It appears that clashes between the Taliban and the fighters of Juma Khan Fateh, the dissatisfied commander of this group, have begun in the Nesai district of Badakhshan. At least until the completion of this note, the Taliban regime has refrained from official comment on the clashes in Nesai. Not only the Taliban, but domestic media outlets have also failed to fulfill their duty in reducing the level of ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding the matter. What we have read and heard so far has come from the exiled media. Were it not for the efforts of these outlets, we would be deprived of even the minimum amount of information. Now that the Taliban and Fateh have opened fire on one another, the question concerns the trajectory of the clash; that is, whether the parties to the conflict will settle on a deal or continue confrontation. Several points are worth noting in this regard:
1) Mr. Fateh has not yet formally or publicly withdrawn from the Taliban Emirate; meaning he has not declared that he is no longer a loyal member of the Taliban regime and that he will henceforth continue fighting against this regime in defense of his and his allies’ lost rights. Not only has he not done so, but just a few weeks ago, following a great deal of commotion, he appeared in Kabul and, in conversation with the media, described himself as a devoted soldier of the Emirate, affirming and emphasizing unquestioning obedience to this regime. The fact that he has not withdrawn from the Emirate is significant in that it strengthens the likelihood of a deal, because the Taliban are not facing a front that, in the group’s own words, could be labeled “Khawarij” or “rebels”; rather, they are confronting a force for whom remaining alongside the regime is a matter of pride, provided certain rights and privileges are guaranteed. Many people, overlooking the issue of withdrawal or non-withdrawal, speak as though opposing the Taliban were at the top of Fateh’s agenda, to secure the lost rights of a particular ethnic group or province.
2) The manner in which the clash began is also important, namely whether it was intentional or accidental. If it was unintentional, it will subside quickly; otherwise, the possibility of escalation, or even a war of attrition, is conceivable. By intentional clash, we mean that it was organized in advance with the aim of suppressing Fateh and putting an end to his rule in Darwaz. By accidental, we mean the clash of a few non-native Taliban fighters with local ones, which unintentionally led to an escalation of the confrontation and could also be contained through the mediation of a third force, namely local elders and notables. Since non-native forces are present in Nesai with the aim of monitoring the movements of Fateh’s fighters, exchanges of fire between them sometimes appear unavoidable.
Conversely, if suppressing Fateh is on the agenda, he will not be shown mercy, even if he signs a document of surrender. Suppressing Fateh is not difficult for the Taliban but rather easy, and there is no possibility of serious and sustained resistance on his part. The commanders and fighters standing alongside Fateh could quickly be bribed into betraying him, in the hope of gaining wealth and privilege after his removal. However, if we consider Fateh’s safe trip to Kabul and his unharmed return to Nesai, the likelihood that the fighting was intentional appears weak. Had the Taliban intended to remove Fateh from the scene, his presence in Kabul would have been the best pretext to turn him into a docile soldier. But if he is suppressed now, in the eyes of some he will turn into a hero who, as it were, raised the banner of discontent against an ethnocentric regime and was sacrificed in the process. The Taliban are certainly aware of this consideration, especially given that some opposition fronts have emerged from within Badakhshan.
Meanwhile, another possibility can also be imagined: that the clash did not begin intentionally, but that there was negligence in containing it, and it spread rapidly around Nesai, to the point of resulting in deaths and injuries on both sides. In this scenario as well, the Taliban have no choice but to go all the way and eliminate the threat.
3) Some also speak of the possibility of Fateh joining fronts opposed to the Taliban. This possibility has gained somewhat more traction as the activities of military fronts opposed to the Taliban in Badakhshan have intensified to some degree. Nevertheless, this possibility appears weak, precisely because, as mentioned above, Juma Khan Fateh has not yet formally turned away from the Taliban Emirate, nor has he sought out an alternative force. He also understands that the opposition fronts have not become strong enough for him to find refuge alongside them for any length of time. More importantly, the Taliban are mindful of the risk of Fateh’s integration into opposition fronts and will make a serious effort to prevent this, whether through inducement or threat. Likely, the Taliban have already blocked the avenues and openings for Fateh’s integration into opposing forces; especially if the current clash was launched with the intent of suppressing him, the likelihood of him joining the opposition would be very weak. Given what we know of the Taliban, it seems unlikely that they would grant Fateh the opportunity to join the opposition ranks along with a large stockpile of military equipment and hundreds of dangerous fighters familiar with the intricacies of guerrilla warfare.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis article here:
