Following the Taliban’s announcement that the construction of the Pashdan Dam in Herat is 80% complete and will soon become operational, a wave of criticism emerged from the Islamic Republic of Iran. Eisa Bozorgzadeh, spokesperson for Iran’s water industry, stated that this dam would severely affect the drinking water supply for millions of Iranians in the city of Mashhad, urging the Taliban to reconsider their decision. Iranian newspapers also adopted a sharp tone. For instance, Farheekhtegan a publication affiliated with Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, the Speaker of Iran’s Parliament featured the headline, “The Taliban’s Obscenity Knows No Bounds” on its front page. Similarly, the Khorasan newspaper displayed the headline, “Taliban Following in Türkiye’s Footsteps,” claiming that the Taliban are drawing inspiration from Türkiye’s dam-building policies against Iran. Additionally, Farheekhtegan highlighted Azerbaijan’s alleged role in constructing the Pashdan Dam. Further fueling the controversy, Abolfazl Zohrevand, a member of Iran’s Parliament and a former ambassador to Afghanistan, strongly criticized the Taliban while pointing to Türkiye and Azerbaijan’s involvement in dam construction. He called for a shift in the Islamic Republic’s approach to dealing with the Taliban regime in Kabul. So far, the Taliban have not responded to the Iranian statements.
In connection to the Pashdan Dam controversy, encompassing the Taliban’s persistence, Iran’s apprehensions, and alleged interventions by Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and others several points merit attention:
1) Claims by Iranian lawmakers and prominent media outlets that Türkiye and Azerbaijan are encouraging the Taliban to build dams should not be dismissed lightly. Both nations are Iran’s rivals in the Middle East and the South Caucasus. For instance, Iran has traditionally sided with Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan, partly because Azerbaijan is allied with Israel. Meanwhile, Armenia, despite being predominantly Christian, is viewed more favorably by Tehran due to Azerbaijan’s Shia majority aligning with Iran’s ideological sphere. Relations between Iran and Türkiye, historically stable, have recently soured over developments in Syria. Tehran accuses Ankara of supporting Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), allegedly undermining Bashar al-Assad’s regime a factor that diminished Iran’s influence in Syria while enabling Türkiye’s resurgence. Against this backdrop, Iran is unlikely to tolerate Ankara extending its influence into Afghanistan, particularly if the Taliban are encouraged to use dam construction as a geopolitical tool. While the claims of Türkiye’s involvement remain unconfirmed, its actions in Syria suggest a strategic precedent for challenging Iran in other regions, even where Turkish interests are less pronounced compared to Iran’s deep-rooted stakes.
2) Iran’s hosting of Nizamuddin Qaisari, a controversial ethnic Turk figure from Afghanistan, deserves scrutiny. Once known for thriving under the Taliban regime and claiming Afghanistan was entirely secure, Qaisari has now sought refuge in Iran for the second time this time under markedly different circumstances. He reportedly owns a mansion in Tehran and frequently shares photos and videos of his meetings with Afghan migrants, something even influential figures like Ismail Khan have refrained from doing. More notably, Qaisari, who had previously criticized Marshal Abdul Rashid Dostum, the leader of Afghanistan’s National Islamic Movement, recently made contact with him. Both emphasized the importance of maintaining party unity and expanding its activities. This phone conversation was publicly disclosed by a prominent media outlet. Dostum later claimed that Iranian authorities had assured him they would not deport his commanders this time. Iran’s warm reception of Qaisari contrasts sharply with its past actions, such as the arrest of Mohammad Hashim Rais, a former governor of Jowzjan and a Dostum ally, in March 2022. Rais spent nearly a year in an Iranian prison.
In a video interview, Qaisari expressed concern about the growing influence of ISIS in Afghanistan, stating that he sought refuge in Iran due to threats from the group. This raises alarm for both Iran and the Taliban, suggesting that the Taliban, contrary to their claims, have not suppressed ISIS but have instead allowed it to gain strength. Additionally, the Taliban appear incapable of providing security for political figures they entice to Kabul with lofty promises. In this scenario, Tehran not only grows apprehensive but also sees value in hosting figures perceived as anti-ISIS and opposed to the Taliban.
Tehran’s hosting of Qaisari holds another significant implication: fostering relations with Turkic groups that do not align with Türkiye. Ankara maintains ties with General Dostum and his loyalists but not with all Uzbek communities. Traditionally, Iran has not had strong relations with Turkic groups. However, it now appears to be attempting to cultivate connections with those who are distanced from Ankara; By aligning with such groups, Iran can leverage them to counter Türkiye’s interests in Afghanistan. If Tehran’s relations with the Taliban deteriorate in the future, these alliances could serve as a pressure point against the group.
3) The Islamic Republic of Iran, feeling increasingly surrounded, is likely to take the Taliban’s dam construction initiatives seriously. This sense of encirclement stems from several regional setbacks: the bleak future of Hamas, the severe weakening of Hezbollah, and Bashar al-Assad’s strategic disengagement. Iran’s protective shields in the region appear to be crumbling. Adding to its concerns, some Western media outlets and figures have floated the narrative that after Hamas and Hezbollah, the focus may turn to the Houthis and, eventually, Tehran itself. Even if this narrative is speculative, its dissemination is alarming.
In Syria, despite sharp divisions, there was a rare consensus among global powers: the desire to distance Assad from Iran. Tempting offers were reportedly made to Assad, though the situation did not allow time for acceptance or rejection. Given the strategic importance placed by Iran’s rivals on containing Tehran, creating challenges along its eastern borders becomes a priority. The Taliban, in this regard, could serve as an effective tool.
A regime unable to pay its employees is unlikely to fund dam construction independently unless politically motivated external actors provide the necessary resources.
4) If the Taliban were to choose between aligning with Iran or its rivals, they would likely opt for the latter. The reasoning is straightforward: Tehran lacks financial resources, and siding with it offers no tangible benefits. Conversely, aligning with Iran’s rivals could yield political and economic advantages. To gain legitimacy as a recognized government, the Taliban requires Western and allied approval, not that of an isolated Iran. Moreover, to maintain power amid legitimacy deficits, the Taliban needs Western financial support rather than aid from a cash-strapped Tehran. It has become increasingly clear that the bulk of the Taliban’s financial support comes from Western sources rather than neighboring countries. While regional states, including Iran, may offer some assistance, such aid pales in comparison to what the Taliban receive from the West. Consequently, the Taliban are unlikely to reject lucrative offers that involve creating challenges for Iran.
5) Since the rise of the fourteenth Iranian government under reformist leadership, the country’s approach to Afghanistan appears to have become more cautious. Two primary reasons underpin this shift:
First: The administration led by Masoud Pezeshkian is preoccupied with repairing relations with the West, lifting sanctions, and resolving the FATF (Financial Action Task Force) compliance issue. Success in these endeavors necessitates deprioritizing the Taliban issue, especially in the absence of an immediate and clear threat.
Second: As discussed earlier, Iran is under intense regional and international pressure. This has compelled Tehran to tread carefully to avoid exacerbating the current situation. Consequently, Iranian officials have refrained from taking a strong and explicit stance on the Taliban’s dam-building activities a marked departure from their past assertiveness. For example, during earlier regional crises, former President Sayyid Mohammad Ebrahim Raisi made explicit and warning-laden statements regarding Iran’s water rights.
Conclusion
Iran is likely to revisit the dam construction issue with the Taliban once it perceives some relief from its current pressures. However, this does not imply a potential military confrontation. Instead, it suggests a subtle shift in Iran’s optimistic stance toward the Taliban. This evolving perspective is already evident in the changing attitudes of Iranian parliamentarians, public opinion, and the media’s critical tone toward the Taliban. These developments may steer Iran’s foreign policy toward aligning with the aspirations of the anti-Taliban majority in Afghanistan.
You can read the Persian version of this Analysis here:
