In an unexpected move, Tim Burchett, a Republican member of the U.S. House of Representatives, has invited Amrullah Saleh, the former first vice president of Afghanistan under Ashraf Ghani’s administration, to visit Washington. This invitation has caused a stir in Afghan media. Burchett stated that he extended the invitation to discuss Afghanistan and its people with Saleh. He also emphasized that the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan poses a threat to the United States. Previously, Burchett had also expressed support for what is known as the Vienna Process, led by anti-Taliban forces. Although this process has so far managed to hold four meetings, it has not made any significant progress. Burchett’s invitation can be seen as part of a pattern, given that Michael McCaul, Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, had earlier invited Ahmad Massoud, the leader of the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan. That invitation was not declined but resulted in the dispatch of a delegation and a low-profile meeting that did not garner much attention.
Regarding Burchett’s invitation to Saleh, several points are worth noting:
1) Burchett’s invitation to Saleh gains significance if we consider Saleh a member of the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan. However, Saleh’s membership in the Front remains unclear. What is certain is that he was involved in the one-week war in Panjshir Province and has consistently emphasized resistance against the Taliban. At one point, he even posted a strong statement on Facebook in support of Ahmad Massoud, along with a photo of Massoud, urging others to join the Front. Despite his apparent support, it has never been clarified what official role, if any, Saleh holds in this anti-Taliban organization. Based on his ongoing support for the Resistance Front and his firm stance against the Taliban, we can assume his membership.
If this assumption holds, Burchett’s invitation carries no particularly groundbreaking message for anti-Taliban forces. Supporting the anti-Taliban bloc would necessitate an invitation to its leader, not merely a member. If Saleh is not considered a member of the Resistance Front, some might speculate that the U.S., through such actions, aims to create divisions within the Front. However, this also seems unlikely.
2) Regardless of whether Saleh is a member of the Resistance Front of Afghanistan or not, he has had little to no interaction with other anti-Taliban forces—unless he is working covertly, which is a separate matter. What is evident is that, in the past three years, he has not participated in any of the meetings held by Taliban opposition groups, despite positioning himself as staunchly anti-Taliban. Moreover, Saleh has not conducted any audio or video interviews with domestic or international media, a step many Afghan politicians have not hesitated to take. Instead, he has confined himself to sharing his views on X (formerly Twitter) and Facebook.
If we do not call it isolation, we can say that Saleh’s withdrawal has two main reasons:
First, Disagreement with the Approaches of Other Anti-Taliban Forces: Saleh does not align with the approach of other factions opposing the Taliban, particularly those who prefer dialogue over war. Based on his past and current statements, it is clear that he opposes negotiations with the Taliban. If I’m not mistaken, when he was the First Vice President, he stated in an interview with Tolo News that he would not work in a government that includes the Taliban. How much this stance, as a high-ranking government official, undermined the peace negotiations of that time remains to be discussed later. However, I will mention a claim by Mohammad Omar Daudzai, a figure in the governments of Karzai and Ghani, who referred to this in his memoirs[1]: “Amrullah Saleh was unwilling to compromise for less than completing five years of his presidency and vice-presidency. His tone was always one of war, not peace.”
Second, Saleh, in addition to not aligning with many of the anti-Taliban forces, also cannot gain their trust. This is due to his role as the First Vice President of the previous government, and a portion of the blame for the country’s failures is placed on his shoulders. His membership in Ghani’s government has become a point of contention for forces that were not part of it. Even if they had been, it is uncertain whether they would have been able to save the Republic from its ultimate demise. In any case, the anti-Taliban factions seem to be distancing themselves from figures close to Ghani, which may explain the ambiguity surrounding Saleh’s position in the Resistance Front. Consequently, it appears that Burchett intends to meet with a politician from Afghanistan, not someone who leads an anti-Taliban faction with a distinct vision and stance.
3) Saleh, the former First Vice President of the Ghani government, has become a fierce critic of the United States. A closer examination of his tweets could even label him as anti-American. What is commonly known as the “Doha Agreement,” he repeatedly refers to as the “Doha Conspiracy” blames Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. envoy who signed the deal with the Taliban. Every time Khalilzad has spoken, Saleh has swiftly responded with harsh criticism. Of course, this approach has also faced criticism, with many viewing it as an attempt to avoid taking responsibility. More significantly, Saleh’s strong pro-Russian stance is noteworthy, especially considering that Russia is now more opposed to the U.S. than ever. Each time Saleh criticizes the Biden administration, he praises Vladimir Putin’s leadership in Russia. He has frequently spoken highly of Putin, expressing gratitude for his stand against the U.S. Recently, when Russia hosted the BRICS summit, Saleh, in support of Putin, claimed that Moscow was not isolated, but rather emerging as a global hub. This is ironic considering Putin has repeatedly emphasized the importance of tolerance and engagement with the Taliban and is even expected to remove them from the international blacklist. It raises the question: How does Saleh intend to tie his fate to the old cord of the Kremlin, especially when Putin’s policies towards the Taliban are at odds with his own proclaimed anti-Taliban stance? This is where Burchett’s invitation to Saleh, a politician who is both pro-Russian and anti-American, takes on a more meaningful and puzzling dimension, and the hidden objective behind this invitation is unclear.
4) At this stage, it can be said that Saleh is unlikely to accept Burchett’s invitation. He has not responded to it so far. If he declines, it will likely be due to his unrealistic stance—an unrealistic approach that compels him to remain pro-Russian and anti-Washington, just as he has remained anti-Pakistan without weighing the benefits and drawbacks of such a stance. Mr. Daudzai, who had been Ghani’s special representative for Pakistan in the months before the collapse of the Afghan government, has described Saleh’s statements against Islamabad as “demagogic” and harmful. Similarly, Hamdullah Mohib, Ghani’s national security advisor, has said: “A major challenge for me was the demagogic anti-Pakistan stances of Amrullah Saleh, Hamdullah Mohib, and some other officials. When I spoke to Saleh about this, he said, ‘Pakistan is my enemy, and you cannot change that…’ I spoke to Mohib as well. Mohib responded that to boost the morale of the security forces, it was necessary to take an anti-Pakistan stance, and your job as a special representative is to minimize the negative effects of these stances!” It must be noted here that the goal is to explain the issue, not to validate Daudzai’s claims.
Even his rejection of talks with the Taliban indicates an unrealistic approach. Logic dictates that, when dealing with a group that has monopolized a country, one should not completely rule out the possibility of negotiation. Of course, calling for dialogue does not equate to calling for surrender. Unrealistic political stances cause decision-makers to overlook the balance between their capabilities and objectives, leading them to take actions that, rather than being effective, prove to be very damaging.
In conclusion, requests from U.S. Congressional representatives, at least in the current period, do not indicate a shift in the White House’s approach toward Afghanistan under Taliban rule. Therefore, one must remain vigilant to see how events unfold and which direction they take.
References:
[1] Mohammad Umer Daudzai’s “UNCENSORED: The Downfall of Afghanistan”, has been translated by Sayed Akram Baraz.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
