At a recent gathering of clerics and preachers in Kandahar, Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada once again spoke in a language laced with threats, warnings, and sweeping claims. He accused previous Afghan governments of promoting “un-Islamic practices,” “corruption,” and “godlessness,” and asserted that the Afghan people remain unfamiliar with Islamic law. Yet in a country where the overwhelming majority of citizens are Muslim, and where Sharia has long shaped the fabric of social and personal life, Akhundzada’s relentless, almost feverish insistence on “enforcing Sharia” raises a fundamental question: Why, in a nation of near-universal Islam, does the call to “bring the people back to religion” persist? And why, in the Taliban’s view, is Sharia never applied “enough”? The answer lies not in the lived realities of Afghan society but in the mentality and survival strategy of the mullahs. For hardline Islamist leaders, especially the Taliban, Sharia is not merely a jurisprudential framework or a system of law; it is a political instrument, a chain to keep society in captivity, and a platform to legitimize their perpetual grip on power.
In this logic, the mullah is not simply a religious teacher but an absolute overseer figure whose role depends on the perpetual existence of sin, disobedience, “deviation,” and “ignorance of Sharia.” The more a society becomes informed and self-reliant, the less space there is for the mullah as advisor, monitor, enforcer, and guardian of the faith. This spells the slow death of clerical rule, a prospect the Taliban and other fundamentalists deeply fear. From this perspective, Akhundzada’s emphasis on the people’s supposed ignorance of Sharia and the corruption of past regimes is less about religious concern than about an existential fear of being forgotten, removed, or stripped of power. In a modern, informed society, one that understands Sharia and moves beyond it, the political life of the mullah cannot survive. This is why, despite decades of Islamist political dominance, widespread religious education, and the presence of countless religious institutions in Afghanistan, the public is still labeled by the ruling clerics as “estranged from religion.” In Taliban logic, no society can ever be Muslim “enough” unless it is fully steeped in submission, silence, and obedience. For the mullah, Islam is equated with unquestioning loyalty to the official interpreters of the faith — namely, those clerics in power. Any independent thought, inquiry, or even personal interpretation of religion is deemed deviant. Thus, even if people pray daily, fast during Ramadan, and uphold Islamic values, it will never be sufficient, because, in the Taliban’s hierarchy, obedience to the mullah sits at the pinnacle of Sharia. Neither the Taliban nor other extremist religious movements can ever abandon the rhetoric of “enforcing Sharia,” because it is the sole justification for their place in politics. The day society concludes that Sharia has been fully applied and that clerical oversight is no longer needed will be the day the Taliban’s legitimacy collapses.
What the Taliban either fail to see or deliberately ignore are the painful realities of everyday life in Afghanistan: poverty, unemployment, denial of education, and the stripping away of basic civil rights. Instead of addressing these crises, they deflect, accusing society of having a “religious problem” as if a deeper acquaintance with Sharia would somehow end hunger, ethnic prejudice, humiliation, joblessness, and violence. Under Taliban logic, Sharia is not a path to a better life but a veil to conceal incompetence, corruption, bigotry, and dictatorship.
In his remarks, Hibatullah spoke of two ranks, “the scholars” and “the rulers,” claiming that the people follow one or the other. This perspective reproduces the same tribal and authoritarian logic that sees society as perpetually dependent on the leaders of the clerical class. In this vision, the people never become mature, independent, and self-aware; they always require guidance, guidance provided by those who see themselves as the sole and exclusive representatives of religion. Such a view is fundamentally at odds with democracy, human rights, freedom of thought, and human dignity. If the public is destined to be followers forever, they will never reach the point where they can decide for themselves, question authority, and build their lives based on personal choice. The Taliban exercise total control not only at the political level, but across cultural, religious, and educational spheres. Seizing control of religious institutions has been one of their key strategies for entrenching their ideology. This dominance—while women and girls are deprived of the most basic rights such as education, work, and social participation—demonstrates that the Taliban’s version of sharia is a tool of social engineering: an engineering in which women are erased, individuality is destroyed, and society is reduced to a collection of permanently docile and unquestioning subjects.
Under the Taliban regime, the implementation of sharia is always designed to restrict ordinary people, never the clerics themselves. While girls are denied education, women are barred from work, and society is stripped of intellectual freedom, Taliban leaders enjoy unrestricted access to resources and economic privileges. They not only remain unaffected by the application of Sharia, but they also profit from it. Sharia enforcement is for the masses; the clerics stand outside this system, occupying the role of overseers and rulers. To maintain this privileged position, the Taliban must ensure that society remains in a perpetual state of “needing reform.” A reformed society no longer requires reformers; a society that understands religion no longer needs interpreters; and a society that has achieved “religious maturity” no longer needs mullahs.
This is why, despite having penetrated every sphere of public life—from education and the media to religious and security affairs—the Taliban still complain of the people’s “lack of familiarity with sharia.” This complaint is not a genuine concern, but a reflection of their crisis of legitimacy—a crisis they can postpone only by endlessly repeating the slogan of “implementing sharia.” In reality, what the Taliban fear is not the people’s deviation from religion, but their awakening: the realization that one can be Muslim without obeying the Taliban; that one can believe in sharia without accepting its official interpreters; and that one can be devout without submitting to clerical rule as an eternal guardian.
In this context, the slogan of “implementing sharia” becomes a fully fledged political instrument, one that the Taliban use to simultaneously eliminate rivals, keep society in fear, and reproduce their power. The more this slogan is repeated, the more it signals that sharia is still “incomplete.” And as long as it remains incomplete, the mullah must remain—because without the mullah, sharia will never be “fulfilled.” This is the existential logic of the Taliban. Thus, the obsession with implementing sharia, as promoted by the Taliban, is not a sign of piety but of fear, fear of being removed, forgotten, and finished. Mullahs like Hibatullah Akhundzada know well that if the day ever comes when people believe they no longer need “religious leaders,” that day will mark the end of their reign. The frenzy for “implementing sharia” is the face of a politics of survival—a face cloaked in the garb of religion but rooted in nothing more than the desire for power, domination, and privilege. As long as sharia remains a tool of political control, the mullah will endure. And as long as the mullah endures, sharia will always remain “unfinished”—forever, until the end of time.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
