Pakistan’s airstrikes on Afghanistan have gradually shifted from an exceptional event to something routine and recurring. With each attack, several people are killed, and homes are destroyed. The Taliban respond only with warnings and promises, but in practice the group’s reaction does not reach a level that could create “deterrence.” This passivity, or at least the not-so-serious response of the Taliban to Pakistan’s repeated attacks, is as worthy of reflection as the attacks themselves. The fundamental question is not why Pakistan attacks. The question is why the Taliban, despite claiming full control over Afghanistan, show a limited and cautious response to the repetition of these attacks.
Yes, the Taliban have considerable military force and have maintained territorial control to some extent, but this is different from having the capacity to deter a country with a powerful air force. The Taliban can create clashes along the borders, carry out ground operations, deploy suicide fighters, and even, in some cases, claim to have inflicted casualties on the other side. But a ground response to an air attack is not the equivalent of establishing air deterrence.
This is where the gap between the claim of possessing power and the Taliban’s actual capacity becomes apparent. Therefore, the issue is not whether the Taliban are capable of fighting. The issue is whether, as the rulers of Afghanistan, they have the capacity and the will to impose a cost that would deter Pakistan from repeating its attacks. The gap between the “ability to fight” and the “ability to deter” is precisely what makes the Taliban’s position today different from their past.
Of course, the problem is not only military weakness. The Taliban’s bigger problem is the lack of a broad social and political foundation. The Taliban cannot confidently assume that every Pakistani attack is seen by all the people of Afghanistan as an attack on “Afghanistan,” because the group has not managed, or has not wanted, to establish itself as the “legitimate representative” of society as a whole. As a result, many remain silent in the face of Pakistan’s attacks, or even express optimism. Undoubtedly, some object, but this opposition does not necessarily mean support for the Taliban’s position against Islamabad. The Taliban have also tried to exploit Pakistan’s attacks to portray themselves as the champion defending “territorial integrity” and the victim of “foreign aggression,” and to mobilize part of society around the issue of “national sovereignty.” Yet once again, they have failed and have not been very successful. They now seem to have realized that every blow delivered by Pakistan does not turn into “political capital” for them.
The third layer is the Taliban’s loneliness and isolation at the international level. So far, no country except India has condemned Pakistan’s repeated and deadly attacks on Afghanistan. Even the United Nations (UN) has remained silent. It has expressed concern about civilian casualties, but there is a very large gap between concern over civilian casualties or opposition to the escalation of the conflict and standing alongside the Taliban. Even if India condemns Islamabad’s attacks because of its hostility toward Pakistan, this cannot automatically be regarded as support for the Taliban. Therefore, the Taliban cannot count every criticism of Pakistan as a diplomatic victory for themselves.
The main issue is that the Taliban have so far been unable to build an effective and broad regional diplomatic front against Pakistan, a front that could confront Islamabad with a serious political cost. Why is this the case? Part of the answer must be sought in the Taliban’s domestic policy. The Taliban demand that the international community recognize their regime and also prevent Pakistan from attacking Afghanistan, but at the same time they show not the slightest flexibility on many of the international community’s core demands, including the formation of an inclusive government, respect for women’s fundamental rights, and the removal of broad social restrictions.
Given this, it can be said that a government that restricts the circle of political participation at home and strongly opposes a large part of the international community’s demands abroad will have less capacity to build a broad political coalition when confronting a foreign power.
This is where the loneliness and isolation of the Taliban take on their real meaning. The Taliban’s isolation is not merely that a few countries do not have full diplomatic relations with the group. Isolation deepens when a government cannot bring all political and social groups along with it at home, cannot build a lasting network of partners in the region, cannot secure an effective consensus at the international level, and also cannot create proportionate deterrence on the battlefield against the pressure of a neighbor.
What more needs to happen for the Taliban to come to their senses? When a neighbor can repeatedly target Afghanistan’s territory; when the Taliban are compelled to limit their response against this neighbor; when there is no broad consensus within society condemning Pakistan’s attacks; when even anti-Taliban reactions can be seen among the majority of citizens in response to Pakistan’s attacks; and when, at the international level, the existing reactions are mostly limited to concern over civilian casualties, calls for restraint, and efforts to reduce tensions, what clearer sign is needed to grasp the depth of the isolation?
You can read the Persian version of this analysis article here:
