Under the directive of Mullah Hibatullah, a large jihadist madrasa must be established in each of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. These madrasas must be equipped with sufficient resources and staffed with “prominent scholars of Islamic sciences (Sheikh al-hadith).” A significant portion of the government’s budget is allocated to these institutions. Such schools have been established in nearly all provinces of the country. Recently, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban’s deputy economic prime minister, stated in a meeting with Indian and Bangladeshi religious scholars that the Taliban have initiated these jihadist madrasas to promote Islam among the people.
While these remarks illustrate the Taliban’s resolute and fervent interest in indoctrinating the Afghan populace, they also reveal their deep-seated mistrust of the people of Afghanistan.
Some media outlets attempt to portray Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar as a moderate among the Taliban leadership, suggesting that, if given the opportunity, he and others like him would embrace all citizens regardless of gender, sect, ethnicity, or belief, and include them in the state’s structure. However, his comments reveal that Baradar, like other Taliban leaders, views the majority of Afghans who are “not Taliban” as somehow outside the fold of Islam and alien to its teachings. In their view, these people need to be re-educated in religious principles, and the Taliban’s return to power presents an opportunity to rectify their alleged ignorance and bring them back into the fold of Islam.
Mullah Hibatullah has repeatedly stated that television channels and media that operated “during the occupation” distanced people from religion. He emphasizes the need to eliminate the “remnants of occupation” and acquaint Afghans with the truths of Islam.
One employee of an NGO focused on supporting children and widows recounted an incident when Taliban intelligence agents visited their office to investigate the staff’s backgrounds. When one of the agents saw an employee praying, he expressed surprise and asked, “Do you pray too?” Such incidents highlight the Taliban’s mistrust of the non-Taliban majority and their preconceived notions about them.
It is also possible that the Taliban leadership uses these actions to fabricate excuses for suppressing the population. By casting doubt on people’s religiosity, the Taliban not only portray themselves as more devout but also seek pretexts for weakening and oppressing the public.
The Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs drafts the content for Friday sermons nationwide, and no preacher is allowed to deviate from these prepared texts. Two recurring themes in these sermons stand out. First, they align with the Taliban’s political and cultural narratives, promoting their ideology. Second, they often present basic religious teachings and rudimentary topics, as though assuming that Afghans have been entirely deprived of religious education in the past two decades.
This approach implies that Afghans must be reintroduced to religious principles from scratch.
Now that the Taliban have seized power after years of bloodshed and destruction, they face threats from other extremist groups, including Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP), which shares ideological similarities with them. The Taliban have dedicated a portion of their ideological propaganda to countering Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP). They have published books about ISIS and made them mandatory reading in their madrasas and training centers.
Interestingly, the Taliban refer to the Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP) as a “takfiri group” in these publications, despite the Taliban’s long history of excommunicating others for differing beliefs. For years, the Taliban exaggerated claims of sexual freedoms under the previous republic to incite their followers and justify violence. They labeled anyone who worked with “occupiers,” even as low-level government employees, as apostates, making their blood permissible to spill. The Taliban continue to target former civilian and military employees of the previous government.
If the Taliban are not a takfiri group, then no takfiri group exists. The jihadist madrasas mentioned by Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar promote an entirely takfiri narrative. What is taught in these schools? Students are instructed about the dichotomy between Dar al-Kufr (the abode of unbelief) and Dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam). Other Islamic sects are excommunicated, linked to Jews and Christians, and the revival of ancient sectarian conflicts is encouraged.
The interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence, Quranic exegesis, and Hadith taught in these madrasas fosters fear, violence, intolerance, and the elimination of dissenters. The Taliban aim to indoctrinate future generations with these ideologies. Thousands of religious schools across Afghanistan expose hundreds of thousands of boys and girls to exclusionary and divisive readings of Islam.
The survival and persistence of fundamentalist groups depend on their extremist and violence-promoting ideologies. If these groups were to abandon such beliefs, they would quickly lose their essence and collapse. The leadership of the Taliban organization is well aware of this fact, which is why it strives to keep the flames of these ideologies alive. Establishing jihadist religious schools is one of the Taliban’s main tools to achieve this goal.
If the situation continues as it is, extremism will undoubtedly extend beyond Afghanistan and spread to other countries. Even now, we are witnessing the effects of the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in Pakistan. This country is grappling with extremist militant groups, placing it in a difficult position—groups whose primary bases are reportedly located within Afghan territory.
The Pakistani government believed it could exploit extremism indefinitely to serve its expansionist geopolitical ambitions. However, the challenge these groups currently pose to Pakistan’s government demonstrates that religious extremism is like a scorpion; its nature is to sting, and in fulfilling this nature, it makes no distinction between friend and foe.
You can read the Persian version of this Analysis here:
