Part 4: The Friends of the Taliban

You can read part 1 here: Part 1: The Friends of the Taliban
You can read part 2 here: Part 2: The Friends of the Taliban
You can read part 3 here: Part 3: The Friends of the Taliban

Ethnic Nationalist Intellectuals

The Taliban’s appeal extends beyond extremist Islamic factions and religious clerics. Many educated individuals and intellectuals openly support the group as well. These intellectuals believe that the Taliban have engaged in “resistance” against the “occupation” of Afghanistan by foreign forces, rendering them deserving of respect. Some of these ethnocentric thinkers work to legitimize the Taliban’s cause on the international stage, encouraging them to form a legal government through a Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) to gain global recognition. They worry that if the Taliban continues monopolizing power and ignoring international demands regarding women’s education and the formation of an all-inclusive government, they will collapse—a potential catastrophe for the ethnocentric Pashtun intellectuals who believe such a downfall would undermine their long-term efforts to advance their vision of “Afghanistan,” if not ultimately then at least in the short term. However, the Taliban appear to disregard these concerns from their intellectual allies, repeatedly disappointing the nationalist supporters by replicating policies from their first regime.

The Taliban’s persistent obstinance against global and local demands related to respecting human rights, establishing an all-inclusive legal government, securing women’s rights, combating terrorism, and more does not deter nationalist intellectuals from supporting this group or working on an alternative plan. The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan has granted Pashtun chauvinists a rare, exceptional, and decisive opportunity they will not easily relinquish. Nationalist intellectuals believe that the Taliban have put an end to the influence of non-Pashtun groups in Afghan politics, thus paving the way for their version of “nation-building.” Although these chauvinists claim that they have long been a “nation,” when you observe their efforts to implement their totalitarian project, it becomes evident that even from the perspective of Pashtun nationalist intellectuals, a “real” nation has yet to be formed in Afghanistan.

This group of intellectuals holds a different view of nation-building than others; in their perspective, this process must be entirely Pashtunized, to the extent that other ethnicities abandon any advocacy for the right to self-determination and come to fully embrace the absolute dominance of the “big brother.” This is why, even when Pashtun nationalist intellectuals speak of the “Afghan nation,” their thirst for supremacy remains unquenched, and they strive to bring the “Afghanistan” project to their desired conclusion. In this project, the Taliban play a crucial role—a role that the chauvinists understand better than anyone else. It is precisely for this reason that they are anxious about the potential collapse of the regime established in Kabul and spare no effort in legitimizing it.

One prominent Pashtun intellectual, previously a professor at Kabul University, visited Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada in Kandahar after the Taliban came to power. He claimed that “Sheikh Hibatullah Akhundzada is an understanding and informed man” and that only a small but influential circle around him opposes women’s education, not Hibatullah himself. According to him, Pakistan’s intelligence services have infiltrated this circle, preventing schools and universities from opening for girls. Yet the figure this intellectual describes diverges starkly from the widely recognized Hibatullah. The many misogynistic decrees issued by Hibatullah over the past three years make it clear that he is one of the staunchest opponents of women’s education, leading the same faction that this nationalist intellectual criticizes. A troubling trait among Pashtun nationalist intellectuals is their tendency to blame Pakistan’s intelligence for all prevailing atrocities, attempting to whitewash the Taliban regime’s dark record.

Another tactic employed by Pashtun nationalist intellectuals is to divide the Taliban into “extremists” and “moderates,” thereby extending the group’s hold on power. They are not alone in this effort; mainstream media also frequently categorize the Taliban into moderate and extremist factions, subtly endorsing certain leaders by suggesting that if given more time, they would act differently. This approach reflects weakness and helplessness rather than strength and authority. When one cannot confront a terrorist group as a whole, it is subdivided into moderates and extremists to justify collaboration and compromise. Through this tactic, a group that should be dismantled remains entrenched in politics—one of the disastrous consequences of political realism.

Ultimately, the damage that Ethnic Nationalist Intellectuals inflict on the Pashtun people by supporting the Taliban is even greater than the overt harm caused by the Taliban’s actions. Long-term support for the Taliban will harm Pashtuns the most. Some conscious Pashtun intellectuals have recognized the havoc the Taliban have wreaked on Pashtun society. Unfortunately, this awareness has yet to become widespread enough to mount a substantial challenge to the Taliban ideology. It will take time for the Pashtun community to realize that Islamic extremism fosters neither development nor progress fully. Instead, it fuels an all-encompassing regression by promoting religious ignorance on the one hand and undermining the remnants of modern knowledge infrastructure on the other, leading to a disastrous setback on every front.

You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:

بخش چهارم: دوستان طالبان | روزنامه ۸صبح