The Taliban’s newly publicized criminal code, which has recently drawn widespread attention in Afghan media, is not merely a technical document. If the reported content is accurate, it signals a shift toward systematizing coercion through judicial processes, a context in which law, rather than restraining power, becomes an instrument for its execution.
In Afghanistan, reports of repression are usually framed through familiar patterns: sudden arrests, torture, prohibitions, the closure of public space, and the erosion of civil rights. What distinguishes the Taliban’s criminal code, however, is its focus not on isolated acts, but on establishing procedure, transforming pressure and coercion from arbitrary, discretionary actions into a repeatable framework, bearing the stamp of a court and the language of law.
On January 21, 2026, the human rights organization Ravadari reported obtaining a copy of the Taliban’s criminal code. According to Ravadari, the document was signed in the name of Hibatullah Akhundzada and distributed to Taliban judicial bodies in the provinces for implementation. The code is organized into three sections, ten chapters, and 119 articles, frameworks that Hasht-e Subh Daily also highlighted in its reporting.
Simultaneously, a spokesperson for the Taliban Supreme Court, speaking to Afghanistan International, confirmed the code’s content and its enforcement in courts. This acknowledgment moves the discussion from allegation to indication of a structured process, one with far-reaching social and legal implications, which has prompted extensive reactions both inside and outside Afghanistan.
Why Does a Judicial Text Become Political?
On the surface, a criminal procedure code should outline stages of adjudication, interactions with the accused, evidence handling, investigations, and trials; it should read like a set of instructions. But in a non-accountable system, even such instructions can become a governance tool: a method for raising the cost of dissent, controlling discourse, and limiting public space, not through visible street force, but through summonses, case files, courts, and verdicts.
The critical distinction lies in the role of law: under the rule of law, law limits power and protects citizens’ rights. Under rule by law, law becomes an instrument of power. The question is not simply whether the text exists, but whether it is designed to safeguard rights or to shape power.
Human Rights Analysis and Warnings of Systematic Repression
Ravadari warns that the code’s content is deeply concerning and conflicts with international human rights standards and fundamental principles of fair trial. Among its violations, the organization cites disregard for equality before the law, the presumption of innocence, prohibitions against torture, protection from arbitrary detention, and insufficient guarantees for the right to silence and effective defense.
Hasht-e Subh Daily, referencing Ravadari’s assessment, highlighted that the code could formalize repression and curtail fundamental freedoms. Certain language within the text has been interpreted by critics as legitimizing humiliating practices and violations of human dignity.
Three Controversial Axes in Local Media Coverage
Afghan media have emphasized three particularly notable aspects:
- Discrimination against minorities and labeling language: Etilaat Roz reported that the code could entrench religious minority discrimination.
- Social stratification and unequal punishment: Radio Azadi highlighted sections dividing society into classes, allowing punishment severity to vary by social status, an idea directly at odds with equality before the law.
- Criminalization of dissent: Critics fear the judicial process may be used to suppress free expression through intimidation via cases and courts, rather than overt violence. Ravadari warns that the code could make arbitrary punishment appear legal.
When Courts Fail to Check Power
In a society without an independent judiciary, courts can transform from impartial arbiters into instruments for executing power. The danger is not limited to a single unjust ruling; the primary risk lies in normalization. Once repression is formalized into a procedure, it becomes routine. And when it becomes routine, it is both harder to recognize and more costly to resist.
Put simply, if coercion occurs openly on the streets, people see it and call it force. But if the same coercion comes through summonses, case files, and court rulings, power can present it as law. The critical question is: whose interests does the law serve, and against whom is it wielded?
Emerging International Response
In recent developments, Richard Bennett, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on human rights in Afghanistan, stated that he is reviewing the Taliban’s criminal code, examining it through both human rights and Sharia perspectives. He described the potential consequences of this text for the Afghan population as deeply troubling.
This stance underscores that the issue is not merely an internal social media debate; it is part of a broader transformation in the architecture of justice under Taliban rule.
Conclusion
The central question remains: are the Taliban writing law, or are they structuring power? If the reports and human rights reactions are accurate, the criminal code is less a sign of legal order than a quasi-legal coercive system, one that, through the language of courts and codified articles, raises the cost of dissent and converts ad hoc repression into a systematic process.
In today’s Afghanistan, the problem is not simply the absence of law; it is how and for what purpose law is written. When law becomes a tool for executing power rather than limiting it, courts cease to be havens of rights and can become regularized stations of coercion.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
