The game of power in Afghanistan has always taken shape and unfolded under a veil of ambiguity. Geographically sensitive areas of strategic significance have consistently drawn the attention of regional and extra-regional powers. Among these, the provinces of Herat and Badakhshan, owing to their strategic and geopolitical importance, rank among the most significant points of interest for the powers involved in Afghanistan.
In recent months and years, Herat and Badakhshan have come under closer scrutiny than before from the intelligence agencies of regional and extra-regional countries. Several factors have contributed to this growing attention. In particular, since the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, alongside the emergence of various political, military, and civil movements outside Afghanistan, the importance of these regions has doubled. The armed and political opposition, which in public perception lacks operational capability and effective function and has mostly been used to maintain balance in the arena of power competition, is itself part of this equation. The reserve role these movements play in preserving balance and extracting concessions at critical political junctures is another feature of this complex game.
The uprisings in Badakhshan, Ghor, and Herat, alongside women’s protest movements in major cities of Afghanistan, offer important clues for analyzing the country’s future. In many cases, these uprisings and short-term movements of resistance have shown meaningful temporal correlation with one another. This connection does not necessarily stem from coordination or joint organization; rather, it is the strategic importance, geopolitical position, and geographic connectivity of these regions that cause the beginning and end points of these fault lines to shift in status with the smallest tremor.
Much has long been said about the defensive lines of the Hindu Kush as the intersection point of north and south, as well as east and west, of Afghanistan; but in a new categorization, the northeastern and southwestern geography of the country has become the main center of tensions along the Hindu Kush.
To better understand this issue, it must be emphasized that the Hindu Kush is not merely a geographic mountain range, but is considered the point of intersection for the interests of regional and global powers. The importance of this mountain range is such that over at least the past century, it has repeatedly served as a route for invasion, hostility, and collision among powers. Today as well, with Afghanistan having become a focal point of security challenges and the absence of a dominant power clearly felt, this land has turned into an uncovered pot for the comings and goings of regional and extra-regional intelligence agencies. Nevertheless, the Hindu Kush has retained its fundamental position.
These strategic fault lines have generated significant security tremors. From the uprising in Badakhshan, which is tied to the security interests of China, Pakistan, and Tajikistan, to the unrest in Ghor and Herat, which is linked to the interests of Iran and even Russia, all of these can be examined within a single analytical framework. Based on the theory of strategic fault lines, Afghanistan’s security future, its geopolitical identity, and the paths toward collision or understanding among powers take shape within this same context. For this reason, powers in Herat and Badakhshan have turned to testing strategic pressure points and balance building to assess the fragility of the current situation, which is the product of a kind of understanding among various actors.
Another notable point is that significant natural, human, and God-given resources lie dormant in Herat, Badakhshan, and along the entire length of the Hindu Kush, capable in the long run of sustaining uprisings, frictions, and political and military opposition even without reliance on external resources, relying solely on internal capacities. From geographic position to underground resources, from an anti-domination and anti-colonial mindset to the potential for recruitment by extremist groups, all of these are among the components observable in these regions.
For example, from a geopolitical perspective, Badakhshan is considered the starting point of the Hindu Kush’s security wall, a belt that is not only regarded as a natural boundary between power blocs but has also become an arena of competition among regional actors. China, India, Pakistan, Iran, and Russia each view this region as part of their own security and strategic calculations. As a result, Badakhshan has once again become a focal point of power struggle in the region.
Likewise, along the Hindu Kush lie provinces that, over many decades, have cultivated the capacity to generate resistance, uprising, and local rebellion. This has caused these regions, from a security and geopolitical perspective, to be continuously kept active as strategic fault lines in the games of concession seeking and securing the interests of involved powers, preserving the latent capacities within them. Alongside geography, underground resources, transit routes, drug trafficking networks, and the mountainous, difficult-to-access nature of these regions, the Hindu Kush has been transformed into a potential highway for the export of insecurity. Under current circumstances as well, the connective nature of this geographic belt has linked various provinces to one another, laying the groundwork for the formation of a chain of regular and related reactions.
For this reason, the issue of Herat and Badakhshan cannot be regarded merely as an internal reaction to the distribution of power following Taliban rule. These events can only be understood and interpreted within a larger analytical framework. Therefore, those who attempt to portray the developments in Badakhshan and Herat as stemming solely from internal Taliban grievances or the power-sharing demands of local actors either lack sufficient awareness of the true significance and scope of the issue or are deliberately seeking to steer the analysis toward their own preferred narrative.
In this regard, the role and degree of influence of the Persian-speaking states in these two provinces, alongside their strategic and geopolitical importance, deserve attention. In Badakhshan, the Republic of Tajikistan, and in Herat, the Islamic Republic of Iran, form two sides of a security gateway known as the Hindu Kush. Beyond security, economic, political, and geopolitical interests, these two countries also follow developments in these regions through the lens of civilizational, cultural, and historical ties.
Both Persian-speaking states are considered part of the emerging arrangements and understandings of the East, and both are moving in the direction of reducing US influence in the region, which they associate with the spread of extremism in Afghanistan. In addition to Iran and Tajikistan, China, Russia, the Central Asian countries, Pakistan, Turkey, the Arab countries, Europe, the United Kingdom, and the United States also view these two provinces through the lens of their own security and strategic interests.
The countries of the region, except Pakistan, are well aware that if the existing realities are ignored, the wave of extremism and insecurity that could spread from the two ends of the Hindu Kush, namely Badakhshan and Herat, will ultimately affect the entire region. For this reason, the developments in these two provinces are no longer merely a local or internal matter for Afghanistan, but are part of the larger equation of regional security and the competition of powers at the heart of Asia.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
