According to several reports, China has invited Mullah Yaqub Mujahid, the Taliban’s defense minister, to visit Beijing. This unexpected invitation comes as U.S. President Donald Trump has called for Washington to retake the Bagram airbase. A Russian newspaper, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, has confirmed reports of Mullah Yaqub’s possible trip to China and linked it directly to Trump’s recent remarks about Bagram. The paper suggests that Beijing intends to convey its concerns regarding Bagram to the Taliban.
Mullah Yaqub recently made an unannounced visit to Qatar, during which Bagram was reportedly on the agenda. It is said that Qatari officials, acting on behalf of Trump, raised the issue with him. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of Hezb-e-Islami, in a post on X clarified his stance on the matter, claiming that Mullah Yaqub’s visit to Qatar and the simultaneous presence of a U.S. delegation in Kabul were both part of efforts to secure a renewed American military presence in Afghanistan. Since the trip was unpublicized, discreet, and lacking in formal protocol, unlike his previous visits, which were conducted with greater ceremony, it seems likely that Bagram was indeed the main topic under discussion. Although Mullah Yaqub serves as the Taliban’s defense minister, he is also regarded as a pragmatic figure. Within the Taliban, he is viewed as representing a distinct bloc, a status rooted in his lineage as the son of the group’s founder and first leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar. Should the United States seek to exploit the Bagram issue to create fractures within the Taliban, Mullah Yaqub could prove instrumental.
Against this backdrop, China’s invitation to Mullah Yaqub appears even more significant, especially while Trump’s remarks on Bagram remain fresh in international headlines. Beijing likely hopes to leverage its position to prevent Bagram from being handed over to the United States, just as Washington aims to use it to negotiate over the airbase. As a result, Beijing may extend concessions to him personally, while Washington will also seek to win his favor. In such a scenario, Mullah Yaqub could either become a casualty of U.S.-China maneuvering or rise to a position strong enough to sideline his intra-Taliban rivals.
From another perspective, if the United States intends to rely on the “moderate” wing of the Taliban, China may find it necessary to draw upon the hardliners. The prevailing assumption is that moderates tend to align with Western powers and their regional allies, while hardliners are seen as tied to America’s regional competitors. Thus, as a member of the moderate faction, Mullah Yaqub appears more attuned to the tune set by the West than to that of its rivals.
It appears the invitation was extended to Mullah Yaqub rather than Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi for another reason: sanctions lists. Muttaqi is on the UN sanctions list and cannot travel abroad easily. For that reason, he was barred from trips to Pakistan and India after the U.S. representative on the UN Security Council sanctions committee opposed granting him broader exemptions. By contrast, Mullah Yaqub is not listed by the UN and can travel far more freely than many of his colleagues. China seemingly invited him for that very reason; had Beijing invited Muttaqi and been unable to secure a travel exemption, China’s standing as a permanent member of the UN Security Council would have been put in an awkward position.
What does China want from the Taliban?
Beijing wants to prevent the Taliban from becoming a bargaining chip for the United States. Chinese officials also believe that even if the Taliban were to facilitate a U.S. return to Bagram, there would be no guaranteed recognition of the regime. Accordingly, Chinese interlocutors will likely warn Mullah Yaqub, drawing on past American breaches of promise, especially under Trump, and make clear Beijing’s role in helping the Taliban evade U.S. sanctions. They will raise concerns about the unregulated extraction of underground resources and the allocation of proceeds to the Taliban. They will point to China’s political backing of the group in the UN Security Council and in other regional and international fora.
For Beijing, the United States mustn’t reestablish a presence at Bagram. Trump has explicitly tied his interest in Bagram to the base’s proximity to Chinese nuclear facilities, so the issue has become one of national prestige, compelling China to confront Washington. Whether this showdown will close Bagram’s door to the United States remains uncertain.
If the Taliban refuse China’s request, Beijing does not possess the inclination or the instruments to exploit anti-Taliban forces to ignite a new war. China does not pursue such interventions; its preference is to preserve the status quo through economic and commercial engagement. At most, Beijing might offer rhetorical political support to the Taliban’s opponents, an approach that could influence some regional states to temper their stance and accuse the Taliban of complacency toward terrorism, a charge that is relatively easy for many governments to deploy.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
سفر احتمالی وزیر دفاع طالبان به چین؛ آیا گره بگرام کورتر میشود؟
