Dr. Najib is among those politicians whose political record is surrounded by less ambiguity. He is one of the most exemplary figures who paid the price for his mistakes in his life. This may be the highest price a politician can pay for his misdeeds. Najib, the statesman who rose to power with full Soviet support and was ousted following the cessation of political and financial backing from the Soviet Union, is accused of horrific crimes against political prisoners during his tenure as head of the dreaded KhAD, power-seeking, tyranny, ethnic favoritism, and corruption. Najib is considered a failed politician who could not effectively manage Afghanistan during the critical and fateful period following the Soviet withdrawal. His last mistake said to be driven by ethnic bias, led to his tragic death. Despite this, some, both in the past and now, have tried to portray him as a patriotic, combative, and nationalist figure; an effort that, given his poor political record, has yet to cement a favorable and dominant narrative of Dr. Najib. These efforts to sanitize Najib’s image show that there is a revisionist trend in the historical narrative based on tribal values, a trend that has garnered considerable support due to the strong anti-Pakistan sentiment among Afghan citizens.
The popularity of Dr. Najib and other anti-Pakistan figures among the people indicates that the darker parts of their political records have either been downplayed or completely overlooked. Many citizens have forgotten that Dr. Najib had a dark side, including his involvement in the Polygon massacres and the torture and imprisonment of intellectuals—atrocities that no honorable and conscious person can forget. There is abundant evidence to support these claims, and there is no need to reference all of them in this brief article. However, at the very least, the remaining documents from the Soviet era (the main ally and supporter of Najib’s government) depict a character in stark contrast to popular perceptions: corrupt, power-hungry, ethnocentric, and untrustworthy. “Storm in Afghanistan”, by Alexander Lyakhovsky, a Soviet army officer who was directly involved in the Afghan war, offers a documented account of Dr. Najib’s character and political career, providing a scathing critique of the superficial and popular understanding of Najib’s political actions.
Lyakhovsky published a secret document from the Soviet Armed Forces Intelligence Directorate in April 1986, stating: “Under Comrade Najib’s protection, theft and bribery among party and government officials have spread to an extent not seen even under the monarchy. In other words, he takes, and he allows others to take. Everyone agrees that Comrade Najib has extreme Pashtun nationalist tendencies.” [1] In the footnotes of this document, in a brief biography of Najib, Lyakhovsky reveals his embezzlement of $100,000 while serving as Afghanistan’s ambassador to Tehran: “In the summer of 1979, he was dismissed from his position and fled to Yugoslavia, embezzling $100,000 from the embassy’s funds.” [2] Major General Alexander Lyakhovsky unequivocally describes Dr. Najib as “deceitful, cruel, selfish, power-hungry, and one of the instigators of the Pashtunization policy in Afghan society.” According to Lyakhovsky, Najib “only speaks Pashto with his close friends” and “prefers to choose his colleagues not based on wisdom and skill, but on personal loyalty to himself.” [3]
The author continues by evaluating Najib’s policies, based on classified information and logical reasoning, as ineffective and futile during his presidency. He describes Najib’s policy of national reconciliation as “utter nonsense”: “The regime’s enchantments about restoring peace and national understanding amounted to nothing more than hollow rhetoric. The government assumed that the idea of national reconciliation would unite the nation, as it supposedly aligned with the objective aspirations of the Afghan people. But words were not enough. Achieving peace required more struggle and effort. The people cautiously reacted to the peace proposals of a regime that had long made tyranny its slogan. Furthermore, the policy of national reconciliation was seen by the regime’s enemies as a sign of weakness in the People’s Democratic Party and even the first step toward its complete defeat.” [4]
This negative portrayal of Dr. Najib and his regime, especially from the perspective of a Soviet army officer—his primary ally and supporter, who spared no effort to maintain the puppet regime—naturally displeases those who seek to portray Najib as a national, patriotic, and pure-hearted figure. Lyakhovsky is not the only one who considers Dr. Najib a chauvinist, autocrat, and KGB puppet. Other researchers, including George Arney, author of “Afghanistan, the Crossroads of Conquerors”, also vividly depict Najib as a “butcher” and “top servant” of the KGB: “On the surface, Najibullah seemed a suitable choice to lead the dramatic ‘national reconciliation’ program planned by Moscow. But despite the change in the manner of his appointment, he remained at risk of being labeled a puppet. As head of KhAD since 1981, he was seen by the public as a brutal figure who had ordered the inhumane torture of thousands. Yet his long-standing connection with KhAD also gave him deep knowledge and understanding of the Pashtun tribes on both sides of the border. … Gorbachev believed that Najibullah, as a first-class KGB servant, could be trusted to carry out any orders given by Moscow.” [5]
Those trying to elevate Dr. Najib to a symbol of patriotism and nationalism either have little knowledge of his involvement in the horrific crimes of the People’s Democratic Party or are swept away by rising anti-Pakistan sentiments, conveniently forgetting these crimes. Solely relying on Dr. Najib’s anti-Pakistan stance cannot turn him into a patriotic, national, and selfless figure, as if he had the people’s best interests at heart. If we consider anti-Pakistanism a merit, given Pakistan’s destructive interference in Afghanistan, the leaders of the People’s Democratic Party, especially Dr. Najib, cannot claim much of this merit either. Najib’s and other rulers’ anti-Pakistan stance stemmed more from necessity and compulsion than from genuine choice.
References:
[1]: Lyakhovsky, Alexander. (2003). “Storm in Afghanistan”, translated by Aziz Aryanfar, Volume 2, 3rd Edition, Kabul: Maiwand, p. 3
[2]: Ibid, pp. 5-6
[3]: Ibid, p. 6
[4]: Ibid, p. 14
[5]: Arney, George. (1997). “Afghanistan, the Crossroads of Conquerors”, translated by Sayed Mohammad Yousuf Elmi and Habibur Rahman Hale, 2nd Edition, Peshawar: Maiwand, pp. 200-201
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