The swift fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government to the rebels and opposition forces in less than two weeks stunned the region and Middle East analysts alike. Before the fall of Aleppo, few could have imagined that Assad’s regime would collapse so quickly and that his opponents would seize power. Despite the significant support from Iran and Russia, Assad felt a minimal sense of security, not foreseeing the imminent crumbling of his power base.
However, if we examine his rule post-2011 and piece together the puzzle, signs of his regime’s downfall were evident from the early days of the Civil War. The Syrian army and the country’s economy were severely worn down during 14 years of civil conflict and battles with ISIS, leaving them with little morale to continue the fight. Additionally, numerous reports indicated that Syrian forces were inadequately compensated, with their salaries sometimes delayed.
Syria’s economy was devastated by war and compounded by international sanctions, leading to a dire living situation for its citizens. One key reason why the public did not resist the successive victories of the rebel forces and in some cases even welcomed them was the governance style of Assad’s regime and the widespread corruption within his administration.
On the other hand, the domino-like collapse of Syrian provinces, the loss of control over the war narrative, widespread corruption, lack of morale for continuing the conflict, and ultimately the president’s flight bear many similarities to the fall of Kabul and the Afghan government.
But what can be envisioned about the scenarios ahead?
Three possibilities can be outlined regarding Syria’s potential future scenarios. Given the significant parallels between Syria’s fall and Afghanistan’s collapse in 2021 and the fact that insurgent forces in Afghanistan have managed to seize power twice, the Afghan experience can serve as a useful framework for envisioning Syria’s future.
A) Afghanistan After 2021
One scenario envisions Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), with its history of ties to al-Qaeda and a brief association with ISIS, seizing full power in Syria and establishing a highly oppressive, religious regime similar to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
This scenario is likely due to the ideological similarities between HTS and the Taliban. Just as the Taliban maintained close relations with al-Qaeda, HTS was initially a part of al-Qaeda’s network in Syria, known at the time as “Jabhat al-Nusra.” The group was even considered part of ISIS for a period until it publicly announced its severance from al-Qaeda, stating it no longer aspired to global jihad.
HTS began reconstructing its identity and branding from that point onward. The group changed its name from “Jabhat al-Nusra” to “Hayat Tahrir al-Sham” and made efforts to present a more moderate image. The objective was to convince the international community, especially Western nations, that the group posed no direct threat to them.
This approach may position HTS to play a leading role in Syria’s future power structure, akin to the Taliban’s role in Afghanistan post-2021.
Drivers
What makes this scenario likely and propels it forward is the history and ideology of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Ideologically, HTS does not differ significantly from al-Qaeda and ISIS. As previously mentioned, the group is a joint product of these two extremist organizations.
The governance experience of HTS in Idlib in recent years further reinforces this possibility. Numerous reports of human rights violations under HTS rule have raised serious concerns among many international observers.
These factors, combined with HTS’s history of close ties to extremist jihadist groups and its oppressive behavior, increase the likelihood that if HTS gains power, it will establish a repressive and extremist governance structure in Syria.
Barriers
Several factors could obstruct or reduce the likelihood of this scenario:
1) Presence of Nationalist Forces
The Syrian Liberation Army, as one of the main forces involved in the overthrow of the Assad regime, could present a significant obstacle to HTS’s full dominance. These forces have nationalist leanings, distinguishing them ideologically and strategically from HTS.
2) International Supervision
Although international oversight has shown limited effectiveness in recent years, it can still play a deterrent role. Diplomatic and economic interventions and pressures from global and regional powers can challenge the establishment of an extremist government.
3) Resistance of Syrian Citizens
A significant portion of Syrian citizens are not in favor of an absolute theocratic regime. This sentiment became evident during ISIS’s presence in the region, as many people actively or passively resisted the group’s presence and ideology. Such public attitudes could pose a challenge for Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in establishing a regime similar to the Taliban or ISIS.
These factors might shift the balance of power in favor of more moderate forces and hinder the formation of an extremist government in Syria.
B) Afghanistan in the 1980s: Civil War Among Victorious Forces
The presence of multiple forces that contributed to the fall of Assad’s regime suggests that Syria’s civil war may not yet be over and could enter a new phase. The fight for control of power may now erupt among the victorious factions.
This scenario was previously observed in Afghanistan during the 1980s. The jihadist forces that overthrew the government of Dr. Najibullah soon turned on each other after their victory, engaging in internal conflicts over power. This new wave of fighting plunged Afghanistan into a prolonged period of instability and violence.
In Syria, too, the ideological diversity and political differences among the victorious forces could pave the way for a new civil war. This time, the conflict may unfold among various groups vying for control of the government and strategic regions.
Drivers
Several factors could strengthen this scenario and increase its likelihood:
1) Presence of Regional Powers and Their Competing Interests
The role of regional powers will be highly influential in shaping Syria’s future.
- Türkiye: Given Türkiye’s military presence and policies regarding border regions, it seems likely that its role will be decisive in determining Syria’s trajectory.
- Iran and Russia: These two countries, having heavily invested in the Assad regime and Syria’s political structure, are unlikely to easily relinquish their interests in the country.
- Qatar and Saudi Arabia: Arab nations, particularly Qatar and Saudi Arabia, driven by ideological competition and political interests, will also strive to play a significant role in Syria’s future.
2) Ideological Incompatibility Among Victorious Groups
The diversity in ideology and deep-rooted differences among the victorious forces, including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and Kurdish groups, could spark new internal conflicts. Historical clashes, particularly between the Kurds and HTS, increase the likelihood of a renewed civil war.
3) History of Rivalry Among Victorious Forces
Long-standing rivalries and ongoing tensions between groups like HTS and the SDF highlight the lack of cohesion among the victors. These divisions resemble the Afghan experience of the 1980s, where victorious forces clashed for control, making the prospect of similar infighting in Syria more probable.
These drivers underscore how regional competition and the lack of unity among the victorious factions could push Syria into a new phase of internal conflict.
Barriers
Several factors could help prevent a new civil war among the victorious forces in Syria:
1) Abu Mohammad al-Jolani’s Efforts to Foster Unity
The leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, has recently initiated efforts to unify the victorious forces and prevent chaos in Syria. These initiatives could act as a significant barrier to internal clashes among various factions, increasing the likelihood of collaboration and coordination.
2) Kurdish Willingness to Cooperate
Kurdish forces have expressed their readiness to collaborate with other groups. If managed effectively, this openness could prevent escalating disputes and internal conflicts, contributing to the creation of a stable political framework.
3) Potential for a Unified Political Process
If these efforts toward unity and cooperation among different groups proceed successfully, there is hope that Syria could transition to a phase of political and social reconstruction rather than plunging into another war.
These deterrents suggest that with intelligent and strategic management, Syria could avoid repeating the 1980s Afghan scenario and instead work towards sustainable peace and governance.
C) General Elections
The third scenario, considered the ideal one, is moving toward holding general and democratic elections. In Afghanistan, such a process never took place, as powerful groups seized power and prevented the organization of genuine elections. Currently, many Syrian citizens hope for elections to take place so they can vote for their preferred candidates and have their voices heard in political decision-making.
However, implementing this option, especially given the current situation in Syria, would not be an easy task. Numerous challenges, including humanitarian crises, internal tensions, and a lack of cohesion among different groups, could prevent the realization of this scenario.
Strong and effective international oversight could be a driving force for holding democratic elections. This oversight could help ensure the necessary conditions for transparent and fair elections, restoring the trust of Syrian citizens in the political process. If this scenario is realized, it could be considered a turning point in Syria’s history and an opportunity to build a better future for the country.
Considering the scenarios outlined, the possibility of other scenarios emerging also exists, and future developments will determine the direction Syria will take.
On the one hand, there are concerns that ISIS may take advantage of the chaos and power vacuum that has emerged. ISIS cells still exist in some areas of Syria, such as Deir ez-Zor and Al-Bukamal, and the possibility of the group re-emerging cannot be ruled out.
Another issue is the potential formation of a new autonomous region in the Middle East. The current power vacuum provides an opportunity for Syrian Kurds to establish an independent region, similar to the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. The Kurds currently control parts of northern and northeastern Syria and have no intention of relinquishing control over these areas.
Over the past 14 years, Kurdish forces have fought fiercely against ISIS and endured bloody battles. Still, it seems that Türkiye does not support this scenario due to specific security concerns regarding the PKK’s military wing. Therefore, Türkiye is likely to be one of the factors preventing this scenario, as it currently considers itself the main winner in the Syrian theater.
Ultimately, Syria’s future will depend on the complex interactions between these factors and groups, and upcoming developments will shape the country’s future.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
سوریه پس از اسد؛ نگاهی به آینده و سناریوهای ممکن | روزنامه ۸صبح
