One of the challenges in evaluating social and political issues lies in dealing with fluid, dynamic, and immensely complex phenomena. However, the widespread simplification driven by the expansion of mass media has led to a kind of populist tendency in society—one that seeks to reduce the complexity of intricate phenomena for easier understanding. Complementing this oversimplification is the growing social acceptance of conspiracy theories.
It is difficult to believe that the emergence and growth of the Taliban, their ideology, and Islamic extremism are solely the result of foreign conspiracies or international rivalries. While such destructive conspiracies and interventions have certainly existed and contributed significantly to the rise and fall of these phenomena, they are not the sole cause. Reducing the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the resulting civilizational rupture to a single cause is overly simplistic and misguided.
One of the many contributing factors is the social corruption, in which many political and military elites, leaders, NGOs, and some media outlets in Afghanistan were complicit. Without doubt, the corruption within donor nations and aid organizations was far more extensive in scale than that of Afghan elites. But as Johan Galtung explains, the media hegemony of Western countries and their affiliates in the Global South is so overwhelming that our liberal-leaning public easily forgets or remains silent about the corruption of foreign donors. In Afghanistan, even when someone did write about these issues, the prevailing culture of superficial discourse often led to their words being ignored. In times of intellectual decay, dissenting against centers of power becomes exceedingly difficult.
The fall of the Republic on August 15, 2021, had multiple causes—too many to list or analyze in a single article. Not even the most critical ones can be fully explored here. I’ve heard that several capable young scholars in exile are researching this topic. For my part, I briefly touch on a few relevant points in this piece, emphasizing that the role of the people—especially political and social elites and civic culture—is fundamental to the success of democracy and state-building.
After gaining political independence in 1919, Afghanistan strove to free itself from colonial influence. Following a brief period of independence in the early 1930s, the country again fell into a web of dependency. Despite internal weaknesses, the country’s foreign policy largely aligned with newly decolonized nations. Those familiar with Afghanistan’s foreign policy stances after World War II will recall that the country often supported the peoples of colonized nations and anti-colonial movements across Asia and Africa.
However, after the Saur Coup on April 27, 1978, both the coup leaders and their opponents intensified foreign dependency. It became direct, immediate, vast, and overt—persisting during the Islamic Republic era and continuing under the Taliban’s rule. The Republic, despite crafting a multilateral foreign policy, failed to implement it broadly due to deep economic, security, and political dependence. (It did manage limited success in balancing relations between the U.S. and Iran.)
Decades of defeat and unprecedented displacement—comparable only to post–World War II crises—have deeply embedded dependency within the psyche and culture of elites and parts of society in Afghanistan.
A well-known example illustrates this point: the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Afghan government representatives in the provinces often lacked basic financial and military resources, while foreign commanders of PRTs had access to millions of dollars. They were just as corrupt as Afghan officials. Under such circumstances, it was inevitable that needy individuals and political opportunists would turn to foreign sources. Even up until the fall of the Republic, the Afghan army couldn’t conduct air operations independently. All military equipment suppliers were contracted by the United States, leaving Afghanistan with no decision-making power. When the funders and suppliers left, so did their auxiliaries—including NGOs. As the Iranians say, “Ali was left alone with the pool.”
Since 2014, a relentless media campaign—both foreign and domestic—created such fear and panic that many people were convinced everything would collapse once the foreigners left. In other words, our collective psyche collapsed before the actual fall occurred, and we were psychologically disarmed. Still, despite increasing signs of foreign withdrawal, some believed Afghanistan was vital to the West in its rivalry with China. But in reality, Afghanistan was merely one of several strategic fronts—neither unique nor the most important. That remains the case today.
The belief in Afghanistan’s unmatched strategic significance, promoted during the Soviet invasion by Western media, became deeply rooted in our thinking. We internalized this flawed analysis. Today, with shifting global geopolitics, Afghanistan’s strategic importance has not increased. Instead, it is increasingly viewed as a failed state and a hub for terrorist activity, useful as a tool of sabotage against regional rivals. This approach is a continuation of Brzezinski’s infamous strategy of creating fire-starter zones against the Soviets, adapted for new circumstances. Not only the United States but also India and Pakistan—particularly India—have used Afghanistan against each other. (Other factors also shape Pakistan’s policies toward Afghanistan.)
Additionally, overconfidence in and reliance on the United States led Republic leaders into a delusional state. As provinces fell one by one, they continued holding “sustainable development” meetings, embroiled in ethnic and linguistic disputes, while fantasizing about turning Afghanistan into “Asia’s crossroads,” reclaiming tulips from Holland, and becoming self-sufficient from pine nut exports. Meanwhile, a sense of helplessness had deeply rooted itself among the people, elites, and security institutions. It was too late to change the political psychology, and no serious efforts were made to do so. Warnings from those who foresaw the collapse were drowned out in a wave of nihilism and systemic falsehoods. I must admit that in the early years of my service, I too was trapped in this delusion.
Before the fall, as fighting intensified, so did indiscriminate bombings and village assaults. The more violence escalated, the more people—once hopeful for peace, economic prosperity, and the rule of law—distanced themselves from the Republic and its allies. Consequently, villagers increasingly aligned with or submitted to the Taliban. Extremist reactionary groups encircled the cities from the countryside, reversing Mao’s “peasant war” tactic.
The transfer of security responsibilities to Afghan forces was a plan meant to be executed by the National Security Council. From the outset, we disagreed with the foreign donors. Afghanistan demanded full control of defense and security, but conditioned it on the transfer of capabilities and resources. The army, police, and intelligence forces needed proper training and equipment. In practice, however, foreigners transferred “incapacity” rather than capability. I once asked foreign officials in Kabul why their soldiers required advanced training and heavy weaponry, yet Afghan forces didn’t. No one provided a satisfactory answer. They made empty promises. Eventually, responsibility for the transition was handed from President Karzai to Dr. Ashraf Ghani, who was better positioned to cooperate with foreigners—and to leverage the transition for his election campaign. With great fanfare, incapacity was passed to Afghan forces, while foreign troops took their aircraft, heavy machinery, electronic warfare tools, and operational capacity with them.
After 2014, power was increasingly centralized in the Presidential Palace (Arg), stripping ministries and independent directorates of authority. Although there were two political decision-making centers—Arg and Sepidar—Sepidar was effectively powerless. The split was driven more by ethnic rivalries and differing degrees of foreign allegiance than by policy differences. Arg controlled even minor officer appointments within its inner circle. The political and security leadership was reduced to a sycophantic circle lacking initiative. Meanwhile, traditional societal structures continued to erode, without being replaced by modern political or legal systems.
More critically, the rule of law was steadily replaced by lawlessness. The hollowing out of legal institutions did not start in 2014—it ran parallel to state-building efforts from the start of the Republic. After 2014, the weakening of the central government and the strengthening of centrifugal forces accelerated. As the state was hollowed out and war dragged on, public trust in government institutions, the judiciary, law enforcement, and legislative bodies eroded.
Elections, rife with fraud and stripped of meaning, further discredited democratic processes. Public expression of political will turned into farcical tragedies. At times, systemic fraud was so pervasive that it seemed everything was counterfeit. Institutions meant to prevent malpractice became the very enablers of corruption. As long as these fraudulent processes aligned with foreign interests, the donors cheered them on without protest.
Approaches to peace talks with the Taliban varied. One belief held that the Taliban might negotiate with Afghan government representatives. Years of overt and covert efforts followed, especially under President Karzai. Attempts to involve Pakistan were met with lies and deception, and the Taliban never agreed to talk with Afghan officials.
I firmly believed—and still do—that the Taliban and Pakistan sought total power and would never share it. The British tried to convince the Taliban by offering control of three provinces—an idea that implied two governments and legal systems within one country. Both the Afghan government and the Taliban rejected it. As Abbas Stanikzai later revealed, the Americans had been secretly negotiating with the Taliban since the Bush administration, without informing the Afghan government. These talks became public in 2018 with Zalmay Khalilzad’s overt engagements in Doha. As ethnic tensions and political purges increased under the guise of “youth renewal” and legal violations became systemic, power was transferred to the Taliban on August 15, 2021.
The U.S.-Taliban Agreement of Compromise, or the so-called Peace Agreement, clearly treated the Taliban as the future governing authority in Afghanistan. This was evident to us, which is why we never bought into the illusion of implementing its lofty promises. The agreement’s second section states:
“Along with the announcement of this agreement, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan—which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban—will take the following steps to ensure that no group or individual, including al-Qaeda, uses Afghan soil to threaten the security of the United States and its allies…”
The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan — which is not recognized by the United States as a government and is known as the Taliban — will not allow any of its members, other individuals, or groups, including al-Qaeda, to use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies.
- The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan — which is not recognized by the United States as a government and is known as the Taliban — will not allow any of its members, other individuals, or groups, including al-Qaeda, to use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies.
- The Islamic Emirate of the Taliban — which is not recognized by the United States as a government and is known as the Taliban — will issue a clear message that those who pose a threat to the security of the United States have no place in Afghanistan. It will instruct the members of the Islamic Emirate — which is not recognized by the United States as a government and is known as the Taliban — not to cooperate with any groups or individuals who threaten the security of the United States and its allies.
- The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan — which is not recognized by the United States as a government and is known as the Taliban — will prevent any group or individual from threatening the security of the United States and its allies. It will halt their recruitment, training, and financing, and, under its commitments in this agreement, will not host them.
- The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan — which is not recognized by the United States as a government and is known as the Taliban — is committed to act under international migration law and its commitments under this agreement concerning those seeking asylum or residence in Afghanistan, to ensure that no threat to the security of the United States and its allies arises from such individuals.
- The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan — which is not recognized by the United States as a government and is known as the Taliban — will not issue visas, passports, travel permits, or any other legal documents for entry into Afghanistan to individuals who are considered a threat to the security of the United States and its allies.
Dr. Ashraf Ghani and his team tried hard to block any form of agreement with the Taliban, hoping that the end of Trump’s term and Biden’s election would reverse U.S. policy and enable Ghani to finish his second term. But as we all know, events moved in a different direction, and Biden completed Trump’s unfinished project. I must stress: any agreement involving power-sharing with the Republic would never have been accepted by the Taliban—obstruction efforts were futile.
Externally, Pakistan played a devastating role in nearly five decades of Afghanistan’s turmoil—a fact the Americans fully understood. In a January 2013 meeting with President Obama and President Karzai, attended only by National Security Advisor Donilon and me, Obama bluntly told us: “Afghanistan’s foreign policy must be acceptable to Pakistan. Pakistan is a strategic partner of the U.S. in the fight against terrorism, and we will not pressure them…”
Pakistan received over $34 billion in U.S. aid during the American presence in Afghanistan, but never stopped supporting the Taliban and other terrorist groups.
Iran, initially a supporter of the interim government and development projects, shifted its stance during talks on bilateral security cooperation between Afghanistan and the U.S. It began to strengthen the Taliban, fearing U.S. influence in the region and Gulf state interventions.
(After all these failed policies and painful lessons, I believe we must abandon hostility toward our neighbors. Without regional cooperation and integration, Afghanistan cannot overcome its challenges.)
Most importantly, democracy requires social, political, cultural, and economic preconditions. It cannot succeed without public participation and elevating citizens to informed, active agents of democracy. True civic engagement demands a level of public awareness rooted in social relationships and shared values that transcend tribal or ethnic divisions. Only in such conditions do the conscious and political elements of society embrace the people as the rightful owners and guardians of democracy, who, in turn, take initiative to protect and nurture it.
The beginning of democracy does not guarantee its permanence. The failure of other democratic experiments proves that its re-emergence is always possible. Hence, democracy’s stakeholders must actively defend it. Democracy is not an abstract or supra-social ideal—it always adapts to local cultures and realities, even as it upholds universal values.
It is a long, open-ended journey. It cannot be achieved in a short time through foreign soldiers, technocrats, or intellectuals detached from the people. One of our biggest problems is the vast disconnect between the language, culture, consciousness, and dreams of our elites and those of ordinary citizens. In a society where many men and women remain indifferent or silent in the face of women’s exclusion from education and work, advocating for modern women’s rights is immensely difficult. This does not diminish the bravery of educated, urban women who continue to lead the civil struggle.
When our political leaders fled, the Republic collapsed easily, and the Taliban seized power; it became painfully clear how shallowly rooted the Republic had been among the people. And we were left mourning countless soldiers, security forces, and civilians who lost their lives in cities and villages alike.
Until the dawn of freedom.
You can read the Persian version of this article here:
