Part 5: The Friends of the Taliban

You can read part 1 here: Part 1: The Friends of the Taliban
You can read part 2 here: Part 2: The Friends of the Taliban
You can read part 3 here: Part 3: The Friends of the Taliban
You can read part 4 here: Part 4: The Friends of the Taliban

Drug Traffickers

The cultivation, production, and trafficking of narcotics have been among the primary sources of funding for the Taliban’s war budget throughout the two-decade presence of Western forces led by the United States in Afghanistan. Consequently, the increase in drug cultivation, production, and trafficking has been inseparably linked with escalating violence and the spread of terrorism. The provinces that produced the most opium in Afghanistan were the most insecure regions in the country. The passive performance of security institutions and the infiltration of corruption within the judicial systems of the previous government negatively impacted the anti-narcotics campaign. The annual rise in drug cultivation, production, and trafficking indicated that the previous government lacked both the will and the capacity to combat narcotics effectively. The eradication of poppy fields—an effort that was neither comprehensive nor systematic and mostly symbolic—and the arrest of low-ranking drug mafia traffickers were the only measures occasionally taken by the former government. Most of those arrested on drug trafficking charges did not have influential protectors within the government.

The likely infiltration of senior traffickers within intelligence agencies helped cover up for drug traders. In some areas, individuals in charge of “combatting drug trafficking” were themselves accused of involvement in the drug trade and extortion from traffickers. With significant funds at their disposal, drug traffickers essentially ruled their regions, and government officials—if they even dared to confront them—lacked the power to oppose them. In areas where the government was present, these individuals exercised direct and indirect influence as the primary decision-makers. Many major drug traffickers, as admitted by officials in the previous government, were part of the state apparatus and used this position to facilitate drug trafficking. Although trafficking was pervasive, no “solid evidence to prove the accusations” against the primary suspects was available.

Currently, under the Taliban regime, the situation has worsened. Those who once relied on the cultivation, production, and trafficking of narcotics as a source of war funding under a Western-backed government now control Afghanistan. Contrary to the Taliban officials’ claims about banning drug cultivation, production, and trafficking, credible global reports and statements from neighboring countries’ officials on the continued rise in drug trafficking indicate that even poppy cultivation—which Mullah Hibatullah officially banned through a decree—is increasing. Some drug traffickers effectively govern, while others, as longtime allies of the Taliban, enjoy privileges and resources they could not access under the previous government. Can we expect a regime that is intertwined with and supportive of drug traffickers to combat narcotics?

According to reports from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, since the Taliban came to power, not only has the production of traditional narcotics in Afghanistan increased—a recent report notes a 19% rise in poppy cultivation—but the production of synthetic drugs (methamphetamines) has also been on the rise. These reports reveal that methamphetamine production is a newer and more profitable avenue compared to poppy cultivation and opium production. According to UN experts, “You don’t have to wait for anything to grow to produce this type of drug. You don’t need farmland; just cooks and knowledge are enough. The labs are mobile and hidden. Afghanistan also has the ephedra plant, which is not found in the world’s largest methamphetamine-producing countries, Myanmar and Mexico. The cultivation of this plant is legal in Afghanistan and grows everywhere, although large quantities are required.” Thus, with the Taliban’s extensive experience in profiting massively from drug cultivation, production, and trafficking, they are unlikely to give up this lucrative financial source.

Drug cultivation, production, and trafficking are some of the most profitable trades in Afghanistan, prompting farmers who once cultivated other crops to turn to poppy farming. This is because poppy cultivation is far more profitable than other agricultural products. In other words, poppy cultivation has become a significant component of Afghanistan’s agricultural production, employing a large number of people in cultivation, production, and trafficking. Each year, with the deepening poverty in Afghan families, more individuals are driven into this industry.

The return of the Taliban to power has expanded drug trafficking within Afghanistan and the region, further empowering traffickers who are the Taliban’s longtime allies. Therefore, the “war on drugs,” whether under the previous government or the Taliban regime, has largely remained a misleading propaganda campaign that, despite widespread publicity and officials’ claims, amounted to little more than sporadic mechanical efforts, conferences, and time-wasting sessions, yielding no positive outcomes.

You can read the Persian version of this article here:

بخش پنجم: دوستان طالبان