Amir-Saeed Iravani, Iran’s permanent representative to the United Nations, claimed at a Security Council meeting that foreign fighters, including Syrians, are being transferred to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. According to him, this development could pose a serious threat to the security of Afghanistan’s neighbors and the wider region.
Iravani’s warning of what he described as a looming danger came just two days after Seyed Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister, told the state-run IRNA news agency that the security of Iran’s eastern borders over the past four years, compared with the period of the former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, has improved. He further asserted that the Taliban have performed relatively well in providing security across Afghanistan, though not fully. He also acknowledged that while the Taliban have done a decent job in safeguarding Shia, they have not necessarily upheld their rights, precisely the opposite of the republican era, when Shia rights were protected but their security was persistently undermined by the Taliban. The substance of Araghchi’s remarks suggests that, at least until now, the Islamic Republic has felt no serious security concerns from the Taliban’s presence in Afghanistan and remains largely at ease.
In stark contrast, Iravani’s statements portray today’s Afghanistan as a direct threat to Iran. Indeed, nothing could be more alarming for the Islamic Republic than having Syrian fighters, many of whom hold long-standing animosity toward Iran and its proxy forces, stationed right on its doorstep. By this measure, the minister and the ambassador appear to be contradicting one another: the former paints an almost idyllic picture of security along Iran’s eastern frontier, while the latter raises the specter of hostile militants with Iran in their crosshairs. The gap between the two sets of remarks is just two days, no more. If Iravani’s concerns are well-founded, Araghchi should not have portrayed the Taliban as champions of security, but rather should have at least alluded, directly or indirectly, to the issue of transferring Syrian fighters.
Even if we assume that the relocation of Syrian combatants has either occurred or is being planned, the pressing question is: which states, institutions, or groups are managing this process? In the minds of both Iranian officials and neutral observers, names like the United States, Israel, and Syria inevitably surface. While Iravani refrained from naming specific countries, it is clear that these governments topped his mental list, though he apparently judged it more prudent not to state them openly.
The posture of the United States and Israel toward the Islamic Republic, and vice versa, is as clear as daylight and requires little elaboration. As for the current Syrian government, its relations with Tehran remain strained, and it is hardly displeased by any weakening or even collapse of the Islamic Republic. More importantly, Western governments, including Washington, have repeatedly warned Syria’s new rulers not to harbor foreign fighters or appoint them to sensitive state positions. Even Israel’s primary concern about Syria and its leadership stems from this very issue.
Amid these shifting dynamics, the ruins of Afghanistan appear to have been deemed an ideal location for the transfer of foreign fighters, for several reasons:
- Afghanistan has no functioning state that prioritizes counterterrorism.
- The country shares a border with Iran, and the mere presence of foreign fighters there could pose a direct threat to the Islamic Republic, while simultaneously creating headaches for Russia and China.
- The Taliban have long maintained cordial ties with foreign jihadist fighters, leading the organizers of this transfer process to assume that Afghanistan’s current rulers would raise no objections.
- Syrian officials have previously argued, when pressed by the West, that dispatching foreign fighters to their country exposes them to retaliation from the fighters’ home states. From this perspective, a stateless Afghanistan is far more convenient for Ahmed Al-Sharaa, Syria’s interim president.
Securing Taliban consent is, of course, essential; without it, the plan could not be realized. The Taliban are already hosting thousands of foreign militants linked to groups listed as “banned organizations” by many governments worldwide. Hosting Syrian fighters would merely add to the tally of their “guests.” The Taliban, in exchange for concessions, would likely welcome Syrian fighters without much concern for Iranian displeasure.
Should traces of American or Israeli involvement emerge in this affair, the likelihood of a renewed war between Tel Aviv and Tehran would rise significantly. Israel’s objective would be clear: to ensure that, in the event of a possible strike on Iran, the Islamic Republic’s eastern borders simultaneously erupt with militant activity, stretching Tehran’s capacity to manage the crisis.
Even if the transfer of Syrian fighters remains nothing more than an allegation, Iran’s strategy in raising the issue serves a distinct purpose: to secure the firm backing of China and Russia. Both powers are sensitive to the presence of foreign militants in Afghanistan, and this sensitivity could prove useful for Tehran. Fighters with battlefield experience in Syria could pose a sharper threat to Russian interests in Afghanistan than others. Thus, amplifying the narrative even at the level of unverified claims helps align Tehran, Beijing, and Moscow more closely over Afghanistan, particularly when Western interference is invoked as part of the story.
It is also worth recalling that Iran’s former foreign minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, once alleged in an interview that Iraqi and Syrian ISIS fighters had been transferred into Afghanistan: “It is no secret to anyone that the leaders of ISIS and their seasoned fighters from Iraq, Syria, and parts of Libya have, in recent months, been moved into Afghanistan. This, in fact, is one of the major challenges facing the current rulers of Afghanistan.” Yet, from that time until now, the accuracy of Abdollahian’s claim has never been substantiated. Two years later, Iravani has essentially revived the same concern.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
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