Note: Gilles Bertrand, the European Union Special Envoy to Afghanistan, in a special interview with the Hasht-e Subh Daily, paints a concerning picture of the country’s political, economic, and, especially, human rights situation. He emphasizes that Afghanistan is facing a collapsed economy, widespread dependence on humanitarian aid, and an “unprecedented violation” of women’s rights. Bertrand considers the Taliban laws, particularly the group’s Criminal Procedure Code for Courts, as a step toward institutionalizing inequality and concentrating power. He further reports on the continuation of sanctions and the pursuit of international accountability mechanisms, stating clearly that the European Union’s support is directly intended for the people of Afghanistan and by no means signifies support for the Taliban. According to him, without a change in the Taliban’s behavior regarding human rights and the formation of an inclusive government, recognition of this group by the international community will not be possible. Bertrand says that in the Taliban Criminal Procedure Code for Courts, domestic violence has been normalized, and followers of schools other than the Hanafi school are considered “incorrect” Muslims. According to him, this code is an attempt to institutionalize social inequality.
The Hasht-e Subh Daily: Mr. Bertrand, you recently visited Afghanistan twice and described the situation as requiring “principled, pragmatic, and people-centred engagement.” From your latest assessment, how would you characterise Afghanistan today (politically, socially, and economically) compared to previous EU evaluations since 2021?
Bertrand: I served and lived in Kabul more than twenty years ago. What struck me most, returning there after such a long time, is that millions of Afghans still need humanitarian support to survive, the country’s economy is in a terrible state, and the situation of Afghan women is worse than it has ever been. Twenty years ago, experts were already flagging major risks on the horizon, such as climate change and its consequences. These risks have become a clear and present danger, and they will force millions of Afghans to be displaced again within the next few years.
What feels most saddening is the time that has been lost, and that continues to be lost, with another generation in the process of being sacrificed. Not all of this is the Taliban’s fault, of course, but it is now primarily their responsibility to address it, as the de facto authority.
The Hasht-e Subh Daily: The Taliban’s new criminal procedures frameworks, including the previous Law on the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, and now the new law called Criminal Procedure Code for Courts, signed on January 4th by the supreme leader of the Taliban, have effectively transformed ideology into enforceable law. How does the EU assess this legal architecture in terms of international human rights law and Afghanistan’s treaty obligations?
Bertrand: The code for criminal procedures is a complex document: partly seeking to codify existing practices, very vague on some aspects, extremely precise on others… We also understand that it has not been promulgated yet, and some changes and additions may be on their way. What comes out for now is that it appears to entrench social inequality, with four categories of citizens: religious clerics at the top, accountable to almost nobody, and individuals with ‘restricted legal capacity’ at the bottom, apparently including women … It seems to normalise domestic violence, or considering as improper Muslim followers of schools other than the Hanafi. And it gives the courts major discretionary powers that can be easily abused, including when imposing the death penalty.
The Hasht-e Subh Daily: Does the EU view these laws as reversible political decrees, or as a long-term system of institutionalised repression?
We see it as a step in that direction, yes, and potentially a step away from the international commitments of Afghanistan, that the de facto authorities are responsible for upholding. And irrespective of the intentions, it offers ample space for power abuse, especially by present or future Taliban leaders and clerics.
The Hasht-e Subh Daily: In practice, these laws have enabled arbitrary detention, public punishment, and the silencing of dissent. During your engagements, did the Taliban acknowledge EU concerns regarding the use of criminal law as a tool of coercion, and if so, how did they justify it?
Bertrand: I have not returned to Kabul since the code was enacted, so I have not discussed it directly with the Taliban.
The Hasht-e Subh Daily: Afghan women and girls are now excluded from education beyond the primary level, most employment, public spaces, and even public speech. Many legal experts describe this as gender apartheid. Does the EU share this characterisation, and what are the legal and political implications of adopting such a definition?
Bertrand: We raise this subject in every conversation with the Taliban. Afghanistan’s women are facing human rights violations of an unprecedented magnitude, with no justification in either religion or culture, and we know that the Taliban also hear this message from all their Muslim interlocutors. This is not only tragic, but it is also completely unsustainable: no country on earth can deprive itself of half of its talent and human potential. If the present restrictions continue, in the logic of gender segregation that the Taliban are trying to impose, there will be no more female teachers, nurses, or any other type of professionals needed for women to survive.
“Gender apartheid” is a powerful term that has gained traction in recent years. It has the merit of bringing continued political attention to the situation of Afghan women, but it has not been used for now as a legal characterization: the International Criminal Court refers to gender persecution.
The Hasht-e Subh Daily: Would this open the door to stronger international accountability mechanisms?
Bertrand: Irrespective of how you coin them, we consider that the Taliban should be accountable for the gender segregation policies that they have put in place again since 2021.
The EU was the penholder of the resolution for an international Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIM) for Afghanistan, which the Human Rights Council adopted by consensus in October 2025. The Mechanism will not only look into the crimes committed by the Taliban, but in all severe human rights violations in the country’s recent history. That includes, obviously, violations of women’s and girls’ rights, but it is not limited to them. It is now up to the UN, the EU, and the international community as a whole to get the mechanism up and running.
The Hasht-e Subh Daily: Several UN experts have warned that Taliban policies against women may amount to crimes against humanity. Does the EU support referrals or investigations through mechanisms such as the International Criminal Court or a UN-mandated investigative body?
Bertrand: This is already taking place. The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants in July 2025 against the Taliban’s supreme leader and against the Chief Justice for the treatment of women and girls since August 2021. The Court’s decision states a presumption of crimes against humanity.
The Hasht-e Subh Daily: The EU remains one of Afghanistan’s largest donors, yet Taliban restrictions, particularly bans on female aid workers, directly undermine aid delivery. At what point does humanitarian assistance risk sustaining a system that systematically violates rights?
Bertrand: With the near disappearance of US aid and budget restrictions in many other capitals, we have become by far the largest donor to Afghanistan. 25% of last year’s support to Afghanistan came from the EU’s budget, and the share will increase further this year. However, what we mean by a principled approach is that we support the Afghan people, not the de facto authorities. Our aid goes through UN agencies and NGOs, not through other channels, and it focuses on the Afghans’ humanitarian and basic human needs, with a focus on delivering “for women by women”.
The Hasht-e Subh Daily: Has the EU ever considered suspending or redesigning aid in response to these restrictions?
Bertrand: We suspended many more traditional aid programmes in 2021, and we actually redesign our aid constantly, but in a positive way: finding areas and communities where we can support the livelihoods of Afghans, with support to microfinance and small companies, many of them run by women. We support informal education schemes, health structures, and similar activities.
Suspending these actions would only make the lives of Afghans worse. The issue is rather in reverse: we would provide much more effective support if we could work normally with the de facto authorities, but many changes are needed on their side for that to happen.
The Hasht-e Subh Daily: You noted the strain caused by millions of returning migrants and deportees. How is the EU ensuring that aid reaches communities, especially women-headed households, without being co-opted or instrumentalized by Taliban authorities?
Bertrand: As I said, we do this through trusted partners who know the local realities. Just as an example, we support 8,000 small companies run by Afghan women throughout the country. None of this goes through the de facto authorities, and we also have a very robust monitoring system. On support to returnees, we work a lot with UNHCR, but funding cuts by other donors have greatly affected their ability to deal with the 4.8 million Afghans who have returned to their country over the last three years.
The Hasht-e Subh Daily: Critics argue that the Taliban have faced little tangible cost for dismantling women’s rights. Beyond statements and diplomatic engagement, what concrete pressure tools does the EU currently deploy, or consider deploying, against Taliban decision-makers?
Bertrand: The UN Security Council set conditions in 2021 for the Taliban to be recognised by the international community. As they have not met these conditions, they remain de facto authorities, with some concrete consequences deriving from non-recognition and from the many brakes that remain in their relations with the rest of the world. This situation will only change when they take action on the three conditions: security, on which there has been partial progress, inclusiveness, and respecting the country’s international commitments.
The Hasht-e Subh Daily: Are targeted sanctions, travel bans, or asset freezes still on the table?
Bertrand: Well, these are precisely examples of things that have never normalised. Most Taliban high-level officials remain under UN international sanctions. A few others are on EU and other countries’ sanction lists, for their role in human rights violations or other reasons. The Central Bank’s assets abroad remain frozen, too.
The Hasht-e Subh Daily: The Taliban continue to seek international recognition while rejecting core international norms. Is there a clear EU roadmap outlining the minimum conditions for any shift toward formal recognition, or is recognition categorically off the table?
Bertrand: Recognising the de facto authorities as the legitimate government of Afghanistan can only happen at the end of a process, alongside the conditions established by the UN Security Council. That process exists; it is the Doha Process, led by the UN, and we have constantly advised the Taliban to commit to it.
We know that there are major gaps between the world’s position and that of the de facto authorities, but we could also start with small steps, on both sides. To achieve this, we also badly need a commitment to avoid steps in the wrong direction, especially on human rights.
The Hasht-e Subh Daily: Some critics argue that ongoing engagement without consequences risks normalising Taliban rule. How does the EU respond to Afghan civil society voices who say diplomacy has so far failed to protect their rights?
Bertrand: I hear very few voices, and none from within the country, suggesting that we should disengage altogether. Whenever the world has turned away from Afghanistan, it has faced major consequences. This is why we have never left, why we maintain our diplomatic presence in Kabul, and why we pursue our policy of principled engagement and support for the Afghan people.
You can read the Persian version of this interview here:
گفتوگو با ژیل برتران: اصولنامه جزایی طالبان نهادینهسازی نابرابری اجتماعی است
