Introduction
Relations between Afghanistan’s Taliban and Pakistan, once described as those of “longstanding friends,” have entered a turbulent phase since the Taliban’s return to power in Kabul in August 2021. Pakistan, once a key sponsor of the Taliban, now faces a growing threat from Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). This militant group uses Afghan soil to stage deadly attacks on Pakistani security forces. Despite diplomatic efforts from repeated visits by Pakistani officials to Kabul to Islamabad’s formal complaints at the United Nations, no progress has been made in curbing the TTP. Yet in August 2025, a sudden spike in TTP casualties coincided with the postponement of an anti-Taliban opposition gathering in Islamabad, raising a pressing question: Has a covert arrangement emerged between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)?
Failed Negotiations and Pakistan’s Shift in Strategy
Since the Taliban’s takeover, Islamabad has repeatedly claimed that TTP leaders and fighters enjoy safe havens in Afghanistan’s border provinces such as Paktika and Nangarhar. United Nations reports have also pointed to direct Taliban and al-Qaeda involvement in training and supporting TTP militants. In early 2025, Pakistan once again urged the Taliban to rein in the TTP, but received no clear response. As a result, Islamabad shifted its strategy, turning to Afghan political opposition figures as leverage against the Taliban.
In early August 2025, the Islamabad-based think tank SASSI announced a conference titled “The Future of Afghanistan: Peace, Stability, and Development.” Figures such as Fawzia Koofi, Nasir Andisha, Mustafa Mastoor, and Habiburrahman Hekmatyar were invited. Although presented as a civil society initiative, in Pakistan, such an event could not have been organized without ISI coordination.
Taliban Reaction and Postponement of the Meeting
The Taliban reacted swiftly. Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Taliban’s acting foreign minister, urged Pakistan’s foreign minister, Ishaq Dar, during a trilateral meeting in Kabul to prevent “anti-Taliban figures” from gathering in Islamabad. The Pakistani daily The Nation reported that the conference, scheduled for August 25–26, had been postponed due to Taliban pressure. Media outlets such as Afghanistan International and Exile TV attributed the delay to “visa complications,” but acknowledged these issues stemmed directly from Taliban diplomatic pressure.
Zalmay Khalilzad, the former U.S. special envoy for Afghan peace, even accused Pakistan of supporting Taliban opponents.
The overlap between the postponement of the conference and Pakistan’s intensified counterterrorism campaign against the TTP has reinforced speculation of a secret bargain between the Taliban and Islamabad.
Rising TTP Casualties in August 2025
For the TTP, August 2025 proved to be a bloody month:
- On August 8, Pakistani forces killed 33 TTP fighters near the Afghan border.
- On August 21, Pakistani security forces demolished a mosque in Bajaur being used as a TTP shelter, killing at least 30 militants.
The precision of these operations suggests Pakistan had access to new intelligence data that was likely provided by the Afghan Taliban to the ISI.
Potential Consequences of a Secret Deal
If such a deal does in fact exist, its consequences could be far-reaching:
- Rifts between the Taliban and TTP: Any cooperation by the Afghan Taliban with Pakistan against the TTP could trigger divisions and even armed clashes between the two groups.
- Pakistan’s leverage card: Islamabad would hold the ability to weaken the Taliban at any time by publicly exposing the agreement.
- Further isolation of the Taliban in the region: India recently withdrew its request for a travel exemption for Amir Khan Muttaqi to visit New Delhi. Diplomats cited the Taliban’s growing closeness to Pakistan as the reason for the reversal.
Conclusion
The developments of August 2025 suggest that the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan may indeed have struck a covert bargain one in which the Taliban agreed to block a planned gathering of their political opponents in Islamabad in exchange for providing Pakistan’s ISI with intelligence on TTP sanctuaries. In the short term, this strategy benefits the Taliban by preventing their opponents from gaining legitimacy in a regional capital. But in the long term, the risks are profound: by turning against their longtime ideological allies in the TTP, the Taliban erode part of their traditional support base while deepening their dependency on Pakistan.
In the author’s view, the only path to ending this cycle of tactical bargains and reciprocal violence lies in meaningful international engagement through coordinated pressure on both sides to address the root causes of their border disputes and terrorist networks. Without such intervention, these kinds of arrangements will remain a “smoldering fire beneath the ashes,” pushing the region toward greater instability.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
آیا طالبان در ازای جلوگیری از نشست مخالفان، به پاکستان در سرکوب تیتیپی کمک میکنند؟
