When the Americans signed the Doha Agreement with the Taliban, one of the provisions was that the Taliban would not allow terrorist groups to use Afghan soil against U.S. interests worldwide. The Americans feared that if the Taliban returned to power, the scenario of the 1990s could repeat itself, with the group hosting al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, thereby creating new problems for the U.S. and questioning the motivation behind the Western-led invasion of Afghanistan. The invasion was purportedly carried out to retaliate against al-Qaeda for orchestrating the September 11 attacks in the U.S., and if al-Qaeda and similar groups re-established themselves in the country, it would negate all the efforts and costs borne by the West in the Afghan war. However, following the killing of Ayman al-Zawahiri in his residence in Sherpur, Kabul, by a U.S. drone, it became clear that the Taliban’s ties to al-Qaeda were more entrenched than previously thought. With the Taliban’s return, al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups are working to strengthen their presence in Afghanistan and are likely preparing to organize military operations worldwide.
Recently, two major reports have been published regarding the resurgence of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. One is from the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, and the other is from the U.N. Sanctions Monitoring Committee on the Taliban. Both reports share a common finding: al-Qaeda is regaining strength in Afghanistan, with its senior commanders present in the country, even though the Taliban are trying to prevent their presence from becoming public. According to these reports, al-Qaeda is making continuous efforts to reorganize its ranks and establish training camps in several Afghan provinces. The reports specify that not only al-Qaeda but also similar groups are present in the country and consider Taliban leaders to be close allies. The U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee report states that the Taliban are striving to fully meet the needs of al-Qaeda members by providing them with wives, homes, and weapons.
A question that has occupied observers’ minds is why, despite undeniable evidence of a powerful al-Qaeda presence and other affiliates in Afghanistan—including the presence of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the then-leader of al-Qaeda, in central Kabul, which led to his death—the U.S. continues to engage with the Taliban, sending them money every week, and does not exert significant pressure on them to prevent terrorist groups from operating in Afghan soil. Do they view al-Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan as controlled and thus not a threat to the U.S., or are there other scenarios in mind?
One analysis suggests that given the developments in the Russia-Ukraine war, Western powers, especially the U.S., may be seeking to exploit al-Qaeda and other Central Asian militant groups to undermine Russian interests. After the September 11 attacks, the U.S. significantly weakened al-Qaeda and eliminated many of its senior leaders, but it either did not want or could not deliver a blow that would deprive al-Qaeda of its ability to reorganize. Considering that al-Qaeda and similar groups were key allies of the U.S. during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, forming an unofficial alliance against “atheism,” it is not out of the question for such an arrangement to occur again. It is clear that in politics, there are no permanent friendships or enmities. The West has managed to contain Russia on the Ukrainian front, and if the confrontation between Russia and the West intensifies, the West may use extremist religious groups as leverage against Russia. Religious fundamentalist groups have demonstrated that despite their intense anti-Western rhetoric, they are willing to engage with and even serve Western interests at times. The current U.S. engagement with the Taliban could support this claim.
Alternatively, it can be analyzed that the U.S. is unwilling to manage long-term wars and, since the Afghan war dragged on, sought to exit with minimal loss. The Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other allied groups used American fatigue to achieve an agreement that ensured their reestablishment in Afghanistan. Currently, U.S. election debates are underway, with candidates from both the Democratic and Republican parties discussing Afghanistan and the manner of the U.S. withdrawal. The statements made by the two electoral rivals indicate that Americans were in a state of confusion and panic during their withdrawal from Afghanistan, not fully considering the consequences. It is said that the Democrats’ foreign policy is based on initiating proxy wars in global hotspots, while Republicans prefer direct involvement in large wars and sudden exits when goals are met or the administration fails to achieve its objectives. Both the hasty U.S. exit from Afghanistan and the possibility that the Taliban might act as a proxy group for the U.S. can be analyzed within this framework. The reality is that contrary to the rhetoric of both parties against each other, both had a role in the hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan. Trump signed the agreement with the Taliban, and Biden implemented its terms.
Weak countries around the world are always at risk of becoming pawns in the hands of major powers. Poor countries lacking military capabilities rely on assistance from great powers for their survival and must consider the opinions of these donor countries in their policies due to the challenges they face without external aid. Thus, small countries often become embroiled in proxy wars and always fall victim to the games of the powerful unless a transformative event occurs to lift them out of poverty and weakness and elevate them among the major nations. Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist groups cannot become major players. It is possible that for Western powers, engaging with a group lacking legitimacy is easier than dealing with a lawful and democratic government. Among Western politicians, there are those for whom human rights issues in Afghanistan are less important than managing the Afghan file with minimal hassle. Naturally, for these politicians, engaging with a group led by an old-fashioned cleric is easier than with a government where major decisions cannot be made by just one person.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
