Introduction
Iran, a country at the heart of the plateau, a natural bridge linking three continents, has throughout history served as a vital conduit of trade, connecting East and West. It is a land of monumental historical, cultural, and civilizational heritage, one that has occasionally split the heart of time to rediscover itself anew, much like a pearl emerging from the depths of the ocean. With its tapestry of ethnicities, cultural diversity, and a rich blend of myth, poetry, and geopolitics, Iran has both benefited from and been battered by its geography and material and spiritual endowments. Time and again it has been cast down, yet its knees have remained unbroken. As the poet Ali‑Reza Nedoushan observes, each time it has risen phoenix-like from its ashes; like the mythical hydra, it has reattached its severed heads. Iran has endured countless upheavals from ancient times to the present. Over the past 2,700 years, this nation has experienced war 443 times—232 instances were defensive; it has been invaded five times by foreign powers: the Macedonian Greeks, Arabs, Ghaznavid Turks, Mongols, and Tatars (Mesbahi, 2024: 7). Foreign aggression has been relentless, but resilience remains Iran’s most enduring historical feature. Cultural integration and human magnetism have acted as antidotes to invasion and helped preserve these lands.
Keywords: Strategic loneliness, geopolitical isolation, Islamic Republic of Iran
Strategic Loneliness or Geopolitical Isolation?
The central premise is that Iran—throughout its history and in the modern era—has often stood alone, and that this loneliness has served as a precondition for foreign invasions. The crucial question becomes: Where does this isolation stem from? To examine this, I reference the theory of “Iran’s Strategic Loneliness” proposed by Mohiuddin Mesbahi, a professor at the University of Florida. He argues that Iran—whether by design or necessity—has remained strategically isolated, deprived of meaningful alliances with global powers (Mesbahi, 2024: 8). This raises a further question: Is this isolation purely strategic, or has it extended to the geopolitical realm as well? What’s clear is that Iran’s strategic loneliness is by no means synonymous with geopolitical isolation. Equating loneliness with isolation is a fundamental error. A realistic, non-ideological examination of Iran’s history shows that Iran, as Iran, irrespective of its ruling regime, has frequently been alone, but never geopolitically isolated. It occupies a geo-strategic position at the intersection of Europe, Asia, and Africa. Even if Iran were to pursue a policy of disengagement and claim “We have nothing to do with the region,” the region would immediately respond: “But we have everything to do with you.”
Iran cannot withdraw, nor can it remain on the sidelines. Despite its strategic loneliness, it is deeply embedded in the international system, while simultaneously relying on its domestic capabilities. Iran has also sought, through economic mechanisms within international institutions, to play a role in global policy-making. Historically, Iran has exhibited two distinct characteristics: first, a defensive orientation—perpetually prepared to defend itself against invasion; second, the formation of a composite civilization due to its geographic location, which made it a crossroads for cultural exchange. These dual traits, as Nedoushan argues, have shaped Iran’s identity from its inception and continue to define it today (Nedoushan, Collected Essays, 2011: 41).
Iran’s national identity has risen from this blended cultural heritage and, despite profound transformations, continues to assert itself. According to Mesbahi, strategic loneliness is a defining feature of Iran, shaping how the Islamic Republic has navigated regional and transregional developments. Mesbahi analyzes Iran’s foreign relations and identity through this lens, noting that under the Islamic Republic, no lasting strategic ally has been cultivated. This failure dates back to the early days of the Islamic Revolution. Iran’s foreign policy not only served national aims but also embraced transnational Islamic ideals: exporting the revolution, defending Islam and Shia, unifying the Muslim Ummah, and working toward a global Islamic order. Ayatollah Khomeini’s message resonated widely; in parts of Asia and Africa, the Islamic Revolution was seen as emblematic of a religiously inspired Third World uprising. By asserting geopolitical independence from both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, Iran became a symbol of the Non-Aligned Movement (Fest, 2017: 308). Iran charted a “third way” neither East nor West—that drew interest even from ideologically unaligned nations. The Islamic Republic’s doctrine of “neither eastern, nor western” shaped its foreign policy, especially during the eight-year war with Iraq. Iran asserts that it received no support during the Iran–Iraq War and simultaneously maintained its anti-imperialist stance—its foreign policy still echoes that narrative today (Firoozabadi, 2022: 354).
Strategic Loneliness and Quasi-Alliances
Iran’s strategic loneliness is by no means unique to the Islamic Republic; history reveals that the country has seldom—if ever—had a true strategic ally among the major powers, particularly one that would stand by its side during moments of existential military threat. In pivotal historical junctures—when the state teetered on the brink of collapse—Iran found itself alone. Darius III and Yazdegerd III perished in isolation and abandonment. Shah Soltan Hoseyn of the Safavid dynasty, despite dispatching urgent letters and pleas to the Ottoman Empire, ultimately surrendered to the Ghilzai tribes without external rescue. Qajar monarchs made multiple attempts to secure alliances—particularly with France—to counterbalance threats from Russia and Britain, especially when Iranian territorial integrity was at stake. Yet, even after prolonged and costly efforts, they came to a sobering realization: Iran lacked a dependable strategic partner. Reza Shah Pahlavi became a casualty of his veiled outreach to Nazi Germany to hedge against Soviet and British pressure. Even Mohammad Reza Shah, albeit tacitly, recognized the inescapable fact of Iran’s strategic solitude. This pattern persisted after the 1979 Islamic Revolution and gradually became institutionalized within the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy framework.
The term “strategic loneliness” refers to Iran’s chronic absence of enduring alliances with any major power, whether during the Cold War or in its aftermath. Contrary to popular belief, the United States was never truly a strategic ally of Pahlavi-era Iran, even though Tehran maintained close relations with Washington. The Arvand Rud (Shatt al-Arab) crisis in May 1969 with Iraq—then fully backed by the Soviet Union—underscored the futility of relying on stable partnerships in the geopolitics of the Middle East (Reisinezhad, 2018). In contemporary times, Russia and China also fail to qualify as Iran’s strategic allies. A clear example came during the most recent round of military escalation between Israel and Iran: while both Moscow and Beijing condemned the Israeli strikes, neither lifted a finger in Iran’s defense in any strategic capacity. The Islamic Republic’s persistent quest for a dependable ally stems from its “Look to the East” foreign policy—a doctrine that emerged in the wake of the 1979–1981 hostage crisis and the subsequent deterioration of ties with the West, especially the United States. Revolutionary ideologues believed that “the East”—primarily China and the Soviet Union—offered a geopolitical space less contaminated by “imperialist arrogance” and showed greater ideological alignment with Iran’s anti-Western stance.
Iran’s official post-revolution foreign policy doctrine identifies forging strategic alliances—both regionally and globally—as a core objective (Firoozabadi, 2022: 523). Yet evidence suggests that the Islamic Republic remains deeply entrenched in its strategic isolation. Despite repeated setbacks, the desire for such alliances persists within the regime. A telling example is Iran’s sale of drones to Russia during the latter’s invasion of Ukraine, despite global condemnation and increasing sanctions, Tehran maintained its course. Behind the scenes, Iran nurtures a dream of a structured alliance with Moscow. Yet its extended negotiations to procure Su-35 fighter jets remain unresolved. Deep historical memory—particularly Russia’s repeated exploitation of Iranian weakness, exemplified by the 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay—continues to fuel public distrust toward any potential alliance with Russia.
Iran’s relationship with China follows a similar pattern. Although post-revolution cooperation in missile and nuclear technology has occurred, Beijing’s reluctance to intervene decisively demonstrates lingering mistrust. China notably refrained from using its veto power to prevent U.N. Security Council resolutions against Iran, including resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929. These came despite Iran’s hopes that Beijing would block sanctions and alleviate its economic strain. China’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear program remains tactically ambiguous (Mesbahi, 2024: 117), allowing it to balance cooperation with Tehran against its broader strategic interests, such as energy access, trade with Arab partners, and maritime access to the Indian Ocean. Open alignment with Iran would jeopardize Beijing’s ties with countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. At times, China’s Middle East stance even aligns closely with Washington’s.
While Tehran has actively pursued the development of strategic partnerships with Beijing and Moscow, both powers have only gone so far as to accept a form of “quasi-alliance.” In analyzing Iran’s relations with Russia and China, it is important to distinguish: while every alliance implies a relationship, not every relationship constitutes an alliance. The theory of Iran’s strategic loneliness underscores the reality that Iran has frequently engaged in geopolitical maneuvering through quasi-alliances or superficial partnerships—particularly with Russia, and to some extent with China—to preserve or marginally enhance its global standing. In many cases, strategic rhetoric substitutes for the absence of tangible material support. Iran’s cooperation with Russia during the Syrian crisis (2014–2018) is a prime example of such a relationship. However, Iran’s systemic security increasingly relies on its strategic capacity to project power through non-state actors, grassroots movements, paramilitary groups, and asymmetric deterrence strategies. In a geopolitical climate where states are reluctant to engage in formal strategic alliances with Tehran, the Islamic Republic turns instead to subnational and popular forces capable of shaping regional dynamics. Examples of these proxy actors include: Ansarullah in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hashd al-Shaabi and Kata’ib Hezbollah in Iraq, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine, and various other smaller groups. Iranian strategists typically classify their engagement with these state and non-state actors under two conceptual frameworks: security-seeking and Islamic resistance. Each of these paradigms merits its detailed exploration.
According to Mohiuddin Mesbahi, the logic of strategic loneliness leads to two major consequences. First, it creates the possibility of semi-permanent alliances among Iran’s neighbors, aimed at undermining or even dismembering the country. This trend is not unique to the Islamic Republic or the Pahlavi era—it can be traced throughout history. For instance, the alliance between eastern Turkic tribes and the Byzantine Empire nearly 1,500 years ago, or the Uzbek khanates’ pact with the Ottoman Empire 500 years ago. In other words, despite conflicting interests in many areas, the states of West Asia have historically converged on one issue: the desire to weaken—or even eliminate—Iran (Mesbahi, 2024). Iran also faces identity- and sectarian-based threats from three primary sources, each of which has historically influenced the projection of its power in the region:
First: Pan-Turkism—a discourse that has gained traction under Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and among Turkic-speaking states, as well as through efforts to stir discontent among ethnic Turkic minorities within Iran. The growing closeness between Azerbaijan and Israel in recent years is also understood within this context.
Second: Arab-centric narratives—shaped by oil politics, military strategies, and security alliances—often aligned with U.S. interests and facilitated by American-supplied weaponry, which have placed Iran in a confrontational stance with several Arab states.
Third: Sunni encirclement—Iran remains the only Shia majority nation among its 14 neighbors. The structure of its political system, rooted in Shia doctrine, has at various historical junctures subjected Iran to immense pressure from surrounding Sunni-led states.
A historical case in point is the sectarian conflict between the Safavid Empire and the Sunni-led Ottoman Empire, which resulted in a protracted 20-year war that only ended with the Treaty of Amasya in 1555 CE.
You can read the Persian version of this anlaysis here:
