Twenty-five years after September 11, the question still stands: did the United States win or lose in Afghanistan? The answer to this question, contrary to what it might seem at first glance, is not so simple. On this basis, one cannot speak with certainty of American victory or defeat. Everything depends on how we define America’s objectives and the criteria for its success in Afghanistan. If we view the Afghan war solely through the lens of the Taliban’s fate, the outcome may seem clear: the United States ultimately lost. If we assess it from the perspective of the fight against al-Qaeda and international terrorism, the picture looks different. If we set the criteria as state-building, the creation of political and social institutions, and the establishment of a new political order in Afghanistan, we are faced with a mix of success and failure.
If the Goal Is Considered to Be the War Against al-Qaeda
The United States invaded Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks because al-Qaeda was based in the country and the Taliban regime had given refuge to Osama bin Laden, the founder and first leader of the group. Therefore, Washington’s initial objective was to fight al-Qaeda and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a base for terrorist operations, not necessarily to destroy the Taliban as a domestic force. This distinction is essential to evaluating the war. Al-Qaeda was severely weakened following the American attack and lost a large part of its organizational and operational capacity, not only in Afghanistan but also in Syria and elsewhere. Osama bin Laden was killed in Pakistan, and Ayman al-Zawahiri was killed in Kabul, two significant events that demonstrate America’s ability to pursue its enemies anywhere in the world. Therefore, if the criterion is the destruction of al-Qaeda, or the reduction of the group’s capacity and the prevention of a repeat of an attack on the scale of September 11, defeat cannot be attributed to the United States.
Institutions Were Built, but Remained Unstable
However, if the criterion is state-building, the assessment becomes more complex. Over two decades, with the support of the United States and its allies, a national army and police force were established, a parliament and elections were formed, political parties and media expanded, and civil society found room to operate. A generation of Afghanistan’s citizens also grew up with a different experience of political participation, education, and civil liberties. All of this represents a genuine achievement that cannot be ignored. But the fundamental weakness lay in institutionalizing and sustaining these achievements. Many of these institutions and structures were deeply dependent on Western financial, political, and security support. The rapid collapse of the entire twenty-year republic, following the withdrawal of American forces, showed that there is a large gap between “institution-building” and “sustainability.” From this perspective, the United States achieved some successes in creating the structures of a modern state, but failed to ensure their durability.
Of course, one must fundamentally ask whether state-building was America’s primary objective. It was not. We know that the war began with the goal of confronting al-Qaeda, but projects such as democracy, human rights, women’s rights, and institution-building later gained importance. For this reason, one cannot attribute everything built in Afghanistan over two decades to America’s objectives. On the other hand, in American foreign policy, democracy and human rights can serve both as values and as tools for legitimizing intervention in other countries. These two do not necessarily negate one another. Governments may both believe in their stated values and use those same values to pursue security and geopolitical objectives.
If the Goal Is Considered to Be the War Against the Taliban
But if the goal is considered to be the fight against the Taliban, the answer is clearer: the United States overthrew the Taliban regime in 2001, but in 2021, following the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan, the Taliban returned to power. Therefore, the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan and the end of the war in this country cannot be regarded as a victory for Washington. This mysterious return of the Taliban has given rise to narratives about a kind of collusion between the United States and the Taliban, namely that Washington removed the Taliban from power but ultimately handed its place back to the group. Of course, the Taliban’s return to power does not by itself prove that the United States had designed such a scenario from the beginning, but Washington’s direct negotiations with the Taliban, the disregard for the twenty-year republic, the Doha Agreement, and the withdrawal of American forces naturally reinforce the possibility of collusion in people’s minds. Not to mention that the war against the Taliban was not on America’s war agenda from the outset, and the group had only been removed from power because it had given refuge to al-Qaeda. Throughout the twenty years of the republic, American officials never officially labeled the Taliban as “terrorists.” When America’s main objective is the fight against terrorism, and the Taliban, from this country’s perspective, are not terrorists, it is clear that the group does not fit into that agenda.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis article here:
بیستوپنج سال پس از ۱۱ سپتامبر؛ امریکا و دوگانه پیروزی و شکست
