approach emphasizing tolerance, inclusion, and participation. His views on women’s roles and the inclusion of other social groups align with this narrative. Nevertheless, Syrian jihadists strive to differentiate themselves from groups like the Taliban.
On the other hand, it cannot be ignored that some Syrian jihadists raised the Taliban flag upon entering Aleppo, accompanied by chants, slogans, and postures reminiscent of the Taliban. Additionally, their ideological stance—a crucial factor in their battle against the Syrian regime—mirrors the Taliban’s. Experience shows that many groups employ various tactics to gain power, offering promises and compelling slogans to the populace. However, after attaining power, they often abandon those promises and adopt a completely different trajectory. During negotiations in Doha, the Taliban assured that their governance would be unlike their past and promised a new model addressing Afghanistan’s concerns. Yet, once in power, they reverted to their old policies, becoming increasingly autocratic and repressive as their confidence in maintaining control grew. Similarly, there are no guarantees that Syrian jihadists, after seizing power, will adhere to their current promises and not establish a rigid theocratic government as envisioned by fundamentalist groups.
Another pertinent question arises concerning the similarities between many regimes in the region and the faltering regime of Bashar al-Assad. Despite years of public protests, widespread dissatisfaction across the country, acute regional tensions, and countless calls to reform domestic and foreign policies to garner minimal support, the Assad regime has failed to learn from these painful ups and downs or seek self-reform. The question is whether the decaying structures of such regimes reach a level of dysfunction where they lose all capacity to revise flawed policies. Despite witnessing widespread anger, they persist on their chosen path until their downfall. For example, the Taliban have neither learned from their failed first regime nor considered the widespread dissatisfaction among civil and political groups and citizens. Instead of adopting a path of national unity, inclusiveness, or cooperation with other forces, their response to mounting global criticism of their anti-human rights policies has been to tighten their grip. Similarly, Iran’s clerical regime, despite losing ground in various regional arenas and growing vulnerabilities, has increased its harsh measures, including mandatory hijab enforcement and enforcing their primitive rule of propagation of virtue and prevention of vice, and other draconian laws.
The dominance of ineptitude in state policies, coupled with internal political rivalries and the conflicting interests of regional and international powers, presents a grim outlook for the region’s nations. It clouds the lives of hundreds of millions of people in this part of the world with bitter ambiguities and startling uncertainties. Syria’s situation is not only a source of distress for its citizens but also carries troubling messages for many nations across the region.
You can read the Persian version of this editorial here:
