The visit of a senior Indian diplomat to Kabul and his meeting with Taliban officials—described by Indian media as a “significant development”—has reignited discussions about New Delhi’s role in Afghanistan’s politics. Although India did not sever all relations with the Taliban upon their rise to power, it has kept them at a level that can hardly be described as ideal. With the fall of the Afghan republic, the general perception was that India had lost the game in favor of Pakistan. This perception didn’t seem entirely unrealistic in the early days of the Taliban’s rule. Pakistan’s ISI openly acted as a power broker, resolving the deadlock in the Taliban’s cabinet formation, allowing the Pakistani military to flaunt its influence over India more than ever. But as time passed, it became clear that Islamabad had viewed the situation overly optimistically. The belief that Pakistan’s military had won both the political and military game in Afghanistan proved mistaken, as New Delhi was unlikely to easily abandon the scene. Gradually, Taliban officials openly expressed their desire to improve relations with India, and India’s embassy in Kabul resumed its operations.
India’s renewed diplomatic presence in Afghanistan coincided with growing tensions between the Taliban and the Pakistani government. Islamabad, which celebrated the republic’s fall with much enthusiasm, expected the newly established regime in Kabul to function as a proxy, executing only the roles designated by Rawalpindi. However, the Taliban have largely shown in practice that this expectation is unfounded and should not be taken seriously. By giving unreserved support to their “Pakistani brothers” (TTP), the Taliban signaled that they would not dance to Islamabad’s tune as they had in the past. While it initially appeared that India had ceded Afghanistan’s political arena to Pakistan, it became evident that New Delhi would seize this opportunity and might even welcome the Pakistani military’s deepening entanglement in its self-made quagmire. Supporting the Taliban regime, already in strained relations with the Pakistani government, could be one way to further mire Islamabad in the Afghan quagmire. As Pakistan’s steadfast rival, New Delhi would not let this opportunity slip away and would spare no effort to weaken Pakistan’s military establishment—which has maintained an adversarial stance towards India since Pakistan’s founding in 1947. This dynamic is inseparable from any geopolitical rivalry, and it would be naive to overlook its decisive role in mainstream global politics.
India and Pakistan’s rivalry on Afghan soil has always been active, sometimes to Pakistan’s advantage and sometimes to India’s. New Delhi has consistently supported governments, while Pakistan has often backed proxy terrorist groups. Pakistan’s military supported jihadi factions during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan—while India supported the Soviet-aligned government—and later fully supported the Taliban against US-led foreign forces and the Afghan government. Islamabad’s backing of proxies has brought short-term gains but has also incurred long-term losses that far outweigh any benefits. Pakistan’s military backed the Taliban for two decades, hoping to secure “strategic depth” in Afghanistan. However, despite the initial optimism following former ISI Chief Faiz Hameed’s visit to Kabul and that iconic photo at the Serena Hotel, the Taliban regime’s continued support for the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) and their disregard for Islamabad’s repeated demands to suppress this group has underscored the disastrous consequences of supporting terrorist proxies for Pakistan.
Today, Pakistan’s military is paying the price for its support of terrorist groups like the Taliban. India, by contrast, has sided with legitimate Afghan governments. Even if this approach has not yielded substantial short-term gains for India, it has granted it considerable long-term goodwill among Afghans. India’s provision of educational opportunities, funding for development projects, and support for Afghan government security forces has led to lasting impact and influence, far more sustainable than arming and funding terrorist groups. Pakistan’s support for terrorist groups has backfired, creating threats and terror that are more deadly and costly than India’s developmental activities in Afghanistan. As a result, New Delhi often has a greater chance of success in political maneuvers, while Islamabad’s influence is fleeting and short-lived.
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