The simultaneous presence of Taliban and anti-Taliban delegations at the funeral ceremony of the Islamic Republic’s leader created one of the most distinctive political scenes in Afghanistan over the past nearly five years. The funeral ceremony will end sooner or later, but the question that remains unanswered carries far greater weight: will this unexpected event remain confined to that single scene, or will it also mark the beginning of a shift in how the Taliban’s opponents relate to regional governments, and specifically to the Islamic Republic?
Over the past nearly five years, Western and regional governments have followed one reality in dealing with Afghanistan: that political power rests exclusively with the Taliban, and engagement with the group is unavoidable. Of course, the Taliban’s opponents have occasionally held gatherings in certain countries themselves, or have been invited by various institutions, but in practice they have held no particular place in the diplomacy of regional governments. Now, the simultaneous invitation extended to a Taliban delegation, and figures such as Ahmad Massoud and Mohammad Mohaqiq have, at the very least, moved the Taliban’s opponents out of a position of complete marginalization. Yes, it cannot yet be said that the Islamic Republic is seeking to support the Taliban’s opponents, but it can be said that, for the first time since the Taliban’s return to power, the assumption that Afghanistan can only be discussed through a single address has been called into question. Indeed, the mere coincidence of presence at the funeral ceremony is not, in itself, a serious challenge to the Taliban regime, but it carries a message: that the complete removal of the opposition from regional calculations may not be as settled a matter as it has been assumed to be in recent years.
If this reading is correct, its implications could extend well beyond Iran, in the sense that other countries as well might conclude that maintaining a relationship with the Taliban does not necessarily mean disregarding the group’s opponents. In that case, inviting opposition figures to meetings, conferences, and other official occasions would no longer be seen as an unusual move. Should such a trend take shape, it would, to some extent,t reduce the political isolation of the opposition, even if it does not amount to formal support for them.
At the same time, this development could also push relations within the Taliban opposition itself into a new phase. For nearly the past five years, they have been caught up in internal disputes more than in rivalry with the Taliban. Now, if the door of certain regional countries reopens to part of this opposition, the question of who truly represents Afghanistan’s opposition will resurface. Will all factions have a share in this process, or will only a few well-known figures emerge as the main players? The experience of past years has shown that rivalry over representation has, at times, worn down the opposition more than its rivalry with the Taliban has. If the trip to Tehran results in Massoud and Mohaqiq receiving greater attention from regional governments, other opposition figures may come to feel excluded from the equation, a feeling that could affect the cohesion of the opposition.
On the other hand, the presence of Taliban opponents in Tehran could also break a long-standing taboo: avoiding closeness with the Islamic Republic and Pakistan. In the prevailing view among Taliban opponents, closeness to neighboring countries, particularly Iran and Pakistan, has for more than twenty years been treated with particular sensitivity. Some regard any relationship with these countries as a sign of “dependency” or even “servitude,” whereas the same level of engagement with Western countries is usually welcomed as a “diplomatic success.” The presence of Massoud and Mohaqiq in Tehran inevitably challenged this double standard. It remains to be seen whether the presence of these two figures in Tehran marks the beginning of a more realistic approach by the opposition toward regional diplomacy, or whether it is merely an exception that will once again reproduce the same old sensitivities.
Another variable that should not be overlooked is the future of relations between Iran and the United States. If tensions between Tehran and Washington continue, some of the Taliban’s opponents may continue to avoid closeness with Iran to preserve their standing with the West. But if the two countries move toward reducing tensions, these calculations will change as well. In that case, engagement with Tehran would no longer necessarily mean distancing from the West, and opponents could accept invitations from regional countries with greater freedom of action, without worrying that every foreign trip would associate them with a particular political axis.
But the central question remains unanswered: was this invitation merely a one-off consideration, or should it be seen as a sign of a new Iranian approach toward the Taliban’s opponents? The answer to this question lies not in the photographs of the funeral ceremony, but in the behavior of Iran, the Taliban, and the Taliban’s opponents in the months ahead. If the Islamic Republic’s engagement with the Taliban’s opponents continues, then one could speak of the beginning of a new process. But if everything remains confined to that single moment of presence at the funeral ceremony, then what should be discussed is not a process but an exception. And if it is an exception, the Taliban will remain the Islamic Republic’s principal partner, and the Taliban’s opponents will return to the position they held before the funeral ceremony.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
حضور مخالفان طالبان در تهران؛ آغاز یک روند یا فقط یک استثنا؟
