Since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, they have imposed extensive restrictions on cultural and religious ceremonies. These restrictions have profoundly impacted the social and political fabric of the country, affecting internal security and social relations. Gradually and daily, the Taliban have enacted serious limitations on cultural events, such as the ancient festival of Nowruz, Yalda Night, and other cultural and artistic celebrations, as well as religious ceremonies related to the Shia community, including Eid al-Ghadir, Muharram ceremonies, Mid-Sha’ban, and ceremonies associated with Hindu and Sikh followers. Recently, the Taliban have imposed severe restrictions on the observance of Muharram.
These restrictions have sometimes been communicated verbally without leaving a paper trail and, at other times, in written form. For example, in 2023, the Taliban’s Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice labeled Nowruz an “un-Islamic celebration” and declared that no one in Afghanistan should celebrate it. Mohammad Yahya Aref, an official from this ministry, claimed in a video message that Nowruz was a festival for Zoroastrians, non-Muslims, and polytheists. This stands in stark contrast to the fact that Nowruz is one of the most significant and grand cultural celebrations in the broader Nowruz region.
Additionally, the Taliban have systematically imposed serious restrictions on the teaching and use of the Persian language in official and educational institutions, as well as the Uzbek language in educational settings. This article examines the political and security consequences of these restrictions.
Security Consequences
To date, the most extensive religious restrictions imposed by the Taliban in Afghanistan have targeted the Shia community, including both Jafari and Ismaili sects. According to Taliban ideology, Shias do not adhere to true Islamic values, and some of their religious practices are considered heretical. This perspective is reflected in official Taliban literature, such as a book by Mawlawi Nur Mohammad Islamjar, the current Taliban governor of Herat, which refers to Shias as “Rafidis.” Some Taliban clerics, including Mawlawi Rahim Haqqani, who was killed in Kabul, view Shias as a threat akin to infidels. In some provinces, such as Badakhshan, Taliban members have humiliated and forced some Ismaili Shia followers to recite the declaration of faith to “convert” them to Islam. Sunni clerics have been appointed to Ismaili community centers to provide religious education to children from Ismaili families based on Sunni jurisprudence and teachings.
During both their first and current periods of rule, the Taliban have consistently imposed restrictions on Shia religious ceremonies. This year, they formally communicated such restrictions to the Shia community in writing. The document, which the Taliban referred to as a “commitment letter from the Shias,” reflects the Taliban’s unilateral and derogatory view of Shia Muharram ceremonies. It prohibits the participation of Sunni followers in Muharram events, ostensibly to prevent Sunnis from sinning by attending such gatherings. Shias are instructed to hold their ceremonies within their residential areas, behind closed doors, without any promotional activities, and to share the list of speakers with the Taliban in advance.
While some Taliban advocates argue that these measures are intended to ensure the security of Muharram ceremonies, a deeper examination of the Taliban’s view of Shias reveals a lack of genuine goodwill. Taliban officials, including the group’s head of information and culture for Herat province, have openly stated in meetings with Shia representatives that Muharram ceremonies are political and foreign innovations. In Islamic terms, bid’ah (innovation) refers to adding or removing anything from religion, considered a grave sin warranting severe punishment.
The security consequences of these restrictions are significant. In democratic societies, where there is goodwill in implementing precautionary measures, temporary restrictions are generally accepted by citizens for the public good. However, in regimes like the Taliban, where there is clear and malicious intent towards Shias, there are deep concerns about blatant human rights violations and religious freedoms.
Among the majority, especially the younger generation of the Shia community and some religious scholars, there is a view that certain practices, such as self-flagellation and creating noise disturbances during Muharram, are superstitions and deviations from the true spirit of Ashura. Addressing this issue, however, requires the intervention of Shia religious authorities through awareness, not Taliban-led religious reforms.
Moreover, when the Taliban publicly force Ismaili Shias to recite the declaration of faith as if they are converting from another religion to Islam or declare Muharram ceremonies as heretical without logical explanation, it legitimizes extremists and illiterate individuals within the Taliban and Afghan society to treat Shias as infidels. This can lead to violent actions under the guise of enjoining good and forbidding evil, where killing and seizing the property of Shias are seen as acts of religious merit. Terrorist groups like ISIS, which have a superficial conflict with the Taliban, use these restrictions as an excuse to increase their attacks. Religious ceremonies restricted by the Taliban become targets for terrorist attacks, severely threatening public security.
Additionally, the Taliban’s restrictions on cultural and religious ceremonies, which are part of the local traditions and culture of the Afghan people, have exacerbated internal tensions. Ethnic and religious groups, seeing their cultural and religious identity threatened, may resort to open or even armed opposition.
Political Consequences
Although the Taliban have shown little regard for political values at the domestic and international levels in the past two years and a few months, their actions will inevitably have serious political consequences. The most significant of these are domestic political repercussions. In addition to establishing a regime that is entirely closed, mono-ethnic, gender-exclusive, and single-religious, the Taliban lack political acceptance among the majority of the Afghan population. This is particularly evident among women and men from ethnic groups such as the Hazara, Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen, Baloch, Sadat, Pashai, and even some technocratic Pashtuns. The Taliban’s restrictions send a clear message to a large segment of the Afghan population that they seek to homogenize Afghanistan culturally and religiously, contrary to the diverse beliefs of its people.
These actions by the Taliban do not represent a final blow against cultural and ethnic groups (as defined by the Taliban) but rather indicate the continuation of a long-term strategy of hostility towards non-Taliban groups. Vulnerable populations are exhausting their patience in the face of Taliban oppression, and undoubtedly, this patience will soon end, potentially leading to a widespread revolution against Taliban tyranny. Ethnic and religious groups affected by Taliban oppression will have no choice but to unite and stand against the Taliban, at least for their survival.
Politically, these actions will also compel some regional countries, including Iran, to reconsider their policies towards the Taliban. The Taliban’s presence in Afghanistan, alongside other security threats and the narcotics trade, has severely limited Iran’s political and cultural maneuvering. Iran utilizes the Shia religion and the Persian language as crucial tools in its foreign policy, having invested heavily in these areas to maintain its influence in the Middle East. The Taliban’s presence in Afghanistan has undermined Iran’s political strategies related to language, culture, and religion.
However, Iran has so far adopted an economically focused foreign policy towards Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, aiming to weaken their common enemy: the West. With serious discussions about new Taliban-Western interactions, especially with the United States, what policy will Iran pursue? Can it continue to assert support for the Persian language and Shia religion despite its silence in the face of the Taliban’s significant challenges to these two areas? The answer will unfold over time.
Conclusion
The Taliban’s conflict with the Afghan people conveys two significant messages: first, the continuous victimization of the Afghan population and the potential for increased national discord both now and in the future; second, the awakening of the people to the Taliban’s true intentions and the groundwork for a national uprising to free themselves from Taliban oppression.
