The Taliban and the Doha Agreement were merely excuses for the downfall of a political order that was already shaky, unstable, riddled with corruption, and plagued by negative rivalries. The fundamental principles and values of the Republic, under the leadership of Mr. Ghani and his partners, had internally collapsed over seven years of division, corruption, and arbitrary rule. Today, due to the tribal and regressive tyranny of the Taliban, that period is gradually being perceived by the public as a “white spot,” with the atrocities of the Taliban’s tribal regime making it easier to forget. However, even without the Taliban, the fragile structure of the Republic would not have survived without the presence of the Americans. In recent years, all that remained of that regime was a weak skeleton, dependent on the political and military presence of the Americans and NATO members. Disputes and corruption ultimately led to the collapse. Sometimes, the threat of the Taliban would prompt renewed efforts to interact under the fragile umbrella of the Republic. If the Republic had truly had national standing and popular legitimacy and enjoyed strong public support, the Doha Agreement between the Americans and the Taliban would never have caused its collapse, and the regime would not have shamefully fallen into the hands of a reactionary and oppressive group that the people had bitter memories of, within two weeks before the final departure of the Americans. For this reason, I believe that corruption and political disputes were the main factors in the collapse, reducing the inclusiveness and legitimacy of the government and eliminating the value-based distance between the Taliban and the Republic.
- Widespread Corruption and the Sale of Government Positions
The government leadership had auctioned off government positions. Government positions and ranks had a price. The cost of becoming a governor ranged from $500,000 to $1 million. Command positions in provincial security, mayoralties, and revenue-generating departments were also sold for large sums. Meanwhile, the prices of some other positions and departments were covered by political and electoral coalitions.
Parliamentary seats were rarely based on the people’s vote and were mostly allocated through widespread corruption and large sums of money in the election commissions. Although political and financial corruption has always been a part of Afghan governments, in recent years, corruption in the Republic has become so blatant and widespread that the social shame associated with accepting bribes and plundering public property has completely disappeared.
The roots of corruption were extensive at various levels; from the lowest levels to the presidency, everyone was involved in corruption to varying degrees. Major anti-corruption judicial cases were closed with large sums of money and political deals. Audits and high-level committees pressured the corrupt to distribute the plundered money, with corruption management reaching up to the presidential level. As a result, there was no real government, but rather a political coalition resembling a government, with an approach focused on the division of spoils.
- Political Disputes and Failures
There were significant political tensions and disputes on two main levels. First, between Ghani’s team and his non-Pashtun rivals, who were either government partners or part of the political opposition. In this realm, traditional northern leaders were regarded as worse than the Taliban by Ashraf Ghani and his team.
The second level involved intra-ethnic rivalries, where all parties were engaged in negative competition for their ethnic leadership and personal grudges, often being more hostile to each other than to the Taliban. For instance, the Ministry of Defense remained without a war minister for two months due to factional and leadership disputes among the Panjsher leaders. Ismail Khan’s resistance was largely ignored due to intra-ethnic rivalries. Marshal Dostum’s traditional stronghold in Jowzjan province was not supported. Badakhshan, Balkh, and other northern provinces were caught in major political conspiracies, which were not intended to become bargaining chips for future political negotiations. On the other hand, intra-ethnic vendettas within and outside the government had intensified. Even Arbaki commanders were paid to abandon areas in favor of the Taliban, to discredit political leaders and force them to surrender to the government peace process.
In this context, Ashraf Ghani was not alone; others, driven by intra-ethnic rivalries, were even more “Ghani-like” than Ghani himself.
I have more details on these matters in my memoirs, which I will address at another opportunity. Therefore, it is not entirely fair to blame Ashraf Ghani solely for the situation; his position was quite clear: either everyone would sacrifice and fight for his full leadership, or they would surrender to Mullah Hibatullah.
In this choice, there was no third way to independently counter the Taliban, because intra-ethnic disputes, government policies, American policies, and the lack of independence and political self-determination among political leaders over the past twenty years had completely closed off that path.
- The Failure of the Peace Process
There is no doubt that the Doha Agreement boosted the Taliban’s confidence, and more than 6,000 fresh and dangerous prisoners of the group were released from government prisons. However, on the other hand, the Taliban never imagined that they would once again dominate the entire geography of Afghanistan. For this reason, they were negotiating for maximum bargaining power, not absolute power; because for them, the return of the Emirate was a matter of prestige and value, and they wanted the pinnacle of power with the position of Amir al-Mu’minin. However, the Taliban’s opposition was seeking 50/50 participation in a transitional government and then agreement on an elected political order for the future. In this context, Ashraf Ghani and his associates, who saw no place for themselves in a reconciled government, severely limited the possibilities of political reconciliation and popular mobilization against the Taliban, and the government, until its final days, refused to provide military support to the Taliban’s traditional opponents. Meanwhile, the American policy also ruled out a return to the 1990s era and the division of Afghanistan between the Taliban and the anti-Taliban resistance.
The Americans were inclined to transfer Pashtun leadership from Ashraf Ghani to the Taliban supreme leader with relative participation from other ethnic groups, and to provide political legitimacy for the Taliban-Northern Alliance coalition government in line with the Doha Agreement; since they had already dealt with the Taliban at the top of the political system, and the content of the Doha Agreement with the Taliban conveyed the same message.
Conclusion
In the final weeks, when Ashraf Ghani and his associates realized that there was no room for negotiation to stay in power and continue the government, they sabotaged both the war process outside of Ghani’s leadership in the resistance front and the relative peace process between the Taliban and their opponents. By doing so, they punished their non-aligned political rivals on one hand, and on the other hand, disrupted the process of political power transfer and the legitimacy of the Taliban’s future rule.
Overall, the outcome was that all sides lost. Ashraf Ghani and his associates accepted the condemnation of history with tribal stubbornness and personal grudges, his political opponents also lost the people and the future, and the Taliban lost governance and the legitimacy of the process. Meanwhile, the Afghan people, as always, were crushed by the disintegration and rupture of the political system and the situation. They lost their land, freedom, and hope for the future, and today the people are refugees and displaced both within and outside their homeland.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
اصول و ارزشهای جمهوری پیش از فروپاشی سقوط کرده بود | روزنامه ۸صبح
