The Taliban are steadfast allies of al-Qaeda and other radical jihadist organizations, excluding ISIS. Their relationships with these groups are primarily ideological, followed by pragmatic ties. Ideologically, they share a worldview, perspectives, goals, and agendas, leading to collaboration between the Taliban and these organizations. Pragmatically, they rely on one another for various forms of economic, security, and logistical support, which they have exchanged over the past three decades. The depth of their interwoven relationships transcends personal boundaries, resulting in familial bonds through marriages among their leaders and lower-ranking soldiers and fighters.
For these groups, the entangled relationships between the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other terrorist organizations present opportunities, while they pose a threat to others—especially democratic societies and systems. In any country where the Taliban gain a foothold and establish a normal presence, alleviating security concerns, the potential for extremist groups to become active significantly increases. The Arab Spring experience demonstrated that whenever a political Islamist group came to power or joined the ruling system—regardless of whether it was deemed relatively moderate—it opened the door for other radical groups to operate. The most extreme elements found opportunities in public life and influenced major national decisions. For example, when the Muslim Brotherhood won Egypt’s 2012 election, it created an environment where leaders of more radical groups, such as al-Jihad and al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, not only regained their freedom but also entered the government. Individuals previously imprisoned for involvement in the assassination of Anwar Sadat and other political figures emerged in the media, becoming influential in society and culture while participating in high-level political decision-making processes.
The complex relationships between the Taliban and other terrorist organizations, built over three decades and mutually beneficial, are unlikely to change in the short term, even if the Taliban leadership desires it. However, specific actions by the Taliban’s Amir al-Mu’minin (Supreme Leader) indicate that no such desire exists, particularly as he pursues stricter policies. The financial support the Taliban currently receive from certain countries under the Doha Agreement may now exceed the aid they previously obtained from al-Qaeda and other extremist groups, but their engagement with these countries remains tactical. Various factors hinder the development of sufficient trust to establish strategic partnerships. Presently, the Taliban’s relationships with China, Russia, and Iran raise significant concerns among Western decision-makers, while the funds they receive from some Western entities alarm the Russians, Iranians, and Chinese. In this context, al-Qaeda and other radical jihadist groups remain the Taliban’s only strategic allies, with whom they have developed mature cooperation mechanisms over the years. The Taliban have benefited from these groups’ expertise in suicide operations and other violent acts, as well as from their intelligence capabilities, financial resources, and logistical support, enabling them to challenge NATO forces in Afghanistan. Therefore, now that the Taliban are in power, they must reciprocate these groups’ assistance; failure to do so could lead to internal distrust, potentially resulting in the group’s collapse.
Given the deep ties between the Taliban and these organizations, the Taliban’s entry into any public activity—particularly diplomatic arenas and control of Afghanistan’s official embassies abroad—raises alarm bells for both Afghan citizens and host countries. Taliban control over any diplomatic institution equates to al-Qaeda and other extremist organizations gaining control as well. Diplomatic institutions, due to their immunity under international law, are significant and tempting targets for extremist groups, placing them at the top of their priority lists. The presence of Taliban members in these institutions poses not only a threat but also opens the door for terrorism to infiltrate one of the most sensitive sectors in international relations.
Recognizing the importance of official embassies and Afghanistan’s diplomatic institutions for their long-term goals, the Taliban prioritized influencing these entities from the first days of their takeover in Kabul. To achieve this, the Taliban’s diplomatic apparatus has employed various strategies, ranging from coercion to persuasion. After the fall of the Republic, some of Afghanistan’s diplomatic institutions secretly began cooperating with the Taliban. Some officials were motivated by ideological or ethnic ties with the group, while others aimed to preserve their positions and financial privileges, and a few sought immunity from previous corruption or financial charges. Conversely, several diplomatic missions have resisted submission to the Taliban and made significant efforts to prevent their influence. Shifts in the policies of certain regional countries may, however, open the door for terrorists to infiltrate diplomatic institutions—especially in countries eager to hand over these institutions to Taliban representatives due to their political competition with the West. These countries hope that al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups will seize this opportunity to advance toward another 9/11.
You can read the Persian version of this editorial here:
طالبان و نمایندهگیهای دیپلماتیک افغانستان؛ خطر نفوذ القاعده به کشورهای دیگر | روزنامه ۸صبح
