Ahmad Massoud, the leader of the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan, was scheduled to visit Washington at the head of a delegation from his front. He had been invited by Michael McCaul, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. NRF had accepted McCaul’s invitation and thanked him. The meeting between the two parties was set to take place on September 10. McCaul had also indicated that he would meet with Massoud personally to hear his views. Now, the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan has announced that a delegation from the front will travel to the U.S. without Massoud. According to the statement, Massoud is expected to speak online at a joint session with McCaul and the delegation. Massoud’s avoidance of traveling to the U.S. raises significant questions, and the following points may help address some of them:
1) As previously mentioned, McCaul’s support, as the most influential Republican representative in Congress, does not signify a change in the Biden administration’s stance toward the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan. Not only does it not imply such a change, but McCaul’s support might even lead to the Biden administration’s closer alignment with the Taliban. The reason is clear: McCaul, amid the electoral battle, has summoned Biden’s Democratic allies in Congress and placed the responsibility for the hasty and disastrous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan on their shoulders. More importantly, McCaul describes the Taliban as a terrorist group and a source of terrorism originating from Afghanistan, while Biden has sent billions of dollars to the country under Taliban control over the past three years. Thus, Massoud’s trip to Washington would have had no tangible outcome other than creating noise and sparking a faint hope in those wishing for the Taliban’s departure. This noise would also quickly subside. If Massoud had been McCaul’s guest in person, the situation for the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan would have become more challenging if the Democrats retained the White House in the November 5 elections. In this case, Massoud’s visit would have turned into a “net loss.” If Trump were to return to the White House, he too would not be inclined to heed McCaul’s call and embrace the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan.
2) The National Resistance Front might have hoped that its leader would receive invitations from both houses of Congress, similar to the hosting of leaders from certain countries. Sean Ryan, a former U.S. military officer who orchestrated the invitation for Massoud, aimed for him to be invited to Congress, not necessarily just by McCaul in the House Foreign Affairs Committee. If both the Senate and the House of Representatives had agreed, Massoud would have immediately traveled to Washington, and the importance of the invitation and trip would have increased. Biden’s administration’s stance toward the front would have been more flexible, even if it was reluctant to invite them, due to the majority Democratic control of the Senate, and the White House would have had to consider the senators’ sentiments. If this option had materialized, its message and impact would have been significant, delivering a shock to the Taliban and the regional countries. However, this option seems impractical regardless of whether Democrats or Republicans are in power in the White House unless another September 11 incident occurs, prompting the U.S. to turn to traditional anti-Taliban forces, especially the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan.
3) Alongside the two above points, consideration of the regional countries, especially Russia and Iran, has also played a role. Moscow and Tehran are traditional allies of groups opposed to the Taliban. Even if these two countries have not supported the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan over the past three years, they have at least kept their doors open to it. Given that a branch of NRF resides in Mashhad, this may currently represent a valuable opportunity that should be preserved rather than squandered by acquiescing to McCaul’s request. Similarly, Moscow’s sporadic hosting of the front could be significant. Currently, Russia is indirectly at war with the U.S. in Ukraine, and Tehran is accused of supporting Hamas, a group that has conflicted with Israel, a strategic U.S. ally, for the past eleven months. Thus, Tehran is also indirectly at war with Washington. In this regard, Massoud’s presence in the U.S. could tighten the regional space for him.
It is true that the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan lacks support from Moscow and Tehran and is aware of their weaknesses and limitations. However, if given a long-term choice, it would prefer them over the U.S., even though it understands that Washington could play an influential role in transitioning Afghanistan from Taliban rule to a democratic order. Therefore, it is possible that the National Resistance Front viewed the invitation for its leader to the U.S. as a kind of “political trap,” intended to distance him from Russia and Iran, especially given that there is no indication of a change in the West’s stance toward the Taliban. To ensure that McCaul’s request does not go unanswered and to dispel any notion that the National Resistance Front depends on Iran and Russia, a middle path has been chosen: sending a standard delegation to Washington.
It should not be forgotten that if there is to be a transformation in Afghanistan, it will not be possible without external intervention. Afghanistan’s recent history shows the significance of external intervention in determining its fate. Even in the republican era, democratic processes were subject to external intervention. A close examination of the presidential elections of 2009, 2014, and 2019 reveals the depth of external interference in Afghanistan’s conflicts. The Taliban’s return to power was also due to external intervention. Right now, the vast majority of anti-Taliban forces are looking towards external intervention. The notion that some occasionally express, that one should not rely on outsiders, is more political rhetoric than reality.
Certainly, external intervention can be effective in certain contexts and even contribute to establishing democracy in a country, as numerous examples, including Afghanistan, have demonstrated. It is clear that in some cases, it has been detrimental. For instance, if the U.S. had not invaded Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, it cannot be claimed that the country would have transitioned to democracy and reaped the unripe fruits of a fruitful tree. Similarly, conventional and customary reliance on a foreign country and institution cannot be deemed reprehensible, especially in Afghanistan which has always been prone to external intervention. The issue is not the inherent reprehensibility of external intervention but the necessity of developing internal capacity to effectively and beneficially utilize external interference. Unfortunately, this capacity has not been developed. If it had, everything would not have reverted to square one in the blink of an eye at the dawn of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Therefore, it is up to the anti-Taliban forces to strive to direct the interventionist approach of major regional and global powers in Afghanistan towards creating a path for establishing an inclusive democratic government. The transformation of Afghanistan into a modern nation-state, achieving a level of self-sufficiency in various areas, and resolving ethnic and linguistic conflicts will require significant time and resources. However, one should not lose hope. It is better to acknowledge this harsh reality.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
