Qatar, acting as a covert power broker, has persuaded Germany to grant concessions to the Taliban. Likewise, former Afghan President Hamid Karzai has played a role in this maneuvering. The Taliban themselves have disclosed Qatar’s involvement, while Germany’s (Bild) newspaper has reported on Karzai’s role, citing his meeting with August Hanning, former head of Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND), in Berlin as evidence.
The outcome of this behind-the-scenes orchestration has been Germany’s acquiescence to accepting two Taliban diplomats into the Afghan Embassy and Consulate in Berlin and Munich. Entry visas for these two diplomats have been issued, and one of them has already arrived in Germany. The stated objective of this move is to facilitate the deportation of Afghan nationals residing in Germany who are allegedly involved in criminal activities, according to German authorities.
Several key points emerge from this development:
1) Even if we frame the agreement between Germany and the Taliban as a quid pro quo, it is evident that the Taliban have gained a greater advantage. In exchange for cooperating on the deportation of Afghan migrants, the Taliban imposed conditions that Germany ultimately felt compelled to accept. For the Taliban, being able to dictate terms to a country of Germany’s stature is significant leverage. Berlin’s acceptance of these conditions sends a message that further emboldens the Taliban to disregard international demands and to adhere strictly to the decrees of their supreme leader, Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada. In this scenario, it is not Germany or other foreign nations that bear the cost, but rather the Afghan people who suffer the consequences. The Taliban, having learned from experience that steadfastness in their positions yields favorable outcomes, are increasingly inclined to pressure their counterparts into concessions without making any compromises of their own.
2) Qatar’s role in supporting the Taliban is as clear as daylight, leaving no room for ambiguity. Just as Doha facilitated the Taliban’s return to power, it has, over the past four years, channeled its diplomatic prowess into mediating the group’s interactions with the international community. What is now known as the “Doha Process” is essentially an effort to normalize the world’s relations with the Taliban. Qatar played a crucial role in arranging a visit by a U.S. delegation to Kabul, thereby easing tensions between the two sides. Now, Qatar has opened the doors of Berlin to the Taliban. When a nation that is a staunch supporter of the Taliban assumes the role of mediator, it is unsurprising that its efforts result in the deployment of Taliban diplomats to Germany, while the opposing side gains little to nothing in return.
3) Hamid Karzai’s words and actions indicate that he perceives the Taliban’s continued rule as beneficial to Afghanistan. Karzai’s only nominal disagreement with the Taliban revolves around the ban on girls’ education, a disagreement so minuscule it barely registers. Should this issue be resolved, Karzai seemingly views the Taliban regime as the ideal remedy for Afghanistan’s woes. From the moment the Taliban returned to power, Karzai has consistently demonstrated his opposition to any form of armed resistance against them. He is also opposed to international confrontation with the Taliban and is visibly enthusiastic about the prospect of the group’s recognition on the global stage. Consequently, his meetings with current and former German officials appear to serve no purpose other than advancing the Taliban’s interests.
Suppose Karzai is genuinely committed to his long-standing advocacy for girls’ education. In that case, he should be persuading Western governments that place a premium on women’s rights to exert pressure on the Taliban to change their stance. Instead, his actions suggest he is working to preserve the status quo. Karzai, who once savored the fruits of democracy and ruled Afghanistan under its banner for thirteen years, has not, even once, openly criticized the Taliban. This silence casts serious doubt on the sincerity of his advocacy for what he claims is his most important demand: the education of girls.
More importantly, the Taliban are not so naive or unaware as to allow a figure of Karzai’s stature to independently arrange meetings with officials from a country like Germany. Karzai has traveled to Germany multiple times, not just once. Previous rounds of behind-the-scenes negotiations have probably taken place, the results of which are only now coming to light. In the eyes of the Taliban, Karzai is an asset, a figure whose influence can be leveraged to persuade the Western world. The Taliban, having skillfully coerced neighboring countries into fostering amicable relations, seems to have outsourced the task of engaging with the West to actors like Qatar and individuals such as Karzai.
4) It must not be forgotten that Germany has a history of direct dialogue with the Taliban, placing it a notch above other European nations in this regard. In early 2011, it was German diplomats who first met with Taliban representatives, before any other country did. Michael Steiner, Germany’s then-Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, met with Tayyab Agha, a Taliban envoy, in Berlin. Representatives from the CIA and the U.S. State Department were also present at that meeting. This encounter paved the way for Qatar’s mediation in the Afghan peace process and led to the establishment of the Taliban’s political office in Doha. This background indicates that Germany has always had a stake in this dialogue and that its recent moves under the pretext of deporting Afghan migrants are, in reality, part of a broader effort to build friendly ties with the Taliban.
5) Germany’s actions have now complicated Western efforts to counter Russia’s potential recognition of the Taliban regime. Furthermore, the recent warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the arrest of the Taliban’s supreme leader and the head of their Supreme Court risks losing its effectiveness. There was an expectation that Western countries, if not for the sake of human rights, would at least, in opposition to Russia, take a firmer stance against the Taliban. Given Germany’s influential standing in Europe, its concessions to the Taliban are not without consequence and could catalyze other Western governments to follow suit in accepting Taliban diplomats. This process of recognizing Taliban diplomats has already been completed in the region, and the current focus has shifted to the formal acceptance of ambassadors and eventual recognition of the regime itself. Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Taliban’s acting foreign minister, also alluded to this strategy in his recent speech, stating that countries first accept diplomats, then ambassadors, and ultimately recognize the regime. He claimed that the Taliban are patient and in no rush. Given the circumstances, it is not far-fetched to imagine that Muttaqi’s aspirations could materialize in the Western world as well. Thus, we must fear the day when Western countries, like their regional counterparts, will engage in a race to accept Taliban diplomats, ambassadors, and ultimately grant recognition to their regime.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
آلمان، طالبان و دو صحنهگردان پنهان؛ درنگی بر نقش قطر و کرزی
