Since gaining independence from Great Britain, India has presented itself as one of the world’s largest and most vibrant democracies. For decades, Indians have proudly claimed that their nation stands as a bastion of freedom and democracy against China’s authoritarianism and Pakistan’s militarism. Yet, New Delhi’s recent engagement with the Taliban has cast deep doubt on that image, revealing contradictions sharper than ever before. The official reception of Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Taliban’s foreign minister, by India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar at a level equivalent to a legitimate state representative marks a profound moral and strategic decline for the world’s largest democracy. This comes even though Muttaqi remains on the United Nations sanctions list and is widely known as a figure associated with terrorism.
This move coincided with two other significant developments that underscore its importance. First, Pakistan’s airstrike on Kabul targeting Noor Wali Mehsud, leader of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP); and second, New Delhi’s announcement that it would upgrade its diplomatic mission in Kabul to the level of an embassy. Together, these events suggest that as relations between New Delhi and Kabul improve, Afghanistan is once again becoming a focal point for regional intelligence and geopolitical rivalry, a stage India appears intent on exploiting to its advantage and to Pakistan’s detriment.
The key question, however, is this: how can the world’s largest democracy choose to legitimize a group that, over the past four years, has presided over one of the darkest chapters in Afghanistan’s history? The Taliban have not only barred women from education and employment but have also silenced the media, abducted, tortured, and killed political opponents, and engaged in widespread, systematic violations of the fundamental human rights of the Afghan people. Even more paradoxical is the fact that India itself, a long-time victim of terrorism, is now aligning with a group that has an open record of supporting terrorist networks. The Taliban continues to host dozens of regional and global militant organizations, including the TTP, al-Qaeda, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Ansarullah, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Given this context, India’s engagement with the Taliban defies both political logic and any notion of strategic realism. This growing warmth between New Delhi and Kabul can only be described as a moral and political contradiction, a strategic lapse disguised as pragmatism.
It is no secret that Amir Khan Muttaqi has deep ties with Pakistan’s military and intelligence establishment. There is little doubt that upon his return from New Delhi, he will share every detail of his discussions with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). In effect, by hosting Muttaqi, India has handed over elements of its diplomatic calculations directly to the very institution that has posed one of the greatest national security threats to India for decades. By investing in a group that remains Pakistan’s most significant proxy in the region, India is making a grave miscalculation. For a country that sees itself as an emerging global power, such a move represents nothing less than strategic naïveté.
While the meeting between Amir Khan Muttaqi and India’s decision to upgrade its diplomatic mission in Kabul to an embassy represents the official face of India–Taliban relations, the informal dimensions of this engagement must not be overlooked. Unofficial yet credible sources indicate that over the past three years, several Taliban members have received medical treatment in Indian hospitals, a sign of trust and practical cooperation between the two sides that extends well beyond public diplomacy.
Moreover, there are serious allegations that India, through its new allies in Kabul, including Mullah Yaqoob, the Taliban regime’s defense minister and the son of the group’s founder, has indirectly supported Pakistani Taliban (TTP) fighters and Baloch separatist groups. Islamabad has repeatedly leveled such accusations, and many regional security analysts have taken them seriously. The Long War Journal, in a 2025 report, noted that Pakistan has even sought to link certain TTP attacks to alleged Indian involvement. While such claims may partly reflect propaganda wars, the underlying reality is that New Delhi has been seeking new levers of pressure against Islamabad, and using the Taliban as one of those tools cannot be entirely ruled out.
At the center of these covert relations stands Mullah Yaqoob, the Taliban’s defense minister and son of Mullah Omar. He is arguably the Taliban leader most closely aligned with India, both officially and unofficially. Yaqoob seeks independence from Pakistan’s influence, and India’s backing could strengthen his position within the Taliban’s internal power structure. Some reports suggest that several Taliban members treated in Indian hospitals were directly linked to networks close to Yaqoob, evidence not only of his deep personal ties with New Delhi but also of India’s strategic investment in a specific faction within the Taliban.
The Kandahari faction of the Taliban, traditionally under Pakistan’s sway, has also sought to diversify its external relations to boost its bargaining power and reduce dependence on Islamabad. Its growing proximity to India is part of this shift. Yet such a development is likely to deepen internal divisions within the Taliban, fuel instability, and further entrench proxy conflicts inside Afghanistan.
India claims that its policy toward the Taliban is guided by “realism.” But realism only holds value when it aligns long-term strategic interests with democratic principles, economic development, and security concerns. The Taliban, however, are neither a reliable partner nor a regime capable of sustaining lasting stability. They remain structurally tied to Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus, meaning that any collaboration between New Delhi and Kabul will, sooner or later, serve Islamabad’s interests. In effect, India risks falling into the same trap that Pakistan now finds itself in: investing in an extremist movement that has brought nothing but chaos, insecurity, and instability, and that continues to target Pakistani soldiers and civilians, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, on an almost daily basis.
The consequences for New Delhi are clear. Regionally, Pakistan will grow more distrustful and hostile, border tensions and proxy attacks will likely intensify, and other regional powers, Iran, Russia, and China, will view India as a state willing to sacrifice its principles for short-term gains. Internationally, a country that has long sought to present itself as a defender of democracy against authoritarianism now finds itself aligning with a regime notorious for systemic human rights abuses against the Afghan people.
Ultimately, India’s formal reception of Amir Khan Muttaqi and the upgrading of its Kabul office to an embassy, coupled with covert ties to Mullah Yaqoob and allegations of indirect support for the Pakistani Taliban and Baloch groups, signify nothing less than a strategic and moral collapse of the world’s largest democracy. Today, India is legitimizing a regime that not only suppresses fundamental freedoms in Afghanistan but also maintains deep operational links with Pakistan’s military and intelligence networks while hosting dozens of regional and global terrorist organizations.
This policy stands in stark contradiction to India’s self-portrayal as a beacon of democracy and will, sooner or later, erode its regional and international standing.
History will remember that the world’s largest democracy, instead of standing with the Afghan people and defending freedom, chose to embrace the very terrorists whose hands are stained with the blood of thousands of innocents. This choice is not a show of strength but of weakness and confusion, and if it continues, it will leave an indelible stain on India’s moral and diplomatic reputation in the international order.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
هند و طالبان؛ سقوط استراتژیک و اخلاقی بزرگترین دموکراسی جهان
