Pakistan is set to host, on August 25 and 26, 2025, a gathering of figures commonly identified as opponents of the Taliban. So far, little is known about the format, scope, or nature of this meeting, and neither Pakistan, the Taliban, nor the opposition groups have issued clear or official statements on the matter.
Even before it begins, the meeting has stirred controversy and dominated headlines in both domestic and international media for several reasons. First, Pakistan was the architect and principal backer of the Taliban. Now, by hosting their opponents, Islamabad has naturally turned this meeting into a newsworthy event. Second, Pakistan has long maintained poor relations with Taliban adversaries. At the same time, these opponents, for their part, generally avoided warming ties with Islamabad, given the widespread perception of Pakistan’s negative role in Afghanistan. During the era of the Republic, whenever a prominent anti-Taliban politician was assassinated, suspicion would immediately fall on Pakistan, while the real culprit faded from view. Third, Pakistan was among the first states to recognize the Taliban’s initial regime in the 1990s, pulling Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates along with it. Yet now, not only has it refrained from recognizing the Taliban’s current government, but it has also opened its doors to their rivals. A reversal of this magnitude could not help but attract media and social media attention.
At the heart of the Pakistan-Taliban dispute lies the presence of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) inside Afghanistan. Over the past four years, Islamabad has tested multiple strategies to persuade the Taliban to suppress or restrain the TTP, but each has not only failed, it has exacerbated tensions: closing border crossings, carrying out mass deportations of Afghan refugees, and launching limited airstrikes along the frontier. Alongside these measures, Pakistani officials have also pursued diplomacy, shuttling between Kabul and Islamabad in an attempt to break the deadlock.
Yet these tools and options have brought Pakistan more costs than benefits. For example, closing border crossings disrupts bilateral trade and destabilizes markets inside Afghanistan, leaving traders, shopkeepers, and even low-income groups worse off and widening public resentment toward Pakistan, and similarly, launching military strikes, even limited ones, on Afghan territory plants seeds of anger among local populations. While public approval of the Taliban is low, when Afghanistan is attacked by a foreign power, citizens and political factions alike feel compelled to defend their homeland, regardless of who governs it. Mass deportations of Afghan refugees not only anger Afghans themselves but also provoke criticism from international human rights organizations. Most importantly, the Taliban have largely ignored all these measures, leaving Pakistan’s demands unmet.
In this context, turning to Taliban opposition groups represents, at once, a low-cost and potentially effective alternative—a “last resort” option. By doing so, Pakistan may soften the Afghan public’s perception of itself without provoking objections from the international community. If Islamabad has indeed realized the need to engage not only with the Taliban but with the wider spectrum of Afghan political actors, then the long-standing negative image of Pakistan may gradually erode. While the international community may not openly endorse Pakistan’s hosting of Taliban opponents, it is unlikely to oppose it either. From this angle, leveraging opposition forces could yield Pakistan certain strategic gains.
It should not be forgotten that the Taliban are deeply anxious about Pakistan’s outreach to their opponents, even if they try to present themselves as indifferent. The effectiveness of this Pakistani tool becomes clearer when we recall that Islamabad, while having been the Taliban’s staunchest supporter, also knows its opponents intimately and has played a more central and undeniable role in the Afghan conflict than any other country. This is precisely why Zalmay Khalilzad, the former U.S. special envoy for Afghan peace, reacted so swiftly and harshly, condemning Pakistan’s decision to host Taliban opponents. His sharp rebuke itself underscored Pakistan’s critical role in Afghanistan’s disputes. Thus, if Islamabad remains serious in engaging with the Taliban’s rivals and does not retreat quickly, it is highly likely that the group will adjust its stance so as not to lose its most important foreign ally over ties with the TTP.
Pakistan’s new approach toward present-day Afghanistan also appears to be shaped by a shift in Washington’s policy toward Islamabad. Over the past several months, the White House has repeatedly praised Pakistan while criticizing India. This suggests that if Pakistan intends to act in Afghanistan, it will do so not in isolation but with the implicit backing of Washington. Moreover, several of Afghanistan’s neighboring countries have recently hosted meetings focused on the country’s situation, but Pakistan has not. Now, in order not to fall behind this regional trend, Islamabad has chosen to host the Taliban’s opponents, aiming to project the image of adopting a comprehensive approach to Afghanistan and pursuing conflict resolution through dialogue with all political factions.
In any case, it is still too early to issue a definitive judgment on Pakistan’s new move. The structure of the meeting, its participants, the topics under discussion, and the extent of its media coverage in the coming weeks will more clearly reveal Islamabad’s objectives. Given Pakistan’s deep and long-standing ties with the Taliban, a sober analysis without exaggerating the rifts between the two sides will align writings and commentaries more closely with reality.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
