After two rounds of tense and exhaustive negotiations in Istanbul, Pakistan and the Taliban failed to sign an agreement to extend the ceasefire or end hostilities, the Taliban claim that Pakistan has presented excessive and unrealistic demands and refuses to back down, precisely the same accusation Islamabad levels against them. So far, the mediating countries, Qatar and Turkey, have made no official statements regarding the breakdown of talks or their causes. The question now is: what happens next? The following scenarios outline the potential paths forward.
Scenario One
In this scenario, the Taliban will attempt to restrain Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) without providing any written commitments. If TTP attacks do not cease entirely, they will at least decrease in frequency, and any future assaults will likely be calibrated to avoid inflicting serious or large-scale damage on Pakistan. Statements from Pakistani officials suggest that during the talks, the Taliban appeared willing to contain TTP but deliberately avoided offering a written guarantee. The reason is clear: a written commitment would amount to an official acknowledgment of the presence of foreign militants, including TTP, inside Afghanistan. Such an admission would effectively serve as a confession against themselves. If the Taliban were to sign such a document, it would confirm suspicions among other countries about the existence of terrorist networks operating from Afghan territory, compelling the Taliban to make separate written assurances to each nation. That, in turn, would push the Taliban into confrontation with multiple jihadist groups simultaneously, a scenario far more perilous than the current one. Thus, from the Taliban’s perspective, the middle ground is to offer a verbal pledge to contain TTP, an informal commitment designed merely to manage the current volatile situation temporarily. Nothing more.
Scenario Two
In this scenario, TTP will remain unrestrained, whether because the Taliban are unwilling or simply unable to control them, and will continue launching attacks inside Pakistan. In retaliation, Pakistan will target Afghan territory, prompting the Taliban to respond militarily. Sustained cross-border strikes could spiral into a full-scale conflict, comparable in scale to their previous clashes, or possibly even more intense. Amid such escalation, the possibility of U.S. intervention cannot be ruled out, ostensibly under the banner of “conflict resolution.” U.S. President Donald Trump could then proclaim that he has brought an end to yet another devastating war, this time between Pakistan and the Taliban. Following Trump’s entry into the equation, both sides would likely move toward signing a “settlement agreement,” as they share a particular affinity for Trump and would be reluctant to disregard his demands. Such an accord would enhance Trump’s international standing, making it a plausible outcome. For the Taliban, U.S. involvement would also be politically intoxicating, a return to the global stage under the banner of negotiation rather than isolation. And once again, Qatar and Turkey, not Washington, would host the ensuing rounds of talks.
Scenario Three
In this scenario, before the situation spirals out of control, Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s neighboring countries, particularly China, Russia, and Iran, will likely step in. Although China has previously attempted mediation without success, it remains uncertain whether it could achieve better results this time. The reality is that these three powers, along with the Central Asian republics, do not want Afghanistan and Pakistan to become trapped in a prolonged conflict. For the sake of their own security and economic interests, they prefer to see the crisis resolved. Moreover, for China, Iran, and Russia, resolving the conflict holds additional significance: demonstrating the failure of the United States’ NATO and non-NATO allies, namely, Turkey and Qatar. Suppose America’s regional rivals can prevent Pakistan and the Taliban from entering a full-scale war. In that case, they will focus more on advancing regional initiatives, which would in turn marginalize Western influence, particularly that of the U.S., in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and beyond. Even more important are the statements made by Zabihullah Mujahid, the Taliban’s spokesperson, who claimed that Pakistan is creating insecurity in Afghanistan to pave the way for the United States’ return to the Bagram Air Base. He did not specify whether Pakistan is acting independently or under American direction. Mujahid, after acknowledging the deadlock in the Istanbul talks, further alleged that Pakistan is implementing the projects of major powers, which, according to him, are designed to “destabilize the region.” By “major powers,” Mujahid was clearly referring to the United States, which he believes has turned Pakistan into its captive. Mujahid admitted that the Taliban would share this issue with regional countries. If Mujahid’s claims are true, regional states, especially America’s rivals, would have no choice but to intervene, aiming to end the conflict in a manner that excludes Western participation and, as Mujahid puts it, to dissuade Pakistan from aligning with the U.S. in efforts to destabilize the region.
Scenario Four
In this scenario, which appears less likely, both Pakistan and the Taliban reject all peace initiatives, whether regional or international, and choose instead to engage in a costly, prolonged, and exhausting war. The outcome of such a war is predictable: the Taliban’s defeat. Once they lose the battlefield, there will be no need for mediation; they will have to sign a peace agreement, more accurately, a surrender document, that includes a written commitment to contain Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The reality is that the Taliban lack the capacity to sustain a full-scale war with Pakistan. Their idealistic and seemingly patriotic rhetoric cannot substitute for the ability to wage war against a state equipped with modern military technology. Furthermore, the Taliban’s poor domestic performance has left them without the social or political capital to mobilize either public support or a credible war front through such slogans.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
