Recently, U.S. President Joe Biden claimed that the Al-Qaeda network is not present in Afghanistan and that the United States has destroyed this network with the help of the Taliban. However, following Biden’s statements, former U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan’s Reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad, acted as Biden’s unofficial spokesperson and modified his statements in a tweet. He acknowledged that Al-Qaeda has a few facilities in Afghanistan but stated that it is unlikely to have the ability to launch direct attacks from Afghanistan in 2024. Khalilzad further wrote that if Al-Qaeda decides to launch global attacks, it will rely on the ability of its affiliated groups in the Middle East and Africa.
Contrary to Biden’s claims, the Long War Journal recently criticized his statements and, based on a recent report by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), stated that Al-Qaeda has close ties with the Taliban and that this network has a safe haven in Afghanistan. According to the report, Al-Qaeda has safe havens in the provinces of Helmand, Farah, Kabul, and Herat. It is also involved in training members of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the provinces of Helmand, Zabul, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Badghis, and Kunar.
There is a significant discrepancy between Biden’s statement and the UNSC report. The key question is, on what basis did the American intelligence agencies conclude that Al-Qaeda is not present in Afghanistan, and, more interestingly, that the Taliban aided the United States in destroying the Al-Qaeda network?
It is true that Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of the Al-Qaeda network, was killed in Kabul, and it is possible that the Kandahari Taliban, in competition with the Haqqani network, provided the Americans with information about al-Zawahiri’s whereabouts, leading to his death. However, the death of the leader of the Al-Qaeda network does not signify the end of this network. Al-Qaeda’s long-standing and strong relationship with the Taliban remains intact, and the Taliban has not taken any action to demonstrate hostility towards Al-Qaeda. Not only has the Taliban never been involved with Al-Qaeda, but as ideological allies, they have consistently provided support and shelter to this network in various provinces. The Taliban has even utilized the Al-Qaeda network in their conflict with the resistance front in Panjshir.
If Al-Qaeda, as Khalilzad claims, lacks the necessary facilities and infrastructure to launch attacks on the United States, can it be attributed to the Taliban destroying these infrastructures? Certainly not. Even if we accept that a faction of the Taliban played a role in the assassination of al-Zawahiri, it is still not evident that the Taliban as a whole cooperated with the United States in the destruction of Al-Qaeda. Why hasn’t news of the operations conducted by the United States in Afghanistan during the Taliban’s rule been made public?
Does Al-Qaeda require special infrastructure to launch attacks on U.S. soil? The Taliban has provided all the conditions necessary for the growth and empowerment of its terrorist networks and groups. The recent UNSC report clearly explains this issue, refuting the claim that the Taliban has eliminated Al-Qaeda and that this network can no longer be considered a significant threat.
Another question arises regarding the reliability of the information provided by American intelligence agencies in this matter. Have these intelligence organizations made mistakes in the past that they are not making now? The U.S. intelligence agencies were unable to predict the fall of the government they supported in Afghanistan before the Taliban seized control of Kabul. How can these intelligence agencies be trusted again?
Al-Qaeda and the Global Jihad
The Al-Qaeda network was established by Osama bin Laden in 1988, one year before the withdrawal of former Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the end of the jihad in the country. The establishment of the Al-Qaeda network during the Soviet Union’s impending collapse indicated the grander plans envisioned by the leaders of global jihad. According to the leaders of this terrorist network, the Afghan Jihad served as the initial experimental phase of global jihad, where Islamic extremists sought to assess their capabilities.
Following the Soviet Union’s defeat in Afghanistan, Ayman al-Zawahiri stated that the battle against the Soviet Union was a training stage for the Islamic Mujahideen to prepare for a confrontation with the new global superpower, the United States. Furthermore, it provided an opportunity for Mujahideen from Arab, Pakistani, Turkish, Central Asian, and East Asian backgrounds to fight together in the Afghan Jihad against the enemies of Islam. The architects of the global jihad project required a free breeding ground and a broader space where terrorism could proliferate unhindered, in order to strengthen their cause.
Coinciding with the collapse of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri perceived the country as a fertile ground for cultivating a generation of jihadists. With the Taliban coming to power, they achieved their objective, and Afghanistan became a sanctuary for terrorism in the region. However, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 significantly disrupted the Islamists’ global jihad program, leading to changes in the geography of terrorism. Afghanistan, as an Islamic country with the conditions necessary for the growth and propagation of jihadist generations, has always remained within the crosshairs of Islamists. The terrorists seized every possible opportunity to return to Afghanistan. Now that the Taliban control the country, the Al-Qaeda network and other terrorist groups are striving to fulfill their unfinished project of establishing a breeding ground for terrorism in Afghanistan.
The primary and enduring infrastructure that has remained steadfast, even under the Western-backed regime, is the religious schools that have been promoting Islamic extremism for years. With the return of the Taliban, these schools have flourished further. They serve as permanent sources of recruitment for the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State-Khorasan (ISS-K). No power in Afghanistan has demonstrated the decisive will to address this issue, and some have even supported these schools. As long as this stable social infrastructure exists, terrorism will continue to pose a permanent threat in Afghanistan. Superficial and mechanical measures against it will not only fail to address the chronic crisis in the country, but also lead to the proliferation of terrorism in new forms and manifestations.
