These days, comparisons between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Taliban have become a hot topic in the media and on social networks. The leader of HTS, Ahmad al-Sharaa, recently stated that Syria is not destined to become another Afghanistan, as the two countries have different social and cultural dynamics, with the latter being deeply rooted in tribal structures. His comments have sparked mixed reactions among Afghan social media users, with some agreeing with him and others expressing opposition. The remark by Ahmad al-Sharaa that Syria will not turn into another Afghanistan and his softer, more flexible approach toward the public has garnered significant attention so far. Al-Sharaa has transitioned from being the leader of a terrorist group to being seen as a potential future leader of Syria. Many countries, even Russia, which was a supporter of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, are now seeking political engagement with him. While it may be premature to believe everything al-Sharaa says fully, it is evident that he has so far succeeded in portraying himself as pragmatic and moderate. He has outpaced other Islamists in winning over the Syrian people and mainstream media. On the other side of the spectrum, we are confronted with a terrorist group in Afghanistan the Taliban that, over the past three years, has relied solely on force and repression to demand blind obedience from the population. Their tools have been threats, beatings, detentions, torture, extrajudicial tribunals, and killings. The Taliban have come to “reform” the people according to their own beliefs, showing no interest in using flexibility, moderation, or addressing the people’s needs. Nor have they shown any willingness to adhere to globally accepted laws and principles.
If we analyze the current situations in Syria and Afghanistan through the lens of political realism, we encounter two distinct behavioral models. One is represented by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, and the other by the Taliban under Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada. Both groups are extremist Islamist movements with a significant history of terrorism. However, one attempts to adapt itself to the people and the world, while the other, with a childlike obstinacy, demands that people and the world conform to it. The former seeks engagement with the public and international community; the latter, however, declares that it will refuse engagement even in the face of a nuclear threat. This level of savagery, backwardness, stubbornness, and ideological ignorance demonstrates that the Taliban have no desire to change. The primary fear of the Taliban and other ideologically driven movements—whether on the far right or far left—is the fear of their own “death.” To preserve and sustain their sacred beliefs and values, which are long outdated and unsuitable for a dynamic and ever-evolving society, they are willing to commit any atrocity. Some movements, like HTS, when faced with the stark reality of their sustained and long-term failures in achieving their delusional goals, come to realize that political survival necessitates flexibility and compromise with the ever-changing reality. These movements, even if only superficially, project an image of “change” to gain control over the political landscape—at least until their position in society is no longer under threat. However, most extremist movements are unwilling to even engage in this form of deceptive display. The ideological virus runs so deep in these groups that they become entirely deaf and blind to reality, incapable of showing any adaptability. The Taliban fall squarely into this category of extremist movements.
The Taliban have not retreated even an inch from the decisions they have made in any area so far. Instead, they have issued ultimatums to the world with absolute arrogance. It is the international community that has consistently faltered and stepped back when confronting the Taliban, seemingly left with no alternative but to compromise and cooperate with the group. The Taliban, now well aware of the weaknesses of the global community, have intensified their bullying and obstinacy, exploiting these vulnerabilities to extort more than ever before. They understand that those who yield to their demands are readily willing to abandon their principles to appease the group. It appears that the world has become so disillusioned that it effectively believes the absolute and final defeat of terrorism is unattainable. This stems from the fact that global politics, driven by relentless geopolitical competition, continues to perpetuate and reproduce terrorism in various forms.
Currently, the primary strategy employed by the global community in dealing with terrorism is to categorize terrorist groups into “bad” and “worse” or “good” and “bad.” This is a product of the realism that dominates global politics, which dictates that to counter the “worse,” one must align with the “bad,” or to undermine the “bad,” one must ally with the “good.” However, it is crucial to note that this categorization is relative and comparative. For example, in Afghanistan, the international community supports the Taliban, labeled as a “bad” terrorist group, against ISIS, considered the “worse” terrorist group. The Taliban are deemed less dangerous than ISIS in this context, thus placed in the “bad” category. However, if another Islamist group were present in Afghanistan that made the Taliban appear more extreme in comparison, the “bad” and “worse” or “good” and “bad” categories would shift accordingly. Another example is the comparison between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Taliban. Given the recent developments in Syria, HTS has been identified by the global community as a “good” terrorist group, while the Taliban’s three-year track record demonstrates that they fall into the “bad” category. A “good” terrorist, like Ahmad al-Sharaa, engages in compromise with the world and relinquishes ideological rigidity, even if only superficially and temporarily. A “bad” terrorist, on the other hand, remains inflexible, like Mullah Hibatullah, the reclusive Supreme Leader of the Taliban.
The “good” terrorist is pragmatic, recognizing that the world does not revolve around them and that they must adapt to the existing global order. This pragmatism gives the “good” terrorist a better chance of political survival and longevity compared to the “bad” terrorist, who refuses to abandon ideological overreach or embrace reconciliation and compromise. However, if “bad” terrorists like the Taliban occupy a unique position due to the presence of ISIS, the world opts for engagement with them rather than outright opposition. This approach represents one of the pitfalls of conventional realism in contemporary politics.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
